x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ>  c jbjb!! $KK B*3<<<f   nNnNnN8Nd OlMOO(OOOOOO, R_j- OOOOO_B F OO___O6 O O_  :N  O__6| pvO |jBnNY }p<0M}Ʉ_Ʉ8p_ &j5j5Lucas McGranahan Doctoral Candidate Department of Philosophy University of California, Santa Cruz lucas.mcgranahan@gmail.com Masters and Saints: William James as Early American Interpreter of Nietzsche Introduction Born only two years apart, William James (1842-1910) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) were contemporaries who, while living on separate continents and writing in different languages, made remarkably parallel contributions to the history of philosophy. On the one hand, their critiques were equally sweeping, both of them rejecting all of the major nineteenth-century philosophical options: the empiricist view that knowledge consists in the minds accurate reconstruction of an independent reality; the post- and neo-Kantian transcendentalism that grounds cognition and values outside of time and space; and the reductionistic scientific materialism that acts as just one more dogmatic metaphysics among others. On the other hand, they also shared a revolutionary vision of philosophy as a new kind of practically oriented discipline. Although Nietzsches genealogy is retrospective, re-valuing current practices via a reconstruction of the past, whereas Jamess pragmatism is prospective, focusing on the anticipated consequences of ideas, this is only a matter of emphasis: For both thinkers, doing philosophy means critically analyzing the value of beliefs and practices in terms of their simultaneously cultural and natural histories. Moreover, as I discuss below, both thinkers place at the center of this process the individual, considered not as passive mechanism or supernatural agent, but rather as active, multivalent, self-fashioning organism. The similar character of Nietzsches and Jamess philosophies might be explained in part by a couple of biographical commonalities. Firstly, neither thinker received advanced training in philosophy: James studied chemistry, anatomy and physiology, and medicine at Harvard, and he taught physiology and psychology before becoming a professor of philosophy; and Nietzsche was a classical philologist who retired from his professorship at Basel into a solitary life of self-publishing iconoclastic books. Secondly, both suffered chronic physical ailments as well as severe mental crises: Nietzsche famously collapsed physically and mentally at age 44, and James suffered at various points in his life from severe depression and seems to have been committed at one point to an asylum near Boston. Interestingly, furthermore, both thinkers would have considered the latter point of comparison to be relevant for understanding their points of view, as each argued explicitly that illnesses are alternative modes of health that bring with them their own perspectives and modes of valuation. According to James, for example, Few of us are not in some way infirm, or even diseased; and our very infirmities help us unexpectedly. [] If there were such a thing as inspiration from a higher realm, it might well be that the neurotic temperament would furnish the chief condition of the requisite receptivity; and Nietzsche reports, I am very conscious of the advantages that my fickle health gives me over all robust squares. A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, has passed through an equal number of philosophies. Given James and Nietzsches shared historical moment and similarly radical philosophies, it is difficult to believe that they developed their views independently of one another. And yet this is true. On the one hand, Nietzsche does not even acknowledge Jamess existence, mentioning him nowhere in his published or unpublished writings. The only evidence that Nietzsche knew about James, recently adduced by Thomas Brobjer, is that in 1887 Nietzsche appears to have read a book by Henri Joly, Psychologie des grands hommes (1883), which contrasts Jamess views on genius with those of Francis Galton. Thus Nietzsche may have been aware of James, but only at second-hand and late in his own career. Nietzsches ignorance of James can be explained in part by the fact that his career was cut short in 1889, soon before the publication of Jamess first major work, The Principles of Psychology (1890). Nevertheless, James had been steadily publishing original essays since 1878, many of which treated Nietzschean central concerns such as the role of great men in history, the critique of English philosopher Herbert Spencer, and the need to rethink truth in light of Darwinism. Nietzsches aversion to reading in English was surely no help here. On the other hand, although James was familiar with Nietzsches work, owned at least two of his books, and read German with ease, his few references to Nietzsche range from name-dropping to unfair caricature. By my count, James mentions Nietzsche in one letter, one book review, two minor essays, and twice in The Varieties of Religious Experience. It is only with the second mention of Nietzsche in the Varieties that James attempts a substantive discussion of Nietzsche, and here he reads Nietzsche uncharitably and with seemingly no appreciation for their shared philosophical orientation. Thus, whereas James celebrates, for example, his commonalities with his French contemporary Henri Bergson, he simply fails to recognize his kinship with his German contemporary Nietzsche. In my view, Jamess discussion of Nietzsche is both ironic and disappointing: ironic because, as I argue, James misses the fact that he shares with Nietzsche an entire philosophical framework based on an ethics of active self-fashioning; and disappointing because a careful and sympathetic reading of Nietzsche by a major American philosopher would have been a useful thing to have in Jamess time. Of course, the irony is not unrelated to the disappointment, since it was exactly the conditions that made a good reading of Nietzsche by James unlikely that also would have made such a reading precious: the lack of English translations of Nietzsches works before 1896 and the subsequent translation of his works out of order; the domination of early Nietzsche interpretation by the skewed viewpoints of Nietzsches literary executor Elisabeth Frster-Nietzsche, who lionized her brother, and raving polemicist Max Nordau, who demonized him in a popular work that was available in English before any of Nietzsches works were; the use of Nietzsche as a handy pawn in ideological political debates; the lack of any sustained attention from other major American philosophers of the time; the lack of a popular American monograph on Nietzsche before H. L. Menckens The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche in 1908; anti-German sentiment arising from political, military, and other causes; etc. Nevertheless, one cannot help be a little disappointed when one considers how well-positioned James was to provide a sympathetic Nietzsche interpretation as early as 1901. Things have not gotten much better for the James/Nietzsche comparison in the century since their deaths. For example, despite the proliferation of such comparative studies as Freud and Nietzsche (2000) and Wittgenstein and William James (2002)and even a book on Nietzsche and William Jamess younger brother Henrythere is still no book on James and Nietzsche in English. Overall, with a few (mostly minor) exceptions, focusing primarily on theories of truth, the comparison remains a surprisingly neglected, if promising, area of research. This paper is meant to make inroads into a more sustained comparison of James and Nietzsche by using Jamess reading of Nietzsche in The Varieties of Religious Experience to organize a comparison of the two thinkers views on individuality and character-formation. Here I demonstrate that Jamess reading of Nietzsche is not only uncharitable, but also ironic, given Jamess agreement with Nietzsche on the very point where he attempts to take him as a foil: their ideals of ethical character. My aim here is not to scorn or belittle James, whose re-orientation of the philosophical tradition rivals Nietzsches in its scope and importance, but rather it is to do him the favor of bringing him together with Nietzsche at last in order to see what they might have to teach us when considered side-by-side. More broadly, James and Nietzsches missed opportunity for productive dialog also underscores the need for taking seriously a plurality of philosophical methods and traditionsa lesson that is apparently no less necessary for those of us who, like James and Nietzsche themselves, are putatively committed to a sort of philosophical pluralism or perspectivism. This paper consists of two main sections. In the first section, I explicate Jamess uncharitable reading of Nietzsche in the Varieties in the context of a broader discussion of the project of the book. In the second section, I explain the irony of Jamess reading of Nietzsche, showing that, despite their differences on certain ethical and political issues, both thinkers ground their character ethics in similar normative claims about the necessity of active character development, a position that in both cases represents a reaction to patterns of explanation in biology that reduce the organism to passive clay for external forces. 1. A Missed Opportunity: James on Nietzsche Jamess The Varieties of Religious Experience, originally a lecture series at Edinburgh University in 1901-1902, is an influential study of individual religious life that crisscrosses among psychological, anthropological, mystical, and theological investigations. The thematic lynchpin of the Varieties is not religious institutions or traditions per se but rather the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. Thus, the Varieties is concerned with peoples deepest attitudes toward existence, rather than any particular dogma, such that even an atheist who rejects all human institutions could be religious. It is in the context of an investigation into religion in this sense that James twice mentions his recently deceased German contemporary Nietzsche. Nietzsches first appearance in the Varieties is as an off-hand reference, and yet it already says a great deal about how James views him. According to James, certain attitudes toward life are too flippant or peevish to be considered religious, even on his liberal definition of religion. Here Nietzsches attitude serves as one such example. The mood of a Schopenhauer or a Nietzscheand in a less degree one may sometimes say the same of our own sad Carlylethough often an ennobling sadness, is almost as often only peevishness running away with the bit between its teeth. The sallies of the two German authors remind one, half the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats. They lack the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth. The striking thing about this passage is how James conflates Nietzsches attitude with that of Arthur Schopenhauer. According to Schopenhauer, whose pessimistic philosophy represents a combination of post-Kantian idealism and ancient Indian philosophy, life is an evil that cries out to be quelled. In particular, Schopenhauer recommends disinterested aesthetic contemplation and ascetic self-abnegation as two antidotes to the suffering that constitutes existence. James detests such an attitude, thus leading him to portray both thinkers as equally pathetic dying rats. Jamess second mention of Nietzsche in the Varietiesand his only substantive discussion of Nietzsche in any of his writingscomes at an interesting point in the book, because it is here that James switches from a descriptive, scientific mode to a tentatively normative one. That is, after spending many lectures discussing various types of religious experience and types of religious person, James finally asks the question of what is the best way to be religious, which again for James boils down to the question of what is the best way of reacting on the whole to life. In answer to this question, James puts forth his ideal character type of the saint, which is comprised by a set of spiritual psychological propensities and their attendant behavioral qualities. The behavioral qualities are as follows: (a) Asceticism (b) Strength of soul (c) Purity (d) Charity Although James admits that each of these qualities can be taken to pathological extremes, he nevertheless argues that in a harmonious combination they define an ethically ideal human being, at least in the sense that a future community comprised of saints would be the best community conceivable. Having thus defined the saint, James then introduces Nietzsches ideal of the strong type or master as a foil. James declares, The most inimical critic of the saintly impulses I know is Nietzsche. He contrasts them with the worldly passions as we find these embodied in the predaceous military character, altogether to the advantage of the latter. In fact, on Jamess view, Nietzsche not only dislikes the saint but also finds the saint threatening: For Nietzsche the saint represents little but sneakingness and slavishness. He is the sophisticated invalid, the degenerate par excellence, the man of insufficient vitality. His prevalence would put the human type in danger. James then justifies this interpretation of Nietzsche with a quotation from the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals (14), which James himself translates (rather loosely) as follows: The sick are the greatest danger for the well. The weaker, not the stronger, are the strongs undoing. It is not fear of our fellow-man, which we should wish to see diminished; for fear rouses those who are strong to become terrible in turn to themselves, and preserves the hard-earned and successful type of humanity. What is to be dreaded by us more than any other doom is not fear, but rather the great disgust, not fear, but rather the great pitydisgust and pity for our human fellows. . . . The morbid are our greatest peril, not the bad men, not the predatory beings. [] Here is woven endlessly the net of the meanest conspiracies, the conspiracy of those who suffer against those who succeed and are victorious; here the very aspect of the victorious is hatedas if health, success, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in themselves something vicious, for which one ought eventually to make bitter expiation. Oh, how these people would themselves like to inflict the expiation, how they thirst to be the hangmen! And all the while their duplicity never confesses their hatred to be hatred. Thus, Nietzsche claims that the weak or sick, because of their hateful envy, conspire against the strong in order to drain them of their strength, thereby securing a relatively higher position of power in the world. Although Nietzsche nowhere mentions saints or saintliness in this passage, James clearly believes that Nietzsche would look upon the Jamesian saint as an example of despicable weakness or sickness. If James is right about this, then he and Nietzsche surely have completely opposed ethical ideals for humanity. Indeed, given that what is at stake is Jamess very ethical ideal, Nietzsches role here would seem to be not just that of foil but that of arch-villain. That is, it would seem that, whereas James envisions a future utopia of gentle saints, Nietzsche values an elitism that tramples on the weak who attempt to improve their station in life. 2. The Irony of Jamess Reading Jamess reading is ironic because it misses deep commonalities that he shares with Nietzsche. In particular, a careful analysis shows that the Jamesian saint is not unlike the Nietzschean master, because both are meant to approximate a very similar ideal of ethical character-formation. First, consider the irony of Jamess conflation of the two German authors, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, in the passage quoted above. Here James misses the fact that Nietzsches own favorite reason for citing Schopenhauer, at least after his early work, was in fact the same as Jamess: to illustrate an unacceptably passive reaction to the horrors of existence. As formative as Schopenhauers influence on Nietzsche was, Nietzsche in fact went to pains to distance himself from Schopenhauer on the matter of resignationist pessimism in particular, arguing instead for a joyous Ja-sagen to life that James himself echoes in the yes-saying of the saint. Unfortunately, James was simply less familiar with Nietzsche than he was with Schopenhauerwhom he once likened to a dog who would rather see the world ten times worse than it is, than lose his chance of barking at itand he was too quick to place Nietzsche in the ultra-pessimistic Schopenhauerian camp. James and Nietzsches shared emphasis on activity can be further explored through their extremely similar reactions to English writer Herbert Spencer. The following two passages in particular are worth considering back to back. Firstly, consider Jamess position in The Dilemma of Determinism (1884): Why does the painting of any paradise or utopia, in heaven or on earth, awaken such yawnings for nirvana and escape? The white-robed, harp-playing heaven of our sabbath-schools, and the ladylike tea-table Elysium represented in Mr. Spencers Data of Ethics, as the final consummation of progress, are exactly on par in this respectlubberlands, pure and simple, one and all. [] tedium vitae is the only sentiment they awaken in our breasts. To our crepuscular natures, born for the conflict, the Rembrandtesque moral chiaroscuro, the shifting struggle of the sunbeam in the gloom, such pictures of light upon light are vacuous and expressionless, and neither to be enjoyed nor understood. In this rich passage, James contends that the problem with Spencers utopia, as with the standard picture of Christian heaven, is that it would be boring. Specifically, like the mythical place of leisure referred to in the broadside ballad An Invitation to Lubberland, it would promote a tedium vitae (weariness of life) that, because of its pure moral light, is not suited to our crepuscular (active at dawn or twilight) or chiaroscuro (involving contrast between light and dark) nature. In fact, James feels so strongly about this point that he goes on to recommend the end of human existence before such a whitewashed fate: If this be the whole fruit of the victory, we say; if the generations of mankind suffered and laid down their lives; if prophets confessed and martyrs sang in the fire, and all the sacred tears were shed for no other end than that a race of creatures of such unexampled insipidity should succeed, and protract in saecula saeculorum [forever] their contented and inoffensive liveswhy, at such a rate, better lose than win the battle, or at all events better ring down the curtain before the last act of the play, so that a business that began so importantly may be saved from so singularly flat a winding-up. [] Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human state. Now compare Nietzsches remarks on Spencers utopia just a couple of years later in Book V of The Gay Science (1886): Take, for example, that pedantic Englisman Herbert Spencer. What makes him enthuse in his way and then leads him to draw a line of hope, a horizon of desirabilitythat eventual reconciliation of egoism and altruism about which he ravesalmost nauseates the likes of us; a human race that adopted such Spencerian perspectives as its ultimate perspectives would seem to us worthy of contempt, of annihilation! James and Nietzsche thus both reject a world in which activity and energy are not required of us, and both would rather see humankind obliterated than to allow for such a world. This point relates closely to Jamess and Nietzsches similar concerns about the ways in which evolutionary theories (such as Spencers) can be taken to undermine human agency. According to James in a letter, My quarrel with Spencer is not that he makes much of the environment, but that he makes nothing of the glaring and patent fact of subjective interests which cooperate with the environment in molding intelligence. This is much like Nietzsches problem with what he understands to be Darwins position: The influence of external circumstances is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within which utilizes and exploits external circumstances. In other words, both James and Nietzsche view organisms, and especially humans, as active and form-giving beings that are able to shape both themselves and their surrounding worlds, such that life is less worthwhile to the extent that one is unable to exercise this capacity. Thus, both James and Nietzsche both describe humans as active and prescribe a fulfillment of our humanity through activity. Now consider irony of Jamess use of Nietzsches master as a foil. Firstly, although one of Nietzsches most striking moves is to claim that the strong need to be defended from the weak, whose influence could be devastating to the future of humanity, the primary meanings of Nietzschean terms like strong and weak are psychological or spiritual, rather than physical. This means that an expression of strength is not to be equated simplistically, as James does, with an act of predation or physical violence. Such violence is rather the province of Nietzsches blond beast, which represents an earlier and more brutal type of existence that lives on in some of us as a hidden core of potential violence. Although Nietzsche romanticizes the blond beast as a type that existed before the influence of culture, his point in discussing this figure is not that we should, per impossible, revert to a pre-cultural bestial state. Rather, it is that, looking into the future, the image of the beast can remind us that it is better to be over-awed by something terrible than to live insipid or mediocre lives. A central task in interpreting Nietzsches Genealogy, then, consists in determining the exact sense in which Nietzsche wants people to become terrible, strong, or noble, after we have realized that he is not being straightforward in how he uses such terms. In my view, the defining characteristic of a Nietzschean master is not violence or domination as such but rather simply activity as opposed to passivity. However, it is important to note that activity has a double role in Nietzsches philosophy: firstly, it means expressing oneself spontaneously in vigorous, free, joyful activity; and secondly, it means managing ones impulses willfully so as to alter ones own habits of thinking and actingor, in Nietzsches words, to give style to ones character. Activity for Nietzsche therefore denotes both a certain lack of restraint, or spontaneity, and a particular type of restraint, or self-management. These two types of activity are pre-conditions for living well, and yet they are logically independent of any particular value judgment. That is, one can (1) exhibit spontaneous energy and (2) actively intervene in ones own character-formation without thereby being obliged to value any further character traits in particular. The question of how and when to modulate between these modes of activitythat is, when to intervene in order to encourage or suppress a particular mental-cum-behavioral tendencythus emerges as the central problematic of Nietzsches ethics of character. Indeed, asking how best to fashion oneself in this way means pursuing the stated goal of the Genealogy of Morals, which is to find the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. In particular, it means taking the perspective that our organism is an oligarchy, or a collection of ruling forces, in which one needs to make room for new things, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation, foresight, pre-meditation. Similarly, in Beyond Good and Evil, another book that James owned, Nietzsche describes a process of self-management: Leffet cest moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth; namely, the governing class identifies itself with the success of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis as already said, of a social structure composed of many souls. Hence a philosopher should claim the right to include willing as such within the sphere of moralsmorals being understood as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of life comes to be. Leffet cest moithe effect is mein the sense that I am the constructed product of the management of my various souls, a process which Nietzsche here explicitly claims to be the proper subject matter of moral philosophy. Remarkably, in my view, this is exactly the point of The Varieties of Religious Experience: the very book in which James, through a reading of the Genealogy, rebukes Nietzsche utterly. In the Varieties, James is not only interested in giving a phenomenological or taxonomic account of religious experiences, but he is also interested in using the latter investigations in order to describe the kind of individual that is capable of having those experiences. I am suggesting that we ought to take seriously the (oft-omitted) subtitle of the bookA Study in Human Natureand consider the possibility that the Varieties is first and foremost a contribution to philosophical anthropology, or a philosophical inquiry into the structure, dynamics, and sense-making activities of the finite human organism. At the center of Jamess philosophical anthropology lies a view that he shares with Nietzsche, which is that the self is an oligarchy consisting of active centers whose hierarchical relations need to be strictly managed. Indeed, James, like Nietzsche, believes that ethics is essentially about actively managing ones conflicting impulses, such that the best hierarchical relationships come to obtain among them. This view has its roots in Jamess earlier psychological writings on habit and the will, but he develops it in the Varieties more explicitly. According to James, Now in all of us [] does the normal evolution of character chiefly consist in the straightening out and unifying of the inner self. The higher and lower feelings, the useful and erring impulses, begin by being a comparative chaos within usthey must end by forming a stable set of functions in right subordination. Unhappiness is apt to characterize the period of order-making and struggle. The best outcome of this process of self-management, on Jamess view, is a healthy centre of energy, or, one might say, character: Let us hereafter, in speaking of the hot place in a mans consciousness, the group of ideas to which he devotes himself, and from which he works, call it the habitual centre of his personal energy. It makes a great difference to a man whether one set of his ideas, or another, be the centre of his energy. Viewed in these terms, the saintly character type for James is just the character for which spiritual emotions are the habitual centre of the personal energy, that is, the character type that involves the saintly behavioral qualities listed above: asceticism, strength of soul, purity, and charity. Now it can be seen that Nietzsche and James share, not only a framework for thinking about the ethics of character, but also their most fundamental normative claim: that is, one ought to be especially active in ones self-management, since this is a pre-condition for managing oneself well. Indeed, although James does not explicitly list activity as one of the saintly characteristics, a concern with human activity, energy, or strenuousness can be traced throughout his writings, and active self-management plays a special role in the saintly quality of purity in particular. In fact, purity for James means nothing less than the thoroughgoing resolve to harmonize ones conflicting inner tendencies. Thus, James describes purity as follows: The saintly person becomes exceedingly sensitive to inner inconsistency or discord, and mixture and confusion grow intolerable. All the minds objects and occupations must be ordered with reference to the special spiritual excitement which is now its keynote. In purity, one acts with severity against ones inferior parts, which, as in Nietzsches philosophy, is a sign of strength. This is why James claims that what is called weakness of character seems in most cases to consist in the inaptitude for these sacrificial moods, of which ones own inferior self and its pet softness must often be the targets and victims. In a remark that sounds almost uncannily Nietzschean, moreover, James claims that ascetic hardness toward oneself is good because passive happiness is slack and insipid. For this reason, I would argue that such active self-management cuts across the other saintly qualities as a necessary condition for their healthy expression. Conclusion In the end, both James and Nietzsche hold that ones reaction to life, as embodied in the structure of ones character, is the most important and interesting thing about a person, as well as the proper subject matter of philosophy. The important point about activity for both Nietzsche and James is not just that one is happier when one is being active, but rather that to take an active role in managing ones self is to take charge of the essentially human activity of willful character-formation. That is, both James and Nietzsche encourage their readers to capitalize on the human capacity for self-construction, and their reflections on the possibility of such self-construction could be said to amount to philosophical anthropology. To be a Nietzschean master or a Jamesian saint is to be human but more so; it is to be the opposite of the Schopenhauerian ascetic who is human but aims to become less and less so through a cultivated sense of detachment from life. For both James and Nietzsche, philosophy as critically self-reflexive self-fashioning begins with an affirmation of ones position in an uncertain, dangerous, and even tragic world, since it is only with such affirmation that the proper level of activity can be mustered. That is, I think that James also speaks for Nietzsche when he says, The whole concern [] is with the manner of our acceptance of the universe. Do we accept it only in part and grudgingly, or heartily and altogether? James and Nietzsche not only build their philosophies around this same existential point, but they even dramatize it in a parallel fashion: Just as Nietzsche famously enlists a fictional demon to pose the question of whether the reader could affirm the eternal recurrence of the same life in The Gay Science, James asks his audience in Pragmatism whether, given a choice by the worlds author, they would rather take part in an uncertain universe or simply give up on life: Should you in all seriousness, if participation in such a world were proposed to you, feel bound to reject it as not safe enough? Would you say that, rather than be part and parcel of so fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred to relapse into the slumber of nonentity from which you had been momentarily aroused by the tempters voice? Of course, the preferred answer for both Nietzsche and James is an affirmative one, or, what each of them in various places calls yes-saying to life. Reviewing Jamess passage in context, however, also reveals the most important difference between Nietzsche and James. For, in Jamess thought experiment, the reader is being offered a chance to take part in a communal project: Suppose that the worlds author put the case to you before creation, saying: I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own level best. I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world [] It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk? Unlike Nietzsche, James is asking his reader to partake in a collaborative project, assuming, optimistically, that the majority of humanity is up to the task of constructing a worthwhile society in and through their respective self-constructions. Indeed, Jamess whole justification for granting the saint an ethically preferred status in the Varieties lies in the saints projected function within an ideal society. According to James, only a society of saints could produce the relatively peaceable lifestyle most amenable to human flourishing, and it is the saint-like among us today who lead us toward this society through example, as impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animaters of potentialities of goodness. In short, nothing is more foreign to James than an elitist vision of an insular group of strong types looking down contemptuously on the masses. 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James, W. 1975. Pragmatism. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1977. A Pluralistic Universe. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1978. Essays in Philosophy. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1978. Remarks on Spencers Definition of Mind as Correspondence. In Essays in Philosophy, eds. F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis, 7-22. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1979. Great Men and Their Environment. In The Will to Believe, eds. F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis, 163-189. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1979. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Edited by F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1979. The Dilemma of Determinism. In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, eds. F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis, 114-140. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1979. The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life. In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, eds. F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis, 141-162. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1981. The Principles of Psychology. Edited by F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and I.K. Skrupskelis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1985. The Varieties of Religious Experience. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James, W. 1987. Essays, Comments, and Reviews. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupselis. The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Joly, H. 1883. Psychologie des grands hommes. Paris: Hachette. Koopman, Colin. Unpublished. William Jamess Ethics of Self-Transformation: The Will to Believe, The Will, & The Value of Freedom. Marchetti, Sarin. 2011. James, Nietzsche and Foucault on Ethics and the Self. Foucault Studies 11, 126-155. Medina, Jos, and David Wood, eds. 2005. Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions. Edited by Simon Critchley. Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Nietzsche, F. 1891. Jenseits von Gut und Bse. Leipzig: Naumann. Nietzsche, F. 1894. Zur Genealogie der Moral. Leipzig: Naumann. Nietzsche, F. 1966. Beyond Good and Evil. New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. 1968. On the Genealogy of Morals. In The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 437-599. New York: Modern Library. Nietzsche, F. 1968. The Birth of Tragedy. In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. W. Kaufmann, 15-144. New York: Modern Library. Nietzsche, F. 1968. The Will to Power. Edited by W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. 1974. The Gay Science. Edited by W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. Nordau, M.S. 1895. Degeneration. London: William Heinemann. Pawelski, J.O. 2007. The Dynamic Individualism of William James. State University of New York Press. Perry, R.B. 1935. The Thought and Character of William James. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Pihlstrom, S. 2003. On the Concept of Philosophical Anthropology. Journal of Philosophical Research 28, 259-286. Pihlstrm, S. 1998. Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our Human Life in a Human World. New York: P. Lang. Pihlstrm, S. 2007. Metaphysics with a Human Face: William James and the Prospects of Pragmatist Metaphysics. William James Studies 2, no. 1. Ptz, M. 1995. Nietzsche in America: An Introduction. In Nietzsche in American literature and thought, 1-17. New York: Camden House. Ratner-Rosenhagen, J. 2011. American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and His Ideas. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. Richards, R.J. 1987. The Personal Equation in Science: William Jamess Psychological and Moral Uses of Darwinian Theory. In Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior, 409-450. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rorty, R. 1982. Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism. In Consequences of Pragmatism, 139-159. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rorty, R. 2007. Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism. In Philosophy as Cultural Politics, 27-41. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sabo, A.G. 1997. William James and Friedrich Nietzsches Revaluation of Truth and Life. University of Washington. Stassen, Manfred. 1995. Nietzsky vs. the Booboisie: H.L. Menckens Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche. In Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought, 97-114. New York: Camden House. Steilberg, H. 1995. First Steps in the New World: Early Popular Reception of Nietzsche in America. In Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought, 19-40. New York: Camden House. Steilberg, H. 1995. From Dolson to Kaufmann: Philosphical Nietzsche Reception in American, 1901-1950. In Nietzsche in American Literature and Thought, 239-262. New York: Camden House. Suckiel, E.K. 1982. The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Wirth, J. 2009. The Varieties of Sick Experience: Nietzsche, James, and the Art of Health. Veritas 54, no. 1.  On Jamess asylum stay, see Richards 1987, 415.  VRE, 28-29.  GS P, 3.  Brobjer 2004, 45; Brobjer 2008, 103-104.  See Joly 1883, chap. 3. Thanks to Jocelyn Hoy for help with Jolys French.  See GM (1880) on the first point and RS (1878) on the latter two points.  Jamess extant library at Harvard contains copies of Jenseits von Gut und Bse and Zur Genealogie der Moral (James 1985, 435).  The letter, addressed to T. S. Perry in 1905, says of Nietzsche only the following: As for Nietzsche, the worst break of his I recall was in a posthumous article in one of the French reviews a few months back. In his high and mighty way he was laying down the law about all the European countries (James 1926 I, 233). Given only this letter, Franzese seems hasty in concluding that Jamess correspondence indicates that he was well acquainted with Nietzsches life and works (Franzese 2003, 10).  The book review is of Max Nordaus Degeneration (1895), a polemic against modern culture that harshly condemns Nietzsches thinking. In Jamess review, Nietzsche merely appears in a list of philosophers whom James thinks Nordau abuses (ECR, 508).  In an essay on Italian pragmatism, James mentions Nietzsche in a list of philosophers discussed by Giovanni Papini (EIP, 145); Papini also seems to have reminded James of Nietzsche, since James is reported to have written the words Nietzsches thot as well as style on a copy of an article by Papini entitled From Man to God (EIP, 244). In another essay, James compares the attitude of mystic Benjamin Blood with Nietzsches idea of amor fati, thus showing an appreciation for one of Nietzsches terms of art (EIP, 189). This also indicates that James may have been familiar with other of Nietzsches works besides those preserved in his collection (referenced above).  VRE, 39; 295-298. I discuss these mentions below.  See, for example, the essay on Bergson in PU.  Nordau 1895. Incidentally, James reviewed Nordaus book for the Psychological Review soon after its appearance in English. Although James mentions in his review that Nordau abuses Nietzsche (among other philosophers), he does not discuss Nietzsche further. As for Nordau, his volumes are little more than a pathological document on an enormous scale, and an exhibition in minute detail of an individuals temperamental restrictions in the way of enjoying art (ECR, 508).  For this historical context I am drawing on Ptz (1995), Stassen (1995), and Steilberg (1995a and 1995b).  Donadio 1978.  The most substantive comparisons I have found are a published dissertation in German (Hingst 1999) and an unpublished masters thesis in comparative literature (in English) (Sabo 1997). When James and Nietzsche are mentioned together, it is generally because of their views on truth. This is the case in Allen (1993, chaps. 3-4; 1994), Cormier (2001, chaps. 1-2), and Medina and Wood (2005, 9-13). It is also true in the work of Richard Rorty, who provides an interesting case because of his wide influence and his regular invoking of both figures. However, although Rorty regularly name-drops James and Nietzsche as allies, he is not particularly interested comparing them per se (but see Rorty 1982 and 2007 for some of his more sustained comparisons and Boffetti 2004 for a critique of Rortys too-Nietzschean reading of James). Intellectual histories in which James and Nietzsche enjoy a few pages of comparison include Ratner-Rosenhagen (2011) and Cotkin (1994). Finally, the occasional comparison of James and Nietzsche by Franzese (2003; 2008, 194-200) is more closely related to the present work than are the other works cited here because of its emphasis on character formation; and a review of Franzese (2008) by Marchetti (2011) brings in Foucault for a three-part comparison. There is also Wirth (2009) on the question of health in James and Nietzsche. The number of references here is meant to show exhaustiveness rather than to belie the point that the comparison of James and Nietzsche has not received the depth of scholarly attention that it deserves.  VRE, 34.  VRE, 36.  VRE, 39.  This is an interesting turning point, not just in the Varieties, but also in Jamess body of work as a whole. In his earlier scattered writings on ethics, James shies away almost completely from giving overt ethical prescriptions, focusing instead on the conditions for moral development in society or in the individual (e.g. PP, chaps. 4 and 26; MP).  VRE, 221. The psychological propensities, slightly abridged, are as follows: A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this worlds selfish little interests; and a conviction, not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power. A sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control. An immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down. A shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmonious affections, towards yes, yes, and away from no, where the claims of the non-ego are concerned. (VRE, 219-220)  VRE, 298299.  VRE, 295.  VRE, 296.  James admits to having abridged, and in one place transposed, a sentence (VRE, 297n24). In fact, James omits two sizeable chunks of text, representing the first one with an ellipsis (disgust and pity for our human fellows. . . . ) and disguising the second one completely by connecting two clauses with a dash that in the original connects the latter clause to something else. (I.e., the victorious is hatedas if health is Jamess construction, the dash appearing in place of a good deal of omitted text.) For all this, Jamess translation is not particularly misleading, at least not any more misleading than is inherent in taking Nietzsches passage out of context in the first place. The ellipsis in brackets indicates my own abridgment of Jamess quotation.  VRE, 296297.  See, for example, the Attempt at a Self-Criticism that Nietzsche appended to The Birth of Tragedy: How far removed I was from all this resignationism! (6). For the yes-saying of the saint, see VRE, 219-220.  This comes from a letter in which James criticizes the idea of constructing a Schopenhauer monument in Frankfurt: I really must decline to stir a finger for the glory of one who studiously lived for no other purpose than to spit upon the lives of the like of me and all those I care for. [] As for Schopenhauer himself, personally, his loud-mouthed pessimism was that of a dog who would rather see the world ten times worse than it is, than lose his chance of barking at it (Perry 1935 I, 722-724).  Note that in the first lecture of A Pluralistic Universe James mentions Schopenhauer as an example of a thinker whose philosophy is clearly a consequence of his personal vision, even though in his original manuscript he mentions Nietzsche instead (PU, 14; 168). This might provide further evidence that James thought of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer as interchangeableor perhaps that he realized that he should speak of the German philosopher whose work he knew better.  My attention was drawn to the similarity of these two passages by a remark of Walter Kaufmanns in a footnote in his translation of The Gay Science (GS 373 n135).  DD, 130.  On the concept of tedium vitae in James, see Cotkin 1990, Chapter 4.  DD, 130-131.  GS 373.  Cited in Richards (1987), pp. 426-427.  WP, 657.  GM I, 11.  GM I, 7.  GS 290.  GM I, 17.  GM II, 1.  BGE, 19.  I am not the first to call James a philosophical anthropologist, although such claims are few and have come only sporadically over the decades. The earliest discussion I have found is Edie 1965 (reprinted as Chapter IV of Edie 1987), which rails against the myth of pragmatism that overemphasizes Jamess instrumentalism and pragmatic theory of truth while ignoring his views on human nature and his resonances with European philosophy. Next are a dissertation and a subsequent essay by DeArmey (1978; 1987), which describe Jamess philosophical anthropology as a unification of phenomenological and scientific investigations. More recently, Pihlstrm has a string of publications that draw upon both Kant and James in attempting to formulate a viable transcendental philosophical anthropology (1998, chap. 5-6; 2003; 2007). Finally, Franzese (2008) reads James as a philosophical anthropologist whose thought centers on a conception of the human being as the indeterminate animal. Two books on James that do not employ the term philosophical anthropology but that foreground Jamess conception of human nature are Suckiel 1982 and Pawelski 2007. For Suckiel, a teleological understanding of humans as purposive beings is one of the two pillars unifying Jamess pragmatism (the other being his experientialist view that something is real if and only if it is capable of being experienced). For Pawelski, the physiological structure of reflex action informs Jamess views on activity and passivity. Finally, note that I will not be discussing the German school of philosophische Anthropologie that began in Europe in the 1920s and whose chief proponents included Max Scheler, Helmuth Plener, Arnold Gehlen, and Ernst Cassirer (even if there are certain respects in which James could be construed as a forerunner of this school).  PP, chaps. 4 and 26. On Jamess conception of willful habit-formation, or willful habituation, see Koopman (unpublished).  VRE, 142.  VRE, 162.  VRE, 219.  Energy in James is the central theme of Franzese 2008.  VRE, 234.  VRE, 214.  VRE, 240. This is healthy asceticism, as opposed to a self-negating asceticism, or what Nietzsche would call the ascetic ideal.  VRE, 41.  GS 341.  P, 139.  James, like Nietzsche, also associates a negative response to life with Buddhism: The hindoo and the buddhist, for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life (P, 140).  P, 139.  Franzese argues that Jamess problem with Nietzsche in the Varieties is that Nietzsche offers a de-contextualized ethical ideal, that is, that Nietzsche, unlike James, rejects the idea that the worth of a particular character type is necessarily a function of its role in society (2008, 194-200). This is perhaps an apt criticism of Nietzsche, although James does not explicitly present it as the crux of his problem with Nietzsches views.  VRE, 298.  VRE, 285. 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