x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ> ` tbjbj .U0%%%%8J%&4/V&V&"x&x&x&x&"&& ///////$o0h2&/&x&x&&&&/x&x&;/,-,-,-&Nx&x&/,-&/,-,-,-x&J& BV%(,-.<Q/0/,-3+3,-3,-&&,-&&&&&&/&/,-&&&/&&&&D$  Conservatism, Pragmatism, and Historical Inquiry I. Introduction In a 2001 article entitled The Classical Conservative Challenge to Dewey, Shawn ODwyer puts John Deweys understanding of method to the test of criticisms made by conservative theorist Michael Oakeshott. Oakeshott criticizes the view that technical knowledge is superior to the reliance on custom, tradition, and habit in practical knowledge, that moral intelligence can be taught, and that moral intelligence consists in the application of techniques to resolve problems. ODwyer concludes that Deweys reflections on moral deliberation pass Oakeshotts challenge to rationalism with its central themes in tact, if not unscathed. In light of ODwyers article we see that the classical conservatives and the classical pragmatists share some enticing similarities in their views on moral philosophy. Both acknowledge that inquiry draws upon its own inheritance of beliefs from the past, beliefs successfully yielded by past inquiry, and avails itself of them as resources in addressing present problems. ODwyer continues, Inquiry, then, is not external to tradition, and it is not ahistorical; it stands in continuity with past ideas, and these comprise its own traditions. I begin with an acknowledgment of ODwyers conclusions, with which I agree, because I intend my present inquiry to be a continuation of his reflections on the extent to which classical American pragmatism holds up to the challenges of classical British conservatism. Both moods of thought rely, albeit critically, on the wisdom found in historically inherited knowledge, tradition, and custom. What we think of as a past-oriented philosophy of conservatism is more complex. For instance, Edmund Burke referred to the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete, What we think of as a future-oriented philosophy of pragmatism is also more nuanced. For example, Dewey emphasized the virtues of the past when he wrote, There is a danger [] of losing the sense of historic perspective and of yielding precipitously to short-term contemporary currents, abandoning in panic things of enduring and priceless value. Because of the central function of history and tradition in conservatism, it is fitting to subject Deweys view of historical inquiry to the conservative conception of history as offered by Oakeshott. However, as we will see the result of my inquiry is that we should invert ODwyers initial question and ask, Does Oakeshotts view of historical inquiry pass the pragmatic challenge? I will focus on three aspects of historical inquiry. First, I will illustrate the methodological norms common to both Oakeshotts conservative and Deweys pragmatic methods of historical inquiry. Second, I will demonstrate that Oakeshotts description of the proper way to conceive of an historical event serves as an exemplar of the pragmatic approach to meaning, articulated by C. S. Peirce. Last, I will examine Oakeshotts criticisms of practical history. In distancing the historical past from the practical past, Oakeshott drew a distinction between practical-normative language, which expresses strategies to preserve or to change, convictions, sentiments, and tastes, and philosophical-historical language, which is explanatory, concerned only with its coherence, its intelligibility, its power to illuminate, and its fertility. Dewey understood these endeavors not as discrete or dichotomous, but as continuous with one another. To the extent that Deweys principle of continuity does not pass Oakeshotts challenge unscathed, Oakeshotts dichotomies are those which deserve to be challenged. II. Normative Methodology in Conservatism and Pragmatism The norms guiding Oakeshotts and Deweys methods of historical inquiry include the postulational character of the tools we use to reconstruct the past, the constraints of the present situation from which we hypothesize these postulates, a consequent fallibilism regarding the certainty of the conclusions our inquiries draw, and a refusal to import explanatory devices outside of or antecedent to the inquiry. Oakeshott designates the conditions which constitute historical inquiry as a mode of understanding are its theoretical postulates [] which specify it as an enquiry of a certain sort. They are not formulae for conducting an historical enquiry or premeditated norms to which it should subscribe. These theoretical postulates emerge in the practice of historical inquiry. Dewey sought to understand the nature of historical judgments with regard to the relation of propositions about an extensive past durational sequence to propositions about the present and future. The relation among these propositions concerns their credibility, relevance, and multivalent temporal structure. Historical analysis demands a search for data, conceptual principles serving as criteria for selection and for determining the relevance of the data, and systematic conceptions working to arrange the selected data. When an historian observes and sorts the data, the result is propositions about present facts, serving as the material for historical inference and reconstruction. Historians should adopt as a norm of inquiry the self-imposed restriction of not assuming that these propositions are relevant beyond the problem which demanded their search and evaluation. The historical analysis evaluates and selects these propositions, and not others, based on the conceptual subject-matter with which it operates. Oakeshott begins with the present as a universe of discourse composed of a subject, [] related to objects. And the most general modal condition of the present in historical understanding is its sole orientation to the past. The historian relates to the objects of study as survivals of the past, which evoke that past. The concern of the historian is the reconstruction, the imposition of order upon, and the re-assemblage of the past, by using the present surviving artifacts. The process by which the historian conducts this reconstruction is not recovery or discovery, but inference. The historical past must be inferred because it was never present, and did not survive. The historian dissolves the survivals from the past into their constituent aspects in order to employ them as circumstantial evidence in the inferential reconstruction of the lost past. The historical past, then, is assembled of passages of related events, inferred from survivals from the past, in the present, and the assemblage is an answer to an historical question. The past cannot be tested as true or false against any gold standard of objective truth about the past. Similar to Oakeshotts treatment of the past, Dewey did not conceive truth as some state antecedent to the inquiry to which our conclusions must correspond. Dewey sought to emancipate our thinking from the habit of testing its conclusions only by reference to antecedent existence. This is a more welcome emancipation in historical thinking, as antecedent existence is not ready at hand, if it ever is, to serve as a testing stone. For Dewey, our conclusions are warranted insofar as they resolve the problems and precariousness which initiated our inquiries. In Oakeshotts words, the historians success is measured by her ability to determine the conditions which gave rise to the surviving artifacts. Both Oakeshotts and Deweys views of history are constrained by the present, the temporal locus of inquiry. Dewey reminds us that the conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the period in which it is written. The more transparent this is made, by clarifying the present interests and their accompanying biases genetically and methodologically, the more able the historian is to abstract the conceptual schemes, conceived as postulates, which an historian brings to the selection of relevant data available as present artifacts. In this sense, history is of the present and of that which is judged significant by the present cultural milieu. The past, for Dewey and Oakeshott, is a past-of-the-present. Oakeshott reminds us too that these postulates we employ to reconstruct the past are themselves contingent survivals, which constrain the inquiry. Past events register as relevant because they evince changes, a notion we will see Oakeshott emphasize, and those changes are evident from the present perspective of a given purpose of an inquiry. Oakeshott tells us that the modal conditions of the present offer the conditions of recognition to any object (as no object is unconditionally recognizable). The modes of present recognition, whether they be practical, ethical, or aesthetic, determine the conditions of our recognition of the past we attempt to reconstruct, as that past is constituted in terms of modal conditions which match those of the present. The constraint of the present as a temporal locus of inquiry provides both Oakeshott and Dewey with the consequent norm of fallibilism. Oakeshott believes that an historical past contains only an unstable level of historical understanding. Once the historical past has been abstracted from the unintelligible flux, the relationships between occurrences are only conceptually determined and added to the necessary abstraction to the exclusion of all other possible relationships. The conceptual determination which grants the past the character of its situational identity, whether some deeper regularity of human behavior or permanent force of history, cannot be inferred from the surviving record but must be super-added to the abstracted set of occurrences. Such super-addition is not warranted by the norms which guide Oakeshotts and Deweys approaches to historical inquiry. Several historically minded nineteenth century thinkers, such as Hegel, Marx, and Darwin, identify such forces, whether in negativity, economic force, or natural selection, as regularities which are not themselves occurrences. But Oakeshott does not think that present survivals, the material we use to infer and reconstruct the historical past, speak to these forces, and thus their character as historically understood is unstable. Their instability resides in the fact that they either only speak to wide swaths of history or to immobile and brief situations held still by the character of the conceptual relationship determining the situation. Both Oakeshott and Dewey concede the imperfect nature of each historical inquiry. Given the observation that the current writing of history becomes relevant data for selection by future historians, history must always be rewritten. Such an insight renders historical analysis more humble, fallible, and self-transparent. III. The Meaning of an Historical Event Oakeshotts historical inquiry investigates the nature of the relationships among inferred past occurrences. And he conceives these occurrences as outcomes of what went before; the occurrence is a mediation of its emergence. However, what went before were also occurrences of this same type. Thus the distinguishing trait of the event is the difference it made among these occurrences. Foregoing the search for the intentions behind an occurrence or the personalities which emerge from their antecedent occurrences and give rise to future ones, Oakeshott focuses on the unintended eventual by-products of all of these engagements. In his avoidance of unwarranted explanatory devices, including intentions and personalities, Oakeshott treats history pragmatically; that is, he does not search for an explanans of a different character from an explandum: a law, a cause, or a propensity. He writes, historical events are themselves circumstantial convergences of antecedent historical events; what they are is how they came to be woven. Oakeshott looks for the character of the historical event by looking at the mediation of its emergence and the difference it makes in subsequent emerging events. Each historical event contains a significant relationship with others, and the historical understanding of the event is not a metaphysical commitment (as Hegels, Marxs, or Darwins could be construed), but an attempt to understand the relationships among events by inference from their present survivals. Much like Dewey, Oakeshott investigates the character of the relationships among these historical events, and he dispels various candidates for the exemplary relationship, including a causal relationship. After disposing of several candidates, he calls the relationship among events contingent. When an historian assembles a past, she builds a dry wall, where the events, as stones, are not held together by any universal, causal law as their mortar; instead the shapes of the stones themselves determine their relationship to one another in the wall. Their relationship in this regard is contingent. The use of this spatial metaphor to depict the historians assemblage of an historical past across a temporal span reveals the balance between subject and object in Oakeshotts logic of history. The historian is a builder, and she imaginatively infers the relationships among contingent events. However, the events themselves have a shape and a contour and this is their denotative reference, the difference they make in the shape of the construction. Dewey called his method denotative, because it is realistic in the unsophisticated sense.  The stones composing Oakeshotts dry wall have a sense of thereness, independent of the choice of the historian. Oakeshott concludes that an historical event has no necessary or essential quality. He defines it as a conflation of accessories which, here, have no exclusive characters but are the difference they made in a convergence of differences which compose a circumstantial historical identity. These historical identities themselves are also conclusions of historical inquiries and answers to historical questions. This insight evinces another pragmatic norm of inquiry, that the premises (historical circumstances) the historian uses to infer the meaning of events are themselves also conclusions. An historical event is not an assignable performance understood by imagining the intentions of the performer. It is not the consummation of a trend working throughout history. And it is not the product of a teleological struggle seeking the event conceived historically. Each of these negations is guided by the norms outline above, norms shared by Deweys notion of inquiry. For Dewey, past events register as relevant because they evince changes, and those changes can only be made evident from the perspective of a given purpose of an inquiry. IV. Practical and Pragmatic Approaches to History Oakeshott resisted absorbing modes of knowing into one which was comprehensive of them all, which is itself expressive of the pragmatic mood in philosophy. He especially resisted the tendency to make the practical mode of knowing primordial. Oakeshott created a distance between political and moral activity and the activity of the philosopher and the historian. Dewey did not see these various activities as discrete, hermetically sealed language games. Dewey supposed these modes, practical-normative and philosophical-historical, to be continuous with one another, although he did not take a reductive approach to historical and philosophical inquiry. Dewey warned against making the reductive fallacy, especially when determining the meaning of historical objects. He allowed the historian, the sociologist, and the biographer their own modes of inquiry because each has her own problems. Oakeshott presents his view of the activity and practice of historical inquiry in contradistinction to various views of the past, one of which is a view of the past whose component parts are understood only in relation to a favoured present. Oakeshott warns against reducing historical inquiry into retrospective politics, whereby history is either a mere response to presently given political ideals in order to edify the stature of those ideals with the help of golden age support or history is only seen as a way to recruit retrospectively the empirical support for ideal programs and policies meant to resolve some present problem. Thus it appears that Oakeshott treats theory, conceived of as historical-philosophical language, and practice, conceived as moral-political language, to be distinct endeavors. But the question for Oakeshott is that given that some problem, mystery, or puzzlement in the present gives rise to historical inquiry, in what meaningful sense are these problems not practical? When Dewey gave us history, in Individualism, Old and New and in Liberalism and Social Action for instance, the problem which gave rise to his need to rethink both individualism and liberalism, was the Great Depression, surely a practical problem, yet Deweys histories cannot be accurately described as retrospective politics, in Oakeshotts sense. Rather Dewey showed how past circumstances, such as the industrial revolution, had caused changes in these concepts, which needed reconstruction given the present situation. Thinking with Dewey, problems requiring contemplation, abstraction, and theoretical construction are continuous with those whose resolution relies for the most part on native, practical impulses. Dewey hypothesized the principle of continuity between the lower human functions, such as physical navigating of the world, (practice), and the higher human activities, such as abstract reasoning, (theory). The hypothesis of the principle of continuity undermines several dualisms, such as the fact/value distinction. We reason for various purposes and goals, influenced by interests and values. Our historical inquires are guided by norms, and they are measured according to various values, including coherence, consistency, testability, and relevance. According to Dewey, the higher and more complex human activities of conceptualization and reasoning recruit cognitive resources from both our lower and less complex human functions and from our monitoring of our emotions. Thinking under the norms of the principle of continuity, the mystery which gives rise to the historical inquiry may indeed have a moral or a practical valence, but that does not demand that the inquiry forego its guidance by the conservative and pragmatic norms both Dewey and Oakeshott exemplify. Nor does it demand that such an inquiry become retrospective politics. Oakeshotts criticism of practical history only has legs if one begins with a separation of theory and practice on the cue of the rationalism Oakeshott rejects. That is, conceiving of the practice of historical inquiry as culling the past for potential golden age, theoretical fodder (for the purpose of its subsequent practical employment), a procedure Oakeshott resisted, reverses the pragmatic order of operation. For Dewey, and many pragmatists inspired by him, theorizing is a practice, which emerges as a response to a problem. Insofar as historians working with Oakeshotts view of history do attempt to solve problems, Oakeshotts approach to historical inquiry aligns with Deweys in informative ways, illustrating methodological norms common to conservatism and pragmatism as well as a pragmatic understanding of the meaning of an historical event. While some conservative theorists, such as Russell Kirk, demand that dualism is an essential feature of conservatism,  Oakeshotts reliance on the present, as a constraining locus of the puzzlement which gives rise to inquiry, distances his conservatism from the ontological dualism Kirk espouses. However, to the extent that Oakeshotts division is as strict as Kirks, we need not ask if Dewey passes the conservative challenge, as ODwyer did, we need to answer the question concerning the extent to which Oakeshott passes the pragmatic test in the negative. Works Cited: Auxier, Randall. Dewey on Religion and History. Southwest Philosophy Review. Vol. 6. No. 1. January. (1990), 45-58. Auxier, Randall. Foucault, Dewey, and the History of the Present. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Vol. 16. No. 2. (2002), 75-102. Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. London: Penguin Books, 1986. Dewey, John. The Quest for Certainty. Later Works Vol. 4. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1990. Dewey, John. Art as Experience. Later Works Vol. 10. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1990. Dewey, John. Liberalism and Social Action. Later Works Vol. 11. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1990. Dewey, John. Logic The Theory of Inquiry, Later Works, Vol. 12. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1990. Johnson, Mark. The Meaning of the Body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind. Sixth Edition. South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1978. Oakeshott, Michael. On History and Other Essays. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. Oakeshott, Michael. Rationalism in Politics. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991. ODwyer, Shawn. The Classical Conservative Challenge to Dewey. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Vol. 37. No. 4. (Fall, 2001), pp. 491-514. Peirce, Charles S. The Fixation of Belief. The Essential Peirce. Edited by Edward C. Moore. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998. Peirce, Charles S. Questions Concerning Certain Capacities Claimed for Man. The Essential Peirce. Edited by Edward C. Moore. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998.  Shawn ODwyer, The Classical Conservative Challenge to Dewey, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Fall, 2001), pp. 491-514.  ODwyer, 510. ODwyer concedes that certain of Deweys writings, especially Individualism, Old and New, do offer occasional calls for central economic planning in response to the precariousness of the Great Depression. But Dewey does not succumb to the Enlightenments prejudice against prejudicethe tendency which gave rise to so much classical conservative thought dating back to Edmund Burkes Reflections on the Revolution in France. Dewey does not pretend that we can inquire from a privileged position free from cultural biases. Nor does Dewey reduce moral intelligence to the competent applications of techniques.  ODwyer, 495.  ODwyer, 495. Additionally, both classical conservatives and classical pragmatists, in general, refuse to reduce moral deliberation to a function of reason alone; instead they place an emphasis on the qualitative and affective dimensions of moral problems and on the specific circumstances which make each moral situation unique.  Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London: Penguin Books, 1986), 120.  Dewey, LW 11:6.  Charles Sanders Peirce coined the pragmatic maxim as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, in The Essential Peirce, Edited by Edward C. Moore, (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998), 146.  On History, xviii.  Rationalism in Politics, 215.  On History, 4.  On History, 4.  Dewey, LW, 12:231.  Dewey, LW, 12:231.  Dewey, LW, 12:231. We define the situation in response to a problem, keyed to genuine doubt that arrests action. We expect that the solution to almost any problem will have some relationship to other problems, but the most generic norms of inquiry are the ones that guide and mediate our efforts to apply the propositions that were effective in one situation to the requirements of another.  On History, 29.  On History, 30.  On History, 35.  On History, 36.  On History, 50.  Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, LW 4:92.  Dewey, LW, 12:232-233.  Randall Auxier, Dewey on Religion and History, Southwest Philosophy Review, Vo. 6, No. 1, January, (1990), 46. Auxier cited John Dewey, Experience and Nature, in Later Works, Vol. 1, 34.  Dewey, LW, 12:233. See also Randall Auxier, Foucault, Dewey, and the History of the Present, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002.  Dewey, LW, 12:237.  Dewey, LW, 12:237.  On History, 10.  On History, 64.  On History, 73.  On History, 73.  On History, 77.  Causal relationships subsume particularities under an overarching universal law. This type of relationship observes two objects and identifies one in kind and explained by the other as its causal condition (On History, 83). This type of relationship is determined in scientific inquiry, although the law itself may not be determined in the inquiry to which it is applied. However, Oakeshott reports that the antecedent (supposedly causal) event is separated from the event to be explained by its causal conditions by an interval of time, but that causality itself knows nothing of any such interval of time (On History, 85). And second, since the historical inquiry is attempting to answer an historical question by assembling a passage of the past composed of related events which have not survived, but which have been inferred by artifacts which have, then the two observed objects which constituted the causal relationship are not presentonly one is (On History, 86). Thus, he dismisses the causal relationship as the exemplary one in assembling the relationship among historical events. Nevertheless, he feels that its loose usage in historical inquiry is a suggestion to those significant relationships he is looking for Oakeshott also investigates the notions of correlation, analogy, and fortuitousness, (and rejects them) as candidates for the character of the relationship among historical events. However, I skip over these candidates because of the constraints of space.  Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1:380.  Dewey, Experience and Nature, LW 1:380.  On History, 103.  On History, 103.  Peirce, Questions Concerning Certain Capacities Claimed for Man, in The Essential Peirce, 66. Peirce argued that we can avoid confusion and advance knowledge by working according to the hypothesis that we do not have the power of intuition, and therefore that we cannot reason from intuitions, defined by Peirce as premises which are not also conclusions.  On History, 70.  Dewey, LW, 12:237.  On History, x.  Dewey, Art as Experience, LW 10:320.  Among these are the past of legend and saga, whose touchstone is the unity of feeling without either causal explanation or notions of exact time and place. Another is the past in which apparent contingencies are explained away by either necessary or sufficient contributing factors or by their subsumption to operation of general laws. (Rationalism in Politics,) 182.  Rationalism in Politics, 182.  Rationalism in Politics, 181.  On History, xviii.  Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 108.  Johnson, The Meaning of the Body10.  Kirk refers to the pragmatism of James and the naturalism of Dewey as having forgotten the truth of dualism (Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, Sixth Edition, (South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1978), 377.     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