x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ> oqna wjbjb11 ([[UHHH8$,P,x vyyy,!R@$` yyyyy 2 yPdy:C,| Hz$o $H 0x yR$$d At What Price Pluralism?: A Reply to Robert Talisse Abstract: Robert Talisse has argued that Deweyan democracy fails to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism because it rests on a thick concept of human flourishing. I argue, contra Talisse and many of his Deweyan critics, that human flourishing is an appropriately thin concept, and, further, that Dewey takes pluralism to be nothing more than a brute fact, one that we must learn to work with, but also a fact we should neither rue, nor feel obligated to foster. To this end, I argue for a reading of Deweys politics as merely pragmatist, that is, as advocating only a participatory method of deliberation, rather than codifying any particular set of overarching thick concepts. In his 2010 essay Farewell to Deweyan Democracy, Robert Talisse continues the polemic against Deweyan democracy that he began in his 2007 book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. Basically, Talisses arguments run like so: Deweyan democracy does not function apart or alongside Deweys controversially naturalized metaphysic, but as inextricably linked with it. As such, Talisse argues, Deweys politics rest on a thick concept of what Dewey alternately calls growth or human flourishing. That such a thick concept grounds Deweyan democracy is, on Talisses view, what renders Deweyan democracy oppressive and coercive, and thereby makes Deweyan democracy incapable of accommodating the fact of reasonable pluralism, in the Rawlsian sense. In place of this, Talisse offers up an appropriately thin pragmatist philosophy of democracy that draws from Peircean pragmatism. My concern here is not, however, to consider the merit of Talisses positive project. Rather my aim is twofold: I begin by arguing that Talisses objections to the Deweyan political project stem from an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of Deweys concept of human flourishing. I then move to propose a reading of Deweys politics as being merely pragmatist, that is, as being only methodologically pragmatist. Put another way, I do not intend, like the bulk of Talisses critics, to defend the notion that democracy is a way of life. Instead I mean to posit a reading of Deweyan democracy that is entirely amenable to the fact of reasonable pluralism and yet does not conceive of the fact of pluralism as carrying any normative force. I. A (Not So) Fond Farewell Although Talisse mounts a somewhat longer critique of Dewey in APPOD he seems to have amended his view in light of the responses to that work. As such, I will focus in the main on the objections offered in 2010s A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy, which I take to be an accurate representation of Talisses current stance on Deweyan politics. In Farewell, Talisse begins by laying out a fourfold structure for Deweyan democracy that he calls the four theses of Deweyan democracy. The first thesis is that the political order be continuous with the moral order. The second thesis is that the democratic process be construed not simply as an agora where the rich variety of values, comprehensive doctrines and such are gathered and debated, but rather the democratic process should be construed as the process whereby those views are made malleable, in order to further human flourishing. Third is the now infamous democracy is a way of life claim from Creative Democracy. Talisse takes this to be the claim that democracy is not simply a form of government, but is a way of being in the world. Fourth is the claim that Deweyan democracy is a perfectionist doctrine, one that allows for the legislative oppression of reasonable objectors, so long as the oppression is done in the name of furthering human flourishing. Talisse then argues that no Deweyan democrat can hold any one of these views separately, and so the Deweyan democrat is thereby bound to a political doctrine that seems already too comprehensive to accommodate even a reasonable pluralism. It is my sense of Talisses several objections that theses 1-3 distill into the fourth, or at least function together in such a way that they produce the fourth as a necessary consequence of the Deweyan view. I believe this to be central to Talisses dispensing with Deweyan democracy, so I want to be careful to unpack it thoroughly. Talisse launches his objection with an appeal to Rawls fact of reasonable pluralism, namely the assertion that there exist numerous comprehensive doctrines, many of which are at odds with one another in principle, but all of which can agree on a political conception of political justice. Talisse now draws out Rawls inclusion of the fact of oppression, or the notion that if any one comprehensive doctrine is taken as the basis for any given system of politics, the inevitable result is coercion and oppression of the body politic, any number of which may have perfectly valid reasons, or what Rawls will call public reasons, for rejecting the comprehensive doctrine on which their system of government is based. Talisse then moves to indict Deweyan democracy for embodying oppression and coercion in exactly the same sense conveyed by Rawls fact of oppression. Dewey himself almost seems to suggest this reading in The Public and Its Problems: Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. It is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected. And again, when implying that interdependent political relations, i.e. democracy, represent the only possible solution: the perfecting of the means and ways of communications of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action. It is important to note here, as does Talisse, that Deweyans are not being accused of simply proselytizing. It is not that Deweyans are trying to legislate Deweyanism (whatever that may be), nor are they trying to create a society of Dewey devotees. Talisses objection here cuts much deeper. On his view, the notion of human flourishing is so central an idea to Deweyan democracy that it functions as a comprehensive doctrine and one that is, in the Rawlsian sense, an oppressive doctrine. In order to flesh out this objection, Talisse uses the example of Joe Utilitarian, who has a particular view of how voting should be conducted, namely that it should be conducted such that it satisfies the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP). However, once Joe Utilitarian brings this view into the public arena, his view can be reasonably rejected by any number of citizens in that public. It is central to Talisses objection that the objection to the imposition of Joes comprehensive doctrine be reasonable, and that it be reasonable on the basis that Joe has made an unreasonable and potentially oppressive demand of others. The unreasonable demand, then, is not that placed on Joe to submit his view to public debate and abide by the consensus reached there even if his view is true; rather, the unreasonable demand is that placed on the public, by Joe that his comprehensive view be taken as a basic principle. Put in more Rawlsian terms, Joes view cannot be publicly justified, or put still another way, my rejection of Joes view does not render me as unreasonable, that is, as being incapable of participating in democracy. Talisse sees just such an unreasonable demand being placed by Deweyan democracy, insofar as human flourishing is a doctrine analogous to the GHP, such that rejecting it renders one unfit to participate in democracy. In sum, the objection is this: the Deweyan will maintain that the basis for selecting any particular policy is that there are conclusive reasons that the acceptance of this policy best promotes human flourishing, which, on Talisses view, carries with it the implicit claim that to then reject this policy is not simply a mistake, but is a refusal to engage in democracy. By extension, then, it can fairly be said that to reject the notion of human flourishing is equally a failure to be properly democratic. As such, there seems to be a very thick conception of what it means to be doing democracy at work in Deweys claims, such that in an effort to stay the course of democracy, even if the overarching principle of human flourishing can be reasonably rejected, the body politic must be cajoled, coerced, and even oppressed into lending assent to those policies that best promote human flourishing. II. The Thick and the Thin of It In the main, critics of Talisses anti-Deweyan polemics have taken to defending the claim that democracy is a way of life. These defenses have in turn taken many forms. There is some degree of consonance to these critiques, and, to his credit, Talisse has been resolute in response. However, there is something implicit in these critiques, as well as Talisses replies, to which I wish to object, namely that pluralism is an inherently good thing. My claim is that pluralism is nothing other than a bare fact of the world in which we find ourselves. In support of this claim, I argue for a reading of Dewey that posits his politics as only methodologically pragmatist and I demonstrate that a properly thin concept to human flourishing falls out of such a reading. By methodological pragmatism I mean pragmatism conceived of as a method of problem-solving, rather than a purely philosophical stance replete with ready-made theoretical positions on questions of ethics, truth, and judgment. It is pragmatism cast as a way of resolving disputes, independent of any overarching philosophical commitments. A pragmatism so conceived does not, then, appeal to growth or human flourishing as an objective standard, but rather as ever-evolving, eminently revisable set of constraints, constraints meant to ensure the possibility for further development (via inquiry) remains open, rather than being meant to set hard-and-fast limits on human action. I take growth to be nothing more than ensuring that one can continue to be, a way of insuring that possibilities for inquiry remain available. The strength of this conception of growth is that it has normative force only insofar as it has heuristic value. There are two immediate and obvious objections to this view. One objection is that the endorsement of any singular method of problem-solving is already to have a substantive normative commitment. This objection seems implicit in Talisses refutation of Deweyan democracy. A second objection says that to take so broad a view of pragmatism is to have abandoned it to relativism. The answers to these objections are, I think, not unrelated. Of the first, if we are resolved to expand the notion of substantive normative commitment to include the growth-oriented Deweyan democratic deliberation, then there seems to be no reason not to include Rawls notions of public reasons or overlapping consensus, or even reasonableness, in the class of comprehensive doctrines. In this case, the failure of Deweyan democracy to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism is also the failure of liberal democracy writ largeto include Rawls own versionand not any failing particular to Deweyan democracy as such. So long as it rests on a properly thin concept of human flourishing, then, it seems that the Deweyan method of inquiry as democratic deliberation is not ipso facto problematic. Talisse is never clear in Farewell as to what he takes human flourishing to be, but however he conceives of it, that conception appears to be too narrow. Talisse seems to see human flourishing as functioning on the same level as does the GHP for Joe Utilitarian, that is, as a thick concept which lends impetus to a comprehensive doctrine. But this does not seem to be the sense in which Dewey intends it. As Dewey argues in PP: To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values. This seems to be a much thinner conception of human flourishing than Talisse seems to give Dewey credit for, as it calls not for hard-and-fast rules for what constitutes human flourishing, but for a method of being in a society together that creates the most felicitous conditions for persons to develop as such. What Dewey gives us here is not a rigid evaluative standard, i.e. x is good or bad insofar as it satisfies y, but instead he gives us a regulative ideal, i.e. x promotes y insofar as it does z. When considered in this sense, it not hard to see that what Dewey touts as human flourishing looks much less like the GHP and much more like Rawlsian reasonableness, such that Deweyan democracy does not appear any less accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism than Rawls own system. Still however, the concern of relativism remains. It is certainly not Deweys view that all constraints be cast aside and method reign supreme. There must be some constraint, something that must make us feel where the shoe pinches, in order to generate the conditions for inquiry. These constraints, however, are never fixed and absolute, but changing as the conditions of inquiry change. As Dewey argues, using the metaphor of law, These formal conditions [of legal transactions] arise out of the ordinary transactions; they are not imposed on them fromany external and a priori source. But when they are formed they are also formative; they regulate the proper conduct of the activities out of which they develop. So, we can get normativity out of the process of inquiry, but, as Dewey goes on to argue, the forms that fall out of the process of inquiry as regulative forms are never fixed and eternal, and are always changing. Or to use the Rortyian terminology, our justifications as regards any particular inquiry are contingent, and part of Deweyan democracy is that they be recognized as such. Human flourishing is certainly no different. That it might be found, around here and right now, to provide a useful justification for certain cultural practices does not place it beyond refute, and if any number of citizens were to reject it, it would call us to inquire as to its continued usefulness. I think what Talisse has missed here is that hes taken Dewey to be a statist, insofar as growth, qua comprehensive doctrine, is an enforceable statute. If group X objects to social policy Y and refuses to deliberate any further on it, Talisse seems to suppose that policy Y will be enacted anyway, so long as it is taken to promote human flourishing. My claim is that such disagreement is taken by Dewey to be part and parcel of the democratic process, and rather than prompting the state to act, it prompts the other participants to reconsider not only policy Y, but also whether human flourishing still works as an adequate basis for policy. This is what I mean when I say that Deweys politics are merely pragmatist. Deweys insistence in PP is not on human flourishing, or democracy is a way of life, or any other such platitude. Rather the insistence is on method; it is an insistence on a way of doing democracy that, while inextricably linked with pluralism, does not put it forward as a good. What matters for Dewey, on my view, is not that that our political actions aim at the right things, in the sense of absolute and universal goods, but that they are conducted in manner that most promotes associative and cooperative activity. In other words, for Dewey, transformation is not brought about by top-down statism, but by the interactions of individuals looking to solve the problems presented by the social circumstances that surround them. Reading Deweys politics in this fashion gives us a picture of Deweyan democracy that is not simply amenable to the fact of reasonable pluralism, but is in fact fundamentally pluralistic, in that it is firmly wedded to a method of ongoing and growing engagement and participation, a picture which stands in stark contrast to the portrait of potential demagoguery given us by Talisses reading of Dewey. III. Whence Pluralism? In the end, we come to the question with which we began: can even a merely pragmatist Dewey accommodate for the fact of reasonable pluralism? I think the answer to this is fairly straightforward. On Deweys view, democratic practice, not any particular arrangement of social groupings, is the aim. The focus of Deweyan democracy is to foster participation, not to guarantee or artificially limit the number of participants, and the starting point for this is the fact of a plurality of social groupings. But no substantive normative commitment can fall out from this bare fact of pluralism, nor does this extant plurality instantiate the necessity of some absolute doctrine to either account for it, nor to balance out a number of competing demands. The question of how these competing demands find balance, on Deweys view, is answered in the course of deliberative democratic practice. As competing publics come into conflict, new opportunities for inquiry arise, and new experiments can take place. A plurality of social groupings, then, keeps democracy on its toes, so to speak. By being constantly forced to reconsider the makeup of the society and the structure of its institutions, a society is compelled by those that make it up to foster the conditions necessary for them to flourish. And this only happens in a society with a number of competing views, but such a society is no way obligated by the bare fact of pluralism to foster pluralism as such. My sense of Deweys take on pluralism is this: take care of democracy, and pluralism will take care of itself. Put another way, the best way to account for pluralism is not to focus on accounting for pluralism, but to develop a set of best practices for democratic society. In this regard, I agree wholeheartedly with Bacons admonition that we, as pragmatists, cease fretting about pluralism and focus instead on providing a sound philosophical basis for democratic practice. So long as democratic citizens foster deliberative practices and work to see our lives as interdependent and our political and ethical views as historically contingent, an ever-deepening and rich public is assured. Works Cited Bacon, Michael. The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy. Philosophy & Social Criticism. 36 (9). (November 2010) p. 1075-1091. Caspary, William, R. Dewey on Democracy. (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2000). Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems. (Swallow Press: Athens, 1954). -- Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in John Dewey, The Later Works 1925-1953. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. (Southern Illinois University Press: Edwardsville and Carbondale, 1986). Eldridge, Michael. Why A Pragmatist May Be a Pluralist. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 41, Number 1. (Winter 2005) p. 119-122. Festenstein, Matthew. Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1997). -- Unravelling the Reasonable: Comment on Talisse. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 45, Number 1. (Winter 2009). P. 55-59. James, William. The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. Edited by John J. McDermott. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1977). Koopman, Colin. Good Questions and Bad Answers in Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 45, Number 1. (Winter 2009) p. 60-64. McBride III, Lee, A. Collectivistic Individualism: Dewey and MacIntyre. Contemporary Pragmatism. Volume 3, Issue 1. (June 2006) p. 70-75. Misak, Cheryl. Pragmatism and Pluralism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 41, Number 1. (Winter 2005) p. 129-135. Ralston, Shane, J. In Defense of Democracy As a Way of Life: A Reply to Talisses Pluralist Objection. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 44, Number 4. (Fall 2008) p. 629-660. Rogers, Melvin, L. Dewey, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Response to Robert Talisse. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 45, Number 1. (Winter 2009) p. 75-79. Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980). (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1982). Sullivan, Michael and Lysaker, John. You Talking to Me?. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 41, Number 1. (Winter 2005) p. 137-141. Talisse, Robert. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. (Routledge: New York, 2007). -- A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy. Political Studies. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00860.x. (October 2010). Online Posting. -- Responses to My Critics. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 45, Number 1. (Winter 2009) p. 90-108. Van Hollebeke, Mark. Through Thick and Thin: Concerns About Talisses Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Volume 45, Number 1. (Winter 2009) p. 80-89. Westbrook, Robert B. Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2005)  Hereafter APPOD.  Robert B. Talisse, A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy, Political Studies, no. doi: 10:1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00860.x, Online Posting, Oct. 2010. Hereafter Farewell.  Going forward, I will use these terms interchangeably.  As has been noted by many others, this view also draws from Cheryl Misaks Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (Routledge: London, 2000).  LW 14:226  I should also note that arguments prefiguring these can be found in Talisses 2005 book Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics, (New York: Routledge) and in his co-authored essay with Scott Aikin Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 101-118.  Talisse, Farewell, 2.  Talisse is never quite clear in Farewell as to what, exactly, he takes human flourishing to be, although one does get a somewhat clearer view his 2009 Responses to My Critics, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2009) p. 90-108. This issue is taken up with greater care below.  Talisse, Farewell, 3-4.  Ibid, 5. Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (Columbia University Press: New York, 2005) p. xxiv-v, xxxviii. Hereafter PL.  John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Swallow Press: Athens, 1954) 148. Hereafter PP. Cf. Talisse, Farewell, 2, 4, 6.  Ibid, 155.  Talisse, Farewell, 5-7.  Ibid, cf. Rawls PL, 62.  Talisse, Farewell, 5, cf. Rawls, PL, 50-65.  Ibid, 6-7.  Ibid.  John Lysaker and Michael Sullivan have argued that Talisse and Aikin have so gerrymandered the terms of the debate that any account of pluralism the Deweyan is likely to give will be rendered untenable (You Talking to Me?, Transaction of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter, 2005) p. 137-141). Cheryl Misak claims that Talisse and Aikin have made a serious mistake in not recognizing that pragmatists can be pluralists of a sort, but agrees with them that pragmatists cannot be principled, across-the-board pluralists, and she further agrees with Talisses turn to Peirce (Pragmatism and Pluralism, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 2005) p. 129-135). Michael Eldridge praises Talisse for his boldness in taking on one of the most sacred of the pragmatist cows, but goes on to argue that a soft pluralism is permissible for all but the most assertive of pragmatists (Why a Pragmatist May Be a Pluralist, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter, 2005) p. 119-122). Shane Ralston argues that Talisses pluralist objection to Deweyan democracy can only function via an illicit filtering move, where Deweyan democracy is shown to only be incompatible with certain contemporary iterations of pluralism (In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life: A Reply to Talisses Pluralist Objection, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Fall 2008) p. 629-659). Melvin L. Rogers has asserted that an unfortunate conflation of Deweys views with those of Michael Sandel has led Talisse to incorrectly interpret the firm connection between Deweyan democracy and pluralism (Dewey, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Response to Robert Talisse, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2009) p. 75-79). Matthew Festenstein takes issue with what he takes to be an uncritical concept of reasonableness operating in Talisses work (Unravelling the Reasonable: Comment on Talisse, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2009) p. 55-59). Mark van Hollebeke has offered a similar criticism of the thick and thin concepts in Talisses positive project (Through Thick and Thin: Concerns About Talisses Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2009) p. 80-89). Colin Koopman maintains that Talisse is asking the right questions of Deweyan democracy, but that an over-reliance on Rawls leads Talisse to posit the wrong answer to those queries (Good Questions and Bad Answers in Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 45. No. 1 (Winter 2009) p. 60-64). Michael Bacon has argued that the Deweyan model presents a better option for the deliberative democrat than the Peircean model offered by Talisse and Misak (Michael Bacon, The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36 (9), November 2010, 1075-1091. Hereafter Politics.).  See his Reponses to My Critics, n. 7 above.  Following Westbrook in Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2005), I am also dubious of the degree to which Deweyan democracy and Peircean democracy have been assumed to be discontinuous. I worry that positioning them as competing theories posits a falsely dichotomous situation, but that investigation lies beyond the scope of this paper.  Consider William James: Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents itboth in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely once and for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards powerIt means open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth. At the same time, it does not stand for any special results. It is a method only. What Pragmatism Means, in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, edited by John J. McDermott (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1977) p. 379. Also see Richard Rorty, Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism, in Consequences of Pragmatism (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1982) p. 160-175.  My sense of things here is, following Mouffe in The Democratic Paradox (Verso: New York, 2000) that Rawls is no less guilty than Dewey of making the ethical continuous with the political, save for Dewey being explicit in doing so and Rawls accomplishing this by smuggling in ethical norms under the guise of reason.  Dewey, PP, 154. See also Lee A. McBride III, Collectivistic Individualism: Dewey and MacIntyre, Contemporary Pragmatism, Vol. 3, Issue 1 (June 2006) 70-75, William Caspary, Dewey on Democracy (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2000) p. 169-171, and Matthew Festenstein Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1997) p. 95-99. Hereafter, PPT.  Dewey LW 12:106  Ibid. See also LW 12:118-119.  Dewey, PP, 158-159.  Dewey, PP, 182-4, 192-3  Ibid, 73  Dewey, PP, 103-9.  Bacon, Politics, 1086.      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