x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ> uwt %tbjbj?? $]]T?<7777.000000e!V0]0_l7\..9xh* $0]!]! :   William James, Donna Haraway, and Vision: Finitude and the Optics of Knowledge Introduction The language of blindness and sightedness abounds in Western philosophy, providing a starting point for numerous canonical depictions of knowledge and becoming a focal point of criticism for much subsequent scholarship. While American pragmatists depart from the canonical optics of knowledge in many respects, William James, in his essays On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings and What Makes a Life Significant, returns to the metaphor of vision to construct a cautionary tale, advising us to bear in mind our blindness to the significance of others personal experience before succumbing to brash appraisals of their worth. While James never explicitly instructs us to seek sightedness in these essays, there are numerous moments where he seems to achieve something of the sort. Taking Jamess essay in this direction, the project becomes not only a call for caution regarding how our blindness affects our understanding of others, but also a suggestion that we should attempt a sightedness of others values. Unfortunately, this prescription is situated within a canon in which calls for vision have traditionally been extremely problematic. Sightedness in canonical philosophy has historically been conceptualized as a totalizing vision that sees its object, transparent to the seer, from no particular location. In the Western canon, there is no shortage of what has been termed epistemological arrogance, and despite various thinkers and lines of thought that emphasize pluralism, historically American pragmatism shares in this pathological neglect of women thinkers and womens voices. This is where the feminist epistemology of Donna Haraway makes for a fruitful and surprising counterpoint to Jamess discussion of blindness. Haraways epistemology strives to retain the powerful metaphor of vision while preventing us from falling into the traps associated with it. Comparing Jamess notion of blindness with Haraways vision, we find striking and unexpected similarities in their treatment of the metaphor of vision as knowledge. In this essay, after laying out Jamess conception of blindness, I will contextualize Haraways attempts to salvage the metaphor of vision, both within Western philosophy broadly and within the more specific context of feminist critiques of science. Having contextualized Haraways project of vision in its emergence within a radically distinct tradition than American pragmatism, I will then explore Haraways sightedness and how it makes explicit the situatedness of all vantage points, showing us the humble nature of vision. Lastly, examining Haraway and James side by side, we find two approaches to epistemology that share a starting point of finitude. Comparing these two thinkers offers us an epistemology of finitude that differs from traditional epistemological discussions in two significant respects, and with a surprising upshot. First, over and against a more traditional conception of epistemology in which objectivity is understood as a view from nowhere, James and Haraway offer us a way to hold on to discussions of reality while maintaining a keen awareness of the limits of our vision. Second, I suggest that beyond claims about the forms and limits of knowledge, James and Haraway are both offering ontological claims about what it means to inhabit the world as a finite seer. Finally, and for our purposes most importantly, this comparison should serve to illustrate that William James, despite the explicitly sexist threads uncovered in his work by scholars such as Charlene Haddock Seigfried, does have resources to contribute to discussions of feminist epistemology and intersubjectivity. James, Blindness, and Inner Significance James begins On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings by a discussion of feelings. Feelings, James tells us, vitally inform our judgments of things. If this sounds trivially true, it is so only before examining the relation between feelings and blindness. Explicating the role of feelings in thought, James tells us: Where we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the idea we frame of it, this is only because the idea is itself associated already with a feeling. If we were radically feelingless, and if our ideas were the only things our mind could entertain, we should lose all our likes and dislikes at a stroke, and be unable to point to any one situation or experience in life more valuable or significant than any other. In order to grant value or priority to any project, we must be able to contextualize it with feelings. With regard to others projects, our blindness is constituted by the fact that the inward significance of someones experience for them is not manifestly apparent to us. On Jamess view, [t]he subject judged knows a part of the world of reality which the judging spectator fails to see, knows more while the spectator knows less The difficulty in noticing this significance is precisely the blindness that James wishes to call our attention to. And yet, there is something mysterious about the nature of this privileged knowing that resists simple explanation. In the face of this challenge, James adopts the strategy of explanation by example. Recounting a trip to the mountains in North Carolina, James conveys his horror at the disturbing scenery of clear cuts and settlements: The impression on my mind was one of unmitigated squalor. The settler had in every case cut down the more manageable trees, and left their charred stumps standing. The larger trees he had girdled and killedThe forest had been destroyed; and what had improved it out of existence was hideous, a sort of ulcer, without a single element of artificial grace to make up for the loss of Natures beauty. Reeling from his surroundings, James asks the man driving him who would ever want to live there. The driver responds, Why, we aint happy here, unless we are getting one of these coves under cultivation. The scenery is instantly transformed for James. Where he first saw the destruction of nature, he now sees the results of honest sweat, persistent toil and final reward. While not immediately apparent, through conversing with this settler, James gains insight into the feelings that surround daily struggle and vital projects of this settlers life. James realizes that, to the mountaineers, the cultivation of these coves is a meaningful commitment that carries a symbolic weight redolent with moral memories anda very paean of duty, struggle and success. The import of our blindness, then, is that without a glimpse at the feelings of others, we contextualize ideas with only our own feelings present, a state which allows us to value our own projects exclusively. James thinks that without reflection on what makes someones life important for them, we risk the pretension to dogmatize about [inner significance] in each other[, and this] is the root of most human injustices and cruelties Our blindness, then, when unchecked, allows for leveling generalizations about the experiences of others. There is an additional dimension to Jamess sightedness, however, and we must flag it here for later consideration. After gaining a glimpse at the value of life for the settlers, James realizes that the settlers might have an appraisal of his own academic life that is similar to his first reaction to their coves. This reversal from seer to seen signals Jamess realization that as a finite seer, to see with a certain blindness is concomitant to the fact that one is seen by others, who themselves are possessed of a similar blindness. After detailing this exchange with the mountaineer, James does not delve further into the forms and limits of our ways of knowing. Instead, James finishes Blindness with concrete examples that serve as a segue for what was to be his next talk, What Makes a Life Significant. The examples in the latter half of Blindness all foretoken what is to be argued in What Makes a Life Significant, namely, Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. Whether this significance is bound up in manual labor, the imagination, or reflective thought, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of reality; and there is importance in the only real and positive sense in which importance ever anywhere can be. An awareness of our blindness, then, is something to cultivate not ultimately as a reminder of being a finite knower. If the primary upshot of his discussion in Blindness was merely epistemological, it is hard to imagine why he would spend the second half of the essay trying to illuminate the numerous ways in which worlds of meaning can be all but silent to lookers-on. For James, an awareness of our blindness is not just epistemologically prudent, but a way of cultivating a sensitivity to the otherwise hidden ways that other lives are imbued with significance. Epistemological Arrogance and Feminist Critique There is no shortage of authors in the Western canon who claim to inhabit an unlimited epistemological position. Critically engaging the ways in which male subjects purport to understand (and justify themselves in speaking for) female subjects, feminist critiques have exposed many different ways in which this epistemological starting point has resulted in and reinforced centuries of systematic exclusion of womens voices from any kind of philosophical (among other types of) discussion. Emerging out of feminist philosophys critique of epistemological arrogance in the sciences, Donna Haraway offers a powerful alternative to the traditional, male subjects optics of vision. Specifically, Haraway develops her notion of vision as a solution to the impasse created between two dominant tendencies in feminist critiques of science in the 1980s. The first of these tendencies is one that joins the lovely and nasty tools of semiology and narratology to demonstrate that truth is, in essence, nothing more than a social construct used to justify power structures. This deconstructionist line of critique states that even in empirical science, the content is the form. Period. The second line of critique attempted to retain a doctrine of objectivity by either appropriating Marxist tools of analysis in order to create a historicist notion of objectivity, or by developing a feminist empiricism that relied upon more realist conceptions of legitimate meanings of objectivity. The hope of this empiricism was that talk of the right kind of objectivity could provide grounds on which feminists might insist on better accounts of the world, which would in turn allow us to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to our own, as well as others practices of domination The upshot of the first line of critique was that it deflated those doctrines of objectivity which threatened our [womens] budding sense of historical subjectivity, but with its constructivism it simultaneously eliminated the ability to speak meaningfully about reality. The second line of critique offered the ability to historicize knowledge claims, but in the case of Marxist analysis, the conceptual tools were polluted at the source by its structuring theory about the domination of nature in the self-construction of man, and feminist empiricism remained perversely conjoined with the discourse of many practicing scientists, who are caught in the framework of believ[ing] they are describing and discovering things by means of all their construction and arguing. On Haraways view, what these two critiques bring to light is the need to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjectsand a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a real world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom To this end, Haraway revises the metaphor of vision as knowledge to construct an epistemologically humble subject whose claims retains a connection to reality while remaining open to contestation. Haraways Humble Vision In Situated Knowledges, Haraway calls for a radical shift in our conception of what it means to know. On the basis of her analytic resources within technoscience, Haraway shows that a view from nowhere is illusory. Even in the cases of an MRI machine or the sophisticated camera of a spy satellite, [t]he eyes made available in modern technological sciences shatter any idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices show us that all eyes, including our own organic ones, are always active perceptual systems, building onspecific ways of seeing That is to say, the ways of seeing developed through various technological prostheses do not approximate a view from nowhere, but make available to us new ways of seeing, all marked by an elaborate specificity. This is a radical departure from the traditional depiction of seeing. Historically, vision has meant the unmarked category [that can] see and not be seenThis gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White, one of the many nasty tones of the word objectivity to feminist ears Over and against this understanding of vision, Haraway insists that vision is always actually situated and finite. Objective vision, then, turns out to be about particular, and specific embodiment, and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibilities. The condition of knowledge is not a Gods eye view, which, without a connection to its object, could not actually know. Rather, on Haraways definition, a partial (and only partial) connection with the object of knowledge is a condition of knowing. Haraways introduction of responsibility in vision is also crucial to the feminist import of vision. Part of the power play at work in the view from nowhere is that an unseen seer cannot be located, and thus cannot be held to the standards and responsibilities of finitude that accompany a situated vantage point. In her book Modest Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse, Haraway further explicates how finite vantage points have historically performed their epistemological disappearing act to don the guise of an all-seeing subject. The view from nowhere  is the virtue that guarantees that [man] is the legitimate and authorized ventriloquist for the object world, adding nothing from his mere opinions, from his biasing embodimentHis narratives has a magical powerthey lose all trace of their history as storiesas contestable representations By arguing for the necessarily embodied nature of all vision, Haraway shifts the paradigmatic model of a seeing subject: an epistemological narrative without a history (or locatable perspective), by the very act of obscuring its vantage point, commits an act of epistemological irresponsibility. By necessitating the ability to be called into account as a condition of knowledge, Haraways vision opens up a space in which questions of power are inextricably bound up with epistemology. Finally, Haraway explains how different embodied visions (or situated knowledges) relate to one another. On Haraways account, the self is never utterly transparent to itself, but rather always fragmented. Instead of decrying the death of the subject in this fact, Haraway sees the opening of nonisomorphic subjects, agents, and territories of stories unimaginable from the vantage point of the cyclopean, self-satiated eye of the master subject. This decentralization of the self is part and parcel of her reformulation of knowledge: because the subject is partial in all its guises, because it is never whole and completed, it is stitched together imperfectly, and thus able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. To see from anothers perspective, then, is only possible because we ourselves inhabit a situated knowledge, and are thus capable of a partial connection (which, we must recall, is Haraways definition of objectivity). Blindness and Finite Vision We have seen that, for Haraway, the crucial revisions to the traditional cyclopean eye of the Western male subject are a finite gaze, an imperfect joining with one another, the necessity of a locatable vantage point, and the ability to be called into account for ones epistemological position. Arising out of a feminist tradition, Haraway is concerned to theorize vision in such a way as to prevent the kind of power play that justifies itself through an invisible epistemological vantage point, but the claims examined above are not merely strategic; they are all consequences of a more fundamental ontological commitment. As embodied, finite seers, we may only relate to the world in certain ways, and this finitude has implications for which knowledge claims are responsible and permissible and which are not. Nevertheless, as locatable seers, we do not lose all ability to speak of reality, as was the case with the deconstructionist line of thought to which Haraway responded. Instead, we have simply changed the rules of the game, such that an explicit marking of ones position (i.e. finitude) is a prerequisite to playing. The upshot of this, Haraway hopes, is what she has called faithful accounts of a real world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom We should make no mistake: Charlene Haddock Seigfried in Feminism and Pragmatism traces several explicitly sexist threads in James thought, from his psychological writings to his polemic against John Stuart Mills The Subjection of Women. (In the latter case especially, we see that James sexism was not a tacit acceptance of Victorian-era values, but a concerted effort to provide justification for the domestic domination of women. ) There is no way to casually dismiss these threads within James thought. Indeed, it is only with such critical scholarship in mind that we may responsibly examine what of James thought does not succumb to these prejudices. But despite warranted circumspection, while James launches his project of finitude in a different, decidedly more personalist register than Haraway, their respective ontological commitments, as well as the epistemological and ethical conclusions drawn from them, are strikingly similar. Jamess very ability to reconsider the significance of the North Carolina coves for the mountaineers depends on a recognition of his blindness, or, in Haraways language, an openness to being called into account as a finite seer. Jamess attempt to see the surroundings from the mountaineers perspective echoes Haraways mandate that we not attempt to be another; James does this when he calls our attention to two different ways of seeing (his own and that of the mountaineers), both marked by an elaborate specificity. James affirms his specific location as a seer when he realizes that his vision of the mountaineers surroundings is shaped by the comfortable life he leads as an academic, andhere is the moment we flagged beforehe affirms the mountaineers specific vision when he contemplates a reversal of vision and realizes that the mountaineers would likely have unflattering thoughts about Jamess own life in Cambridge. Performing this reversal, searching for his blindness, James inhabits the same position of humble seer that Haraway theorizes, and shuns the cyclopean eye of the master subject. Hands off[,] James tells us, neither the whole truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer By recognizing our blindness, James hopes that we can curb our impulse to proceed in life oblivious to the concerns of others, but this model of considerate interaction is promising only insofar as it grasps and appropriately responds to the nature of our finite vision in the world. The rest of this last quote is perhaps the most telling similarity between these two thinkers: Neither the whole truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Recall Haraways words, that because the subject is partial in all its guises, because it is never whole and completed, it is stitched together imperfectly, and thus able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. The starting point for the essays we have examined here is one of an imperfect grasp of the world and others. James and Haraway share a conception of vision as a necessarily limited medium by virtue of the type of creatures we are, and both see the possibility for a diminution of oppressive practices in our recognition of visions limits. For James, this recognition is aimed towards a cautious eye for the importance of others experience in order to curb our antipathies towards one another, and therein to avoid the exclusive valuation of our own projects and the negative consequences that follow from doing so. For Haraway, the reconstruction of the epistemological subject as necessarily finite and locatable puts knowledge claims on a fair playing field where responsibility for ones claims is a necessity, helping to guarantee the possibility of projects of finite freedom. Starting from our limited vision, both thinkers show us that to see responsibly requires that we must not only bear in mind our blindness, but, in pursuing sight, that we must see from a particular location, and do so humbly.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"629","uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} William James, The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Addition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 629.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"630","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid., 630.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid., 631.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"645","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid., 645.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid., 631.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"631","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} Ibid.  Notable philosophers in this vein are Lorraine Code and Sandra Harding, but here we turn to Donna Haraways work in order to emphasize vision as it relates to epistemology. The theme of vision helps foreground a discussion of a particular type of finite engagement with reality that provides a convenient point of contact between feminism and William James.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"577","uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question is Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 577.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"478","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 478.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"578","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 578.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"579","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 579.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"579","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"583","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 583.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"583","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"581","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 581.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"582","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 582.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"24","uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/H7XTPHEH"]}]} Donna Haraway, Modest Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse : Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997), 24.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"583","position":1,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question is Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 583.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"586","position":3,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid., 586.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"586","position":2,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/KTA7D53A"]}]} Ibid.  To Mills criticisms of domestic standards that conduce to women and childrens oppression and his advocacy for institutions that would support equality and reciprocity, James rejoins that Mill has confused friendship with love, and that his [Mills] advocacy of reciprocal superiority threatens the conception of a wife as a possession.  ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationID":"85g92f7b9","citationItems":[{"locator":"117","label":"page","uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/HG6SSRAB"]}]} Charlene Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism/ : Reweaving the Social Fabric (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 117.   ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM {"citationItems":[{"locator":"645","position":1,"uri":["http://zotero.org/users/local/oWTmbqfJ/items/GV2FFTTD"]}]} James, The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Addition, 645. 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