x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ>  bbjbjVV .<<7^-5 MMMaaa8<a&NYYoooJJJI&K&K&K&K&K&K&$(*6o&MJJJJJo&MMoo&!!!JMoMoI&!JI&!!$]$o=ha:0)$5&&0&1$,*jt*]$*M]$JJ!JJJJJo&o&!JJJ&JJJJ*JJJJJJJJJ : The Intertwining of Culture and Nature: Boas, Dewey, and Deweyan Strands of American Anthropology Word Count: 3,490 (excluding abstract and footnotes) ABSTRACT In this paper we share our initial findings on the intellectual relationship between Boasian and Deweyan thought as a way of exploring the relationship between culture and nature. Our main argument is that John Dewey, influenced by Franz Boas and early American anthropology, made the first attempt to understand nature from an anthropological perspective. We shall first discuss how Boas helped develop the culture concept, which played a key role in the development of American cultural anthropology, while also addressing the conceptual role of nature in early anthropology. Then we explain Dewey on the relationship between culture and nature, arguing that his account of nature is essentially anthropological. Finally, in support our interpretation of Deweys anthropology of nature, we conclude by considering how Deweys anthropological philosophy served as an inspiration for Ruth Benedict and Leslie White, founders of two quite distinct anthropological traditions. I. Introduction Practitioners of anthropology and philosophy have been similarly concerned with understanding many aspects of human experience. Anthropologists study similarities and differences among humans across space and time, and philosophers tackle questions spanning a vast array of human affairs. Given that the limits of both disciplines roughly correspond with whatever the limits of human experience and imagination, it is somewhat surprising that there have not been more scholarly collaborations on the intersection of these methods of inquiry. After all, contemporary conversations have developed between influential figures in both disciplines. Historically, a quite striking association is that of Franz Boas and John Dewey, a relationship that remains largely unexplored. For about thirty-five years, Boas and Dewey were colleagues and intellectual and political allies at Columbia University, with Dewey arriving in 1904 and not fully retiring until 1939, and with Boas arriving in 1896. These icons of American anthropology and philosophy taught at least one seminar together. Their relationship lasted until Boas 1942 death at the University Faculty Club, in the arms of the famous French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss. Although anthropologist Hebert Lewis has shown Boas affinity with Deweys philosophy, biographer Alan Ryan doubts that any Deweyan strand can be traced in the empirical work of anthropologists trained by and following Boas. We disagree with Ryans assessment, for we believe that it is possible and worthwhile to trace the intellectual convergence of these two figures and their respective disciplinary worldviews in both directions, particularly a Deweyen strand in the work of anthropologists. In this paper we share our initial findings on the intellectual relationship between Boasian and Deweyan thought as a way of exploring the relationship between culture and nature. Our main argument is that Dewey, influenced by Boas and early American anthropology, made the first attempt to understand nature from an anthropological perspective. We shall first discuss how Boas helped develop the culture concept, which played a key role in the development of American cultural anthropology, while also addressing the conceptual role of nature in early anthropology. Then we explain Dewey on the relationship between culture and nature, arguing that his account of nature is essentially anthropological. Finally, in support our interpretation of Deweys anthropology of nature, we conclude by considering how Deweys anthropological philosophy served as an inspiration for Ruth Benedict and Leslie White, founders of two quite distinct anthropological traditions. II. Boas, Culture, and Nature Widely considered the father of American anthropology, Boas set the standards for ethnographic research in the field in the U.S. The theoretical contributions of Boas propelled anthropology away from the arm-chair theorizing of nineteenth-century evolutionist to a social science based on the collection of historical and ethnographic data of particular cultural groups. George Stocking, Jr. has explored Boas central role in the development of the modern relativistic notion of culture, and critical in this development is Boas move away from the use of culture in its singular to its plural form. Previously, in the cultural evolutionary theory of the nineteenth century, this term was treated as a virtue of progress or a quality that people had in lower or higher degrees. For examples: Europeans had culture, primitives did not; educated peoples had high culture, the laboring masses had low culture. However, in its plural form, the term means that all peoples made sense of their collective experiences. This is why Boas is such a significant transitional figure in the history of anthropology. This move means accounting for all of human experiences as cultural, leading Boas to an ethnological method that is historical and restricted to the study of one culture during long stretches of fieldwork. It was in such a way that one could account for the complexity and magnitude of cultural traits which could be uncovered in any one society. Boas did not publish a definition of culture until 1930. Yet for many years he had already worked with a consistent implicit definition as shown through the ways he employed the noun culture and the adjective cultural. There are two key elements to Boas developing theory of culture that are relevant to our discussion. First, he was keenly aware of the presence of individuals in cultural processes. For example, in his 1920 article The Methods of Ethnology, Boas describes the problem of understanding the individual-societal relationship as one of the most important ones to be taken up in a study of cultural changes. The particular in Boas historical particularism is not just an emphasis on the collective history of any given group, but it is also a contextualized understanding of how social environments both influence and are influenced by the individual. Boas was in fact concerned with the ability of individuals to continue or change cultural forms. This is particularly clear when considering the nature and importance of ethnographic fieldwork for Boas and his students. Ethnographic fieldwork was carried out with individuals in any given society. Thus it was close work with individualsand not abstractions of a collective of individualsthat was the methodological cornerstone of Boasian epistemology and early American anthropology. Secondly and contrary to the claims of several of Boas successors Boas was neither anti-scientific nor a-theoretical. Instead, throughout most of his early career, he was reacting and correcting the grand cultural evolutionary claims of his predecessors. What stands out in Boas early work is not a stance against science and evolution, but instead an emphasis on better science and rejection of a strict environmental determinism. Boas was, then, attempting a serious reworking of the very notion of the environment in which human cultures developed. In his 1896 The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology, Boas explains the almost universal occurrence of tribal divisions into clans that have totems as one that favors the psychical condition of man. Yet he also points out that it does not follow totemic society has developed everywhere in the same manner. So Boas recognizes the human condition as fundamentally collective and experiential, and this is important because it acknowledges psychic unity as an evolutionary condition of humanity. Yet he is not committed to an a priori acceptance of psychic unity precisely because the idea of culture as the essence of human experience was his starting point. We know that Boas was theoretically interested in explaining aspects of cultural conditions by understanding the biological basis of humanity, allowing the possibility of some degree of environmental and geographic determinism, and in understanding the historical development of cultures vis--vis individuals. That Boas mostly focused on the latter should not be surprising given his rejection of the abuse of biology by nineteenth century cultural evolutionists. One result of the cultural evolutionist-Boasian dialectic is the lack of a clear conceptualization of those non-human conditions or variables that helped shape cultures. First, when one reads the cultural evolutionists of the nineteenth century, such as Herbert Spencer, one finds an emphasis on Culture, in its singular form, which has humans moving away from nature. In that evolutionary scheme, humans especially Cultured and Western European humans stand apart from nature, and, moreover, the actual mechanisms through which humans interacted with nature in order to culturally evolve are not specified. Secondly, one could argue that anthropology was concerned with something close to nature, but not quite by name. Here we would have to consider early anthropological notions of environment and geography as being synonymous with nature. We believe this to be an interesting possibility that needs further investigation. However, as we saw in Boas statement about totems and psychic unity, one of the driving concepts in the development of modern social science, including anthropology, was the psychic unity of humans. Early social scientists did not envision this psychic unity as an extension of nature, which is why environment and geography were often casted as variables in shaping the human condition. We might then conclude that anthropology did not truly address the question of nature in relation to culture or the totality of human experience, and thus we turn to Deweys account of the relationship between culture and nature. III. Dewey on Culture and Nature Viewing humans as in and a part of nature as opposed to something independent of it, Dewey recognized that we are completely natural products of completely natural processes. Indeed, it seems that most if not all of human activities involve some form of interaction of humans and some other part or parts of the natural environment. Thus humans are to be studied as naturally occurring and developing phenomena, and so the proper approach to the study of humanity is an evolutionary perspective. Not surprisingly, it is in Deweys Experience and Nature (1925) that we find arguably the clearest statement of this naturalistic, organic take on the historical and anthropological conditions of human life. It is also worth recalling and continuing to bear in mind that late in life Dewey is on record, in a 1951 Re-Introduction to Experience and Nature, as wishing he had entitled the book Culture and Nature, substituting, of course, the term culture in place of the term experience. Despite both his careful attempts at explaining it and the centrality of this concept within his philosophical writings over many years, Dewey had come to think that many people had misunderstood his use of the term experience as something merely subjective and non-social. At any rate, his starting point is the primacy of experience or culture as a means of showing the realities of nature, that is, as a way of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature, as opposed to being some veil separating us from nature. This constitutes a challenge to the dualistic opposition of mind and nature established, at least in modernity, by Descartes. By experience (culture), Dewey means all of the qualified ways that the world arises through our involvement in and with it. In his Re-Introduction to Experience and Nature, he says that the term culture, as an anthropological construct, indicates the great variety of experienced things, and that such cultural facts include all of the attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions that decide the specific uses to which the material constituents of culture are put and which accordingly deserve, philosophically speaking, the name ideal Culture, then, denotes how and in what ways humans inhabit existence. It is a summary way of designating everything of human experience, from our intense ecstasies and suffering to more seemingly mundane avenues of life. As we shall see, this conception of culture is quite consistent with that of Boas. As for nature, Dewey treats it not as a thing, but as an affair of beginnings and endings, of which human beings are characterized as within and a part, not outside of and over against. Thus the human organism is not separated from evolutionary history, but is instead presented as its cutting edge, that is, as an active player in what comes to be. In this regard, Larry Hickman has explained that among the upshots of this approach ...is that the roots of technology, which in Deweys view includes the tools and methods of abstract thought as surely as it does tools and artifacts that are concrete and tangible, are located in evolutionary history and in the countless adjustment made over millions of years by plants and nonhuman animals. It is only with the advent of human life that nature comes to reflective consciousness. With that development, nature, we might say, comes to have a mind of its own. That is, for Dewey, mind emerges from nature. We start, then, to see an answer to the question of the relationship between culture and nature. It is in relation to this question that Dewey, in his early 1898 essay Evolution and Ethics, says that, unlike some other views, there is not any real conflict between humanity and the whole of the natural environment. Rather, he writes that humans control ...one part of the environment with reference to another part..., utilizing one aspect to modify another aspect. Dewey cites gardening as an example of how human activity, and thus culture, is one aspect of nature. In short, nature is not ontologically independent of culture, and, of course, likewise, neither is culture independent of nature. Rather, nature is a complex construction which has painstakingly and gradually evolved through various human inquiries over the course of vast expanses of history, inquires including, as Hickman says, the arts, religion, magic, hunting, manufacture, and experimental science, to recall just a few. So it is not that nature is constructed ex nihilo, but, rather, that the unrefined material of antecedent experience, unplanned events, random insights, habits, institutions, and tradition have over time been refined and reconstructed by tools including, but not limited to: religious ritual, works of philosophy (and anthropology!), scientific hypotheses, poems, novels, and films. We can thus speak, as Hickman does, of nature-as-culture (contrasted with nature-as-nature). As such, nature is never a completely finished product. Accordingly, a consequence of Deweys affirmation of the nature/culture whole is that nature too is subject to continual reconstruction and re-evaluation in order to bring about adjustment to mutating conditions. We can say, then, that culture is one of the ways by which nature transacts business with itself. In any intelligent activity, such as the practice of intelligent gardening, each one part of the environment is modified with respect to the other part of the environment. Accordingly, deliberation and intelligent management enter into the history of evolutionary development. So, Dewey undercuts the ground for a dualism of culture and nature. For example, he rejects the assumptions of the so-called Nature vs. Nurture debates as involving a false dichotomy. Such anti-dualism is quite consistent with the Darwinian context in which Dewey lived and which he himself emphasized. The bifurcation of culture versus nature is left behind as a facile construction of modernity, with culture being thoroughly natural. This means that Deweys account meshes with and indeed assumes a pluralism of cultural conceptions, for Deweyan naturalism embraces anthropology. Now at this point we are still left with a question of how communication occurs among the aspects of the natural environment. What is the language, so to speak, of the cultural-evolutionary process of one part of the environment being modified with respect to another part of the environment? The fifth chapter of Experience and Nature constitutes the beginning of an answer to this question. Dewey, in one of his more poignant moments, describes communication as the most wonderful of affairs. In discussion crucial to his evolutionary naturalism, Dewey writes that Where communication exists, things in acquiring meaning, thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates which are indefinitely more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating, than events in their first estate. Communication is a transaction of nature identified with humans those beings by which nature exhibits the emergence of self-reflective intelligence. Such transactional intelligence makes naturally occurring experiences more meaningful by relating them to other naturally occurring experiences, and this involves careful attention to lived moments of experience so that their shared characteristics can be rendered explicit. As Hickman puts it, for Dewey, Communication is a multiplier. As such, it is more than simply providing expression to that which already exists. We here note Deweys own definition of communication as the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. Such shared participation enlarges perception. Dewey explains that we become able to recognize unattained possibilities, to draw connections between events. He elaborates on this theme, saying that through communication, qualitative immediacy gives rise to contemplation and instruction, and pedagogy comes into existence. As Dewey further explains, Even the dumb pang of an ache achieves a significant existence when it can be designated and descanted upon, for it gains an importance beyond its merely oppressive aspect. It attains a new level of meaningful existence. Drawing on Thomas Alexander, let us suggest a brief clue to the significance of this statement. If, for example, you are holding the hand of your terminally ill parent or close friend, there is one sense in which we might call such situations simply events, to use an earlier term from Dewey. Yet such occurrences are indeed much more than mere events. My holding the hand of my parent or friend is no mere biological event of just one hand holding another. There is a greater significance of meaning, for it is a shared experience. It is participated in by others as opposed to a solitary endeavor, and this is because of communication, which makes the present more meaningful. At any rate, for Dewey, none of this happens outside of or somehow independent of nature. It is all perfectly natural and simultaneously cultural. However, Dewey relies on a fundamentally anthropological notion of culture to develop his ideas about nature. So we propose the following alternative reading of Dewey in relation to Boas and American Anthropology: Dewey made the first attempt to understand nature from an anthropological perspective. In Deweys conceptualization, there is a unity or singularity between humans and nature not explicitly stated by Boas, and fundamental to Deweys eloquent articulation is his theory of communication. IV. Two Deweyan Strands of American Anthropology That Dewey was embarking on an anthropology of nature helps to explain why he was so influential in the psychological anthropology and cultural ecology of anthropologists after Boas. Psychological anthropologists were concerned with psychological characteristics writ large, and cultural ecologists sought to study humans as integral parts of ecosystems. Put bluntly, the former were humanists, the latter were scientists, and although both groups took divergent paths in the anthropological theory and methods, both also demonstrate the culture-nature unity conceptualized by Dewey. Fully articulating how Dewey influenced the work of Boas-era anthropologists is part of our long-term research. For now, let us simply mention two anthropologists in particular: Ruth Benedict and Leslie White. We identify Benedict and White from the outset because they have both credited Dewey with influencing their work. Moreover, although Benedict was Boas student, White explicitly rejected Boasian anthropology. Ruth Benedict first gained international recognition with the publication of her 1934 book Patterns of Culture. Within Patterns of Culture and throughout her career, Benedict was concerned with the cohesiveness of cultural systems and the dominating strains in those systems. Those strains could be boiled down to psychological characteristics. More importantly, people in any given society have the ability, over the course of time, to choose the character of their culture. Benedicts emphasis on cohesiveness and choice is quite consistent with Deweys move to place humans within the realm of nature, and, in fact, Benedict once said to Sidney Ratner, a student and friend of Dewey, that an important source of inspiration for Patterns of Culture was Deweys Human Nature and Conduct (1922). We also find Benedicts emphasis on cultural choice to be consistent with Deweys ideas about communication, for if individuals can move against the grain of a collective psychology, then not only are they communicating with other parts of nature but they are also communicating with other parts of human nature. Yet if Benedict was inspired by the Deweys humanistic spirit, White made a science out of Deweys philosophy of culture and nature. White was instrumental in the development of an anthropological theory that viewed humans and their cultures as integral parts of ecosystems. Rather than taking a deterministic materialist view of the relationship between nature and culture, White sought to explain how cultures had differently developed according to environmental conditions and to stress the autonomy of culture as a unique force in natural history, a force with purpose and fueled by semiotics that controls other parts of ecosystems. It is suggestive that White is often viewed by historians of anthropology as a transitional figure between Boas and neo-evolutionist theory: let us remember that Boas was a transitional figure between evolutionism and what we might call culturalism. White, inspired by Dewey, redirected a generation of anthropologists from culture back to evolution. Significantly inspired by Dewey, the theoretical and neo-evolutionist turn in mid-twentieth century anthropology has had a long lasting effect. Anthropologists studying cultural and cross-cultural conceptualizations of the environment and nature still draw on Dewey precisely because he undermines the human / nature dichotomy. Furthermore, environmental anthropologists and cultural ecologists still remind their environmentalist colleagues of the importance of including humans in ecological equations. V. Conclusion By way of summary, we can say that (1) Boas was instrumental in developing the culture concept in such a way that (2) allowed Dewey to probe human experience culturally; and (3) Dewey, in turn, developed an anthropological critique of nature that subsequently inspired a generation of anthropologists seeking holistic accounts of humans and their environment. These relationships are significant because they begin to historically and intellectually contextualize concepts still central to contemporary American philosophy and anthropology. Such theorizing of culture vis--vis nature remains incomplete, and so we hope that the uncovering of past collaborations will encourage similar future collaborations.  For example, Clifford Geertz engages Charles Taylors work in Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 6. Anthropologist Keith H. Basso and Edward S. Casey have also collaborated in phenomenological approaches to questions of space and place; see Sense of Place (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1996).  Corliss Lamont (ed.), Dialogue on Dewey (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), p. 56.  There were still other icons of anthropology present for this dramatic Columbia death scene, namely Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Ralph Linton. See, e.g., Patrick Wilckens Claude Levi-Strauss: The Poet in the Laboratory (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), p. 139.  Lewis says: It is impossible to trace the details of this convergence of perspectives here [in Lewis article], but it is clear that Boas and his American contemporaries were exposed to the same general intellectual trends at the time. Also: There were more direct links between Boas and the pragmatists, but the extent of their direct mutual influence is still unclear. -Herbert S. Lewis, Boas, Darwin, Science, and Anthropology in Current Anthropology Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 2001), p. 384. As for Ryan, the specific statement of his with which we take issue is this: I doubt the possibility of tracing in any detail a Deweyan strand in their empirical work, but I do not doubt that his ideas genuinely reinforced the confidence with which they held their own views. (emphasis ours) Among others, it is clear that Ryan has Ruth Benedict in mind. -John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W W Norton & Company, 1995), p. 167.  George W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 195-233.  Boas emphasized the historical development of different cultures, but this did not mean that he thought that all cultures were equally civilized. In the study of primitive cultures, Boas did not have much to say about such attainments of civilization. However, in some of his scholarship and records of his political activism, it is clear that Boas believed that the different attainments of civilization that existed between Whites and other immigrant and Black minorities were not racially based but where instead correctable through education and the political fight against racism.  Boas published his first definition in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, pp. 9, 147, 150-151: Culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individuals as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by those habits.  Franz Boas, Race, Language, and Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 235.  Lewis makes a compelling argument about Boas acceptance of Darwin in an unpublished lecture entitled The Relation of Darwin to Anthropology. Boas, Darwin, and Anthropology, p. 387.  Race, Language, and Culture, pp. 273-274.  Ibid.  Yet such an approach is not a scientistic or reductionist naturalism. There is here no denial of meanings and values, but simply the recognition and appreciation that we are contextually situated within an environment on which our lives depend and which is also itself transformed through our activities. We recognize, of course, that there are a variety of philosophical naturalisms and point here to Kai Nielsens helpful taxonomy in his Naturalism and Religion (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), p. 136. Nielsen distinguishes between cosmological (worldview) naturalism, methodological naturalism, ethical naturalism, and scientistic naturalism. See also John Shooks Varieties of Twentieth Century American Naturalism in The Pluralist Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 1-17.  Shortly before his death, Dewey writes the following: Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle the book Culture and Nature and the treatment of specific subject-matters would be correspondingly modified. I would abandon the term experience because of my growing realization that the historical obstacles which prevented understanding of my use of experience are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable. I would substitute the term culture because with its meanings as now firmly established it can fully and freely carry my philosophy of experience. The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), vol. 1, p. 36I from Appendix I (Experience and Nature: A Re-Introduction).  The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 5.  Ibid. from Appendix I (Experience and Nature: A Re-Introduction). In addition to the term ideal, Dewey says that such uses (of the material constituents of culture) even deserve the name spiritual, if intelligibly used Ibid.  Thomas M. Alexander makes a very similar point in his Dewey, Dualism, and Naturalism. -See A Companion to Pragmatism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 189.  Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), p.  The Early Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), vol. 5, p. 37. This essay was originally published in the Monist, VIII (April 1898), pp. 321-341.  The Early Works of John Dewey, vol. 5, p. 37. The employment of the term control has, of course, become suspect for many due to imperialistic/patriarchal connotations. This is clearly not what Dewey had in mind. However, in order to avoid even the suggestion of such, we here use the term modify as a synonym for it (as Dewey sometimes does).  Ibid, p. 38.  Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism, p. 134.  Ibid, p. 135.  Deweys 1932 article on Human Nature (from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, a classic reference work to which both Dewey and Boas contributed) helps to underscore his general position. Here is a relevant excerpt: The supposition that there is such a thing as a purely native original contribution of man [sic] which can be distinguished from everything acquired and learned cannot be justified by appeal to the facts. It is a view which holds good only when a static cross section is taken; when, that is to say, growth is ignored. The theory takes, as it were, a snapshot of man [sic] at, for example, birth, ignoring past history in the uterus and future history when the supposedly fixed and ready made structures will change as they interact with surroundings. Biologically all growth is modification and all organs have to be treated and understood as developments out of something else and as pointing forward to still something else. The conception of a fixed and enumerable equipment of tendencies which constitutes human nature thus represents at the best but a convenient intellectual device, a bench mark useful for studying some particular period of development. Taking a long enough time span, it is fruitless to try to distinguish between the native and the acquired, the original and the derived. The acquired may moreover become so deeply ingrained as to be for all intents and purposes native, a fact recognized in the common saying that habit is second nature. And, on the other hand, taking a long biological evolution into account, that which is now given and original is the outcome of long processes of past growth. The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), vol. 6, pp. 31-32.  The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 132.  Ibid.  Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism, p. 146.  The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 141.  This is in large part why Deweys theory of communication is closely linked with his political philosophy.  The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, p. 143.  Ibid, p. 133.  Ibid. Shortly after this, Dewey adds the following: Anthropologists, philologists and psychologists have said most that has been said about saying. Nevertheless it is a fact of such distinction that its occurrence changed dumb creaturesas we so significantly call theminto thinking and knowing animals and created the realm of meanings. Speaking from the standpoint of anthropology Franz Boas says: The two outer traits in which the distinction between the minds of animals and man finds expression are the existence of organized articulate speech in man and the use of utensils of varied application. [The Mind of Primitive Man, p. 96] It is antecedently probable that sole external marks of difference are more than external; that they have intimate connection with such intrinsic differences as religion, art and science, industry and politicsat every point appliances and application, utensils and uses, are bound up with directions, suggestions and records made possible by speech; what has been said about the role of tools is subject to a condition supplied by language, the tool of tools. The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 1, pp. 133-134.  See Alexanders John Deweys Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 159. See also Alexanders The Human Eros in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture: Pragmatic Essays after Dewey, ed. John J. Stuhr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 203-222.  We note that this theory of communication is not articulated by Boas, although it is certainly quite consistent with his anthropology.  Thanks to Ann Clark for her helpful comments and suggestions on notes leading to the preceding section.  Leslie A. White, Energy and the evolution of culture American Anthropologist, 45: 335-356  In Patterns of Culture, Benedict contrasts the cultural psychological makeup of the Zuni, the Kwakiutl, and the Dobuans in order to demonstrate that psychological norms are culturally relative.  See The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 6, p. xvi. We refer here to Ratners footnote: Oral statement to Sidney Ratner by Ruth Benedict, ca. 1935. As biographer Lois W. Banner reports, Benedict had initially become familiar with Human Nature and Conduct (and we note Deweys subtitle An Introduction to Social Psychology of particular interest to a psychological anthropologist) at the time of its initial publication in 1922, when she was a graduate student studying with Boas; she presented a paper on Deweys book for anthropology professors and students (including the then undergraduate Margaret Mead) in a 1922 Columbia seminar. (It is unclear whether Boas was in attendance.) See Banners Intertwined Lives: Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Their Circle (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 181, 214. Furthermore, we note that, as an undergraduate, Benedict had in fact taken classes with Dewey at Columbia during the Fall of 1918 and the Spring of 1919 see, e.g., Margaret M. Caffreys Ruth Benedict: Stranger in This Land (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), p. 94.  For example, a key concern of our present collaboration is gauging how the political activism of Boas and Dewey might have influenced their mutual understanding of culture and nature. We know that both Dewey and Boas were public intellectuals (see Stephen J. Whitfield, Franz Boas: The Anthropologist as a Public Intellectual, Soc (2010) 47: 430-438.), but they differed in the manner in which their scholarship affected their politics. Boas, for example, spent considerable scholarly energy battling the dominant notions of scientific racism popular in his days.      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