x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ> ` kbjbjss 2p_%H H H H  86Dz< A+"*******$O,h.|* @$@$@$*H * *(((@$f  *(@$*(( ( s0i%(|*D+0A+(3/'3/(3/ (D( !N**(jA+@$@$@$@$ $  H H H  Deweys Dilemma: Eugenics, Education, and the Art of Living 2012 SAAP Paper Submission Word Count: 3463 Deweys Dilemma: Eugenics, Education, and the Art of Living Abstract Deweys eugenicist contemporarieswhose influence pervaded education and social policies, including state lawschampioned a fixed and limited view of human nature and society. Dewey rarely referred to eugenics in both his public writings and private correspondence, but he actually combated its supporters for decades. I argue that elements of his educational theory specifically respond to the assumptions of his eugenicist colleagues. Dewey saw people as irreducibly unique, infinite in potential, and neither wholly determined biologically, nor completely transformable environmentally. Rather than judge individuals by standardized testing and educational screening that operate according to a preconceived understanding of what is superior or inferior, he urged educators to assist in the identification and development of the unique qualities and talents of each person. Institutions and social relations also needed intelligent adjustment in order to accommodate and foster individuality. Deweys Dilemma: Eugenics, Education, and the Art of Living I It is no accident that in his Ethics textbook John Dewey discussed marriage and family, population growth, and managing the social sphere together, albeit briefly. In early and mid 20th century intellectual circles, especially in the U.S., the issue of maintaining a healthy family stock was not without its controversy. To some theorists the notion of social control alluded to various forms of population control, and beyond more traditional state laws restricting interracial marriage, social policies emerged advocating various forms of eugenics. Some of these policies manifested in state laws. Indiana was the first state in the U.S. to pass a eugenic sterilization law in 1907, followed by California in 1909, and thirty additional states and thirty countries had passed eugenics-based sterilization laws by the early 1930s. If eugenics programs were so ubiquitous, and U.S. education curricula steeped in eugenic thinking, with so many high school and college textbooks praising its virtues, why did Dewey rarely ever mention it directly? What did he think about the subject? While I can only speculate about the first question, I show that Dewey strongly disagreed with its premises and promises, and his vision of creative education provided the pragmatic corrective. An outgrowth of the misapplied biological theories that marked the intellectual history of its age, eugenics meant different things to different people, from race improvement to simply proper nutrition and healthful living. Positive eugenics programs attempted to selectively pair those judged as societys best, while negative eugenics tried to restrict procreation by those judged socially inferior. Most eugenicists were committed to limiting the transmission of undesirable heritable qualities. Lists of these qualities varied, but eugenicists commonly believed that all mental and physical human traits were Mendelian unit characters in the germ plasm, were transmitted as independent, nonreducible characters, and constituted the basis for all traits, desirable and undesirable in man. One such list is found in Charles C. Peterss Foundations of Educational Sociology (1930). Peters had complained that democracy makes a fetish of equal opportunity, and the handicapped pulled society down since they come into life with a drag. The handicapped, were those who inherited insanity, feeble-mindedness, nervousness, criminality, moral delinquency, physical malformations, weakness of personality, susceptibility to disease. Viewed in terms of the nature-nurture debate, as was often the case, eugenicists clearly fell on the nature side of the spectrum, sometimes completely dismissing social factors in individual development. Eugenics policies, negative and positive, repeatedly found their way into high school and college textbooks. Let me highlight just two out of the scores of examples in order to illustrate the span and application of eugenics in educational texts. Paul Popenoe and Roswell Johnson, in their blatantly eugenicist 1918 college textbook, Applied Eugenics, supported a national education system that would work as a sieve through which all children in the country are passed and which will enable the teacher to determine just how far it is profitable to educate each child that he may lead a life of greatest possible usefulness to the state and happiness to himself. Teachers should inspect children for ability and inability, for compulsory education should be utilized for both positive and negative eugenics programs. Decades later, John Woodside Ritchie, in his high school biology textbook, Biology in Human Affairs (1941), argued that the study of biology included learning how bow to natures authority, learn her laws, and live in harmony with her decrees. Thus, any social policy that did not directly influence an individuals biological makeup were either useless or a threat to society. The biologist magnifies differences in humans, which aids society in determining the proper place of people of varying intelligence, health, and ability. Without proper constraints, the country would suffer from a dangerous leveling of its members, where as Ritchie argued, the more efficient must be shackled that they do not outrun the less efficient. Ritchies view of human differences and social relations mixed ethics and social justice with biology: The positive part of the program is the arranging of a social order that will allow and encourage those of high abilities and desirable character to marry early and raise large families. II Steven Selden argued that Dewey stood apart from many of his contemporaries in his disapproval of eugenics programs, particularly those incorporated into educational programs. Although Seldens claim that Dewey made no direct reference to eugenics is incorrect, it is true that he barely spoke of the issuea search of his vast corpus shows only a couple of mentions of it, even in his private correspondence. Not surprisingly, Deweys most explicit mention of eugenics is found alongside his discussion of marriage, family, and population in the final passages of Ethics. Admitting that as yet our knowledge of eugenics is very imperfect it is still reasonable to hold that on the whole children of healthy parents inherit a better physical organism than children of diseased or feeble-minded parents, and that children of educated parents are likely to be better cared for and better prepared to play their part in life than children of ignorant parents. In fact at the present time many thoughtful students believe that the problem of maintaining the best stocks is one of the most serious which confronts us. Since Deweys Ethics was a textbook, the above passage seems to function mostly as an introduction to modern social issues related to family and procreation. It barely does more than acknowledge eugenics as a popular subject among his contemporaries and an important topic for further inquiry, so it should not be taken as Deweys final word on the matter. It is curious, however, that Dewey did not say much about the subject, since it was such a prominent topic in his time period, and he was constantly exposed to it. Most importantly, many Teachers Colleges supported it, as well as numerous universities and high schools across the nation, and a majority of states passed sterilization laws based upon eugenics. Incidentally, his first wife, Alice Chipman Dewey, reported in a letter that eugenics was a topic among the officials they encountered in China. And Deweys final graduate student, George R. Geiger, criticized the eugenics movement and its approach to social reform in his dissertation. Selden rightly thinks that Deweys lack of direct confrontation should not be taken as tacit acceptance of the goals and purposes of positive or negative forms of eugenics. Selden writes, If the eugenics movement hoped for a biologically stratified society of differential rewards, Dewey did not. If eugenicists believed that mental tests could and should be used for classification as opposed to diagnostic purposes, Dewey did not. If the eugenicists distrusted democracy and longed for a biologically determined intellectual aristocracy, Dewey did not. And lastly, if many among the movements followers felt that humankind could be classified into discrete races of varying worth, Dewey did not. In support, Selden first cites Deweys address to the National Negro Conference in 1909, where Dewey argued that capacities individuals gained through life-experience were not inherited or confined to a race or class. (Elsewhere, Dewey complained that so-called superior races deemed themselves as such based on their own standards and achievements.) Dewey saw no reason to accept rigid racial classifications and denied a popular eugenicist premise that certain social refinements were transmitted hereditarily or that there were racial aristocracies. Applied practically, this denial meant that every member of society, regardless of race, should have the same opportunities of social environment and personality. Moreover, any society that failed to provide the environment and education that fosters its members individual abilities deprives those people of social capital and is therefore unjust. Second, some eugenics programs devised intelligence tests that classified individuals in broad, abstract categories and average aggregates, which provided the groundwork for controversial social policies. Colgate University President George B. Cutten, for instance, utilized these mental tests in the early 1920s to argue that most people (85%, in his estimation!) have such a low level of intelligence that real democracy is illusory and untenable, and this justified the need for an intellectual aristocracy. In Mediocrity and Individuality, Dewey directly attacked Cutten and objected that no matter how much innate qualities may set limits, they are not active forces. Experience, that is to say education, is still the mother of wisdom. Dewey opposed intelligence testing insofar as it disregarded individuality or understood intelligence as pessimistically fixed. Rather than fixating on preconceived, static categories, creative education implies studying and treating individuals in their distinctive and unique qualities. It involves getting away from that class and averaged education to which the current interpretation of the results of mental testing the more rigidly commits us. III To expand upon Seldens analysis we should look to Individuality, Equality and Superiority (a companion essay to Mediocrity and Individuality) and a later essay, Human Nature. In the former, Dewey furthered his argument against educational methods based on standardized testing and quantitative comparison, where the title of scientific evidence is often added to give authority to the numerical classes in which individuals are placed. This form of pedagogical thinking fails to uncover truly individualized traits and is connected to pre-configured social arrangements with ready-made winners and losers, superiors and inferiors. This method judges people as superior, inferior, or equal based on their ability to win under existing social conditions. Superior, inferior, and equal are meaningless taken abstractly: the idea of abstract, universal superiority and inferiority is an absurdity. And when superior refers to a preconceived outcome such as success in a competitive industrial society, with the assumption that one who possesses that ability is therefore superior in other way, it betrays overcompensation for the limitations and incapacities which we all know, subconsciously at least, that we possess. Superiority, moreover, does not always flow in the direction of talent and virtuesometimes, perhaps often, the powerful are violent, treacherous, deceptive, and awful. Ironically, pedagogical theories promoting a narrow, preconfigured vision of superiority are regularly defended for the sake of individuality. However, democracy, as Dewey understood it, suffers under this view, for while democracy denotes faith in individuality, in uniquely distinctive qualities in each normal human being, it also refers to faith in corresponding unique modes of activity that create new ends, with willing acceptance of the modifications of the established order entailed by the release of individualized capacities. Deweys democracy denotes aristocracy carried to its limit. In his estimation, democracy a claim that every human individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence be the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect. The habit of fixed and numerically limited classifications is the enemy alike of true aristocracy and true democracy. Even though he rejected rigid racial and intellectual classifications and biological determinism, Dewey was not a strict social-environmentalist, eitherhe did not fall neatly on either side of the nature-nurture debate. He admitted that there are probably some limits to the modifiability of human nature and to institutional change, but what these limits are is still an open question. He warned that these limits have to be arrived at by experimental data on which pronouncements may be based. When found, these limits need to be examined as to whether they are absolute or a result of limitations of our technique for effecting change. For Dewey the tendency to learn and hence to modify and be modified is itself part of the native and hereditary structure: existing organs, impulses, instinctive tendencies, form the resources and the capital on which future development must build. Included in this native stock is, however, the tendency to learn and to acquire. That change is itself part of (human) naturewas of course an important part of Deweys metaphysical outlook. However, he also thought it showed how impossible it was to make any hard and fast distinction between the natural and the acquired. As a result, if we recognize that the capacity to change is part of the natural make up of every human tendency, then this fact will save us from devoting energy to unreal questions and lead to concentration upon the important ones: What are the limits to modification through learning? How does the modification concretely proceed? How is it controllable? IV What then was the relation between Deweys aristocracy carried to its limit, and superiority, inferiority, equality and democracy? Dewey was not forwarding a view that all persons are qualitatively or quantitatively equal. Rather, informed by his understanding of democracy, Dewey believed in moral equality, which for him meant that each individual is distinct, unique. Moral equality means incommensurability, the inapplicability of common and quantitative standards. It means intrinsic qualities which require unique opportunities and differential manifestation; superiority in finding a specific work to do, not in power for attaining ends common to a class of competitors, which is bound to result in putting a premium on mastery over others. Moreover, we cannot base moral equality on legal, political and economic arrangements, which are bound to be classificatory and concerned with uniformities and statistical averagesthese classifications ultimately undermine individuality. The reverse should be the case: politics, laws and economics need to be grounded on moral equality. Dewey claimed that our finest modes of activity are science and art; distinguishing them functionally, the former is one of our best tools to prediction of events and security in an often precarious world, and the latter is one of the most effective means to transmit and enrich meaning. Both, at their best, involve honest inquiry, the trademarks of which are distinctiveness and individuality. Inquiry itself thus has its own incommensurable quality and performs its own unique service. Since for Dewey all modes of activity constitute the art of living (including science), and because individuals develop out of their social context, moral equality thus concerns the art of living with others: Direct personal relationships, the affections and services of human companionship are its most widespread and available manifestations. This is the thrust of his blow against the snobbery of the snobbish. Being superior in the art of friendship, companionship, or in being empathetic, caring, loving, artistic in the colloquial sense, etc., does not require mastery of winning in a competitive society or being a member of an intellectual or racial aristocracy. The snobbery of those that say otherwise is most evident in the neglect of the superior gifts and attainments of the humble of the earth in these respects. Moreover, no contact of this human sort is replaceable; with reference to it all are equal because all are incommensurable, infinite. Deweys counter-argument to eugenicist assumptions and their educational curricula emphasized the transactional nature of the relationship between individuals and their communities: both shape and are shaped by each other. If part of the goal of education, in addition to providing students with essential tools, was to discover and release individualized capacities so that they might make their own way with whatever of social change is involved in their operation, then part of the role of society is to adjust to various intelligences and superiorities. That is, since plasticity is a metaphysical feature of both individuals and their social world, a Deweyan vision of human flourishing at once involves facilitating the functional creation of individuals that can adapt to current conditions and making current conditions functional for individualswe are to make society work for its members, too. Part of the art of living, of course, involves vocation. People probably need place and purpose in order to flourish, and ones occupation ought to contribute to the creation and development of lives worth living. Dewey had already addressed the issue of vocation in detail in Democracy and Education (1916). A vocation, he wrote there, means nothing but such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates. There is overlap, then, between approaching education solely as a means of trade education, that is, of only securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits, and the aforementioned practice of quantification and mental testing according to narrow classifications of intelligence. Among other things, both treat education as a means to perpetuate the existing order of industrial society, rather than operating as a means of its transformation. Dewey is specific about the meaning of this transformation. The desired transformation is not difficult to define in a formal way. It signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptiblewhich breaks down the barriers of distance between them. It denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent: based upon its congeniality to his own aptitudes. Democratic education is therefore an especially important medium in this regard. Urged Dewey, Democracy will not be democracy until education makes it its chief concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought and companionship. At present the intellectual obstacle in the way is the habit of classification and quantitative comparisons. What must accompany this move away from the latter pedagogy is a shift in thinking about what constitutes the superior person. Therefore, while Dewey rarely directly addressed eugenics, he forwarded a powerful rebuke of its accompanying assumptions about human nature and intelligence. V Deweys own metaphysical and social-political perspective was therefore ultimately incompatible with the claims of eugenicists and those that held to similar views concerning human nature and biological determinism. It seems plausible that rather than addressing eugenics directly, Deweys strategy for dealing with them was to attack the underlying metaphysical assumptions supporting their views and their related pedagogical theories. In this sense, then, Dewey combated eugenics for decades without framing it as such. Eugenicists believed in the heredity of individual characteristics from idleness to ambition, sometimes based on race, sometimes on class, sometimes on physical or mental prowess. They called for a stratified society and for the implementation of either positive or negative breeding strategies in order to manage it. The eugenicists desire to impose strict classification standards on individuals manifested in standardized testing and intelligence screening, which included preconceived definitions of superior, inferior and equal that fit a static, limited notion of who or what is best for civilization. Often, as in the case of Cuttens speech, democracy was downplayed or outright rejected, and in its place a biologically determined intellectual aristocracy was favored. Dewey thought that instead we should learn to see our world, our cultures, our societies, our natures, and our modes of activity as fluid, not static, and each form of action called for its own specific superiorities and inferiorities. The eugenicist assumption that individually acquired characteristics are solely hereditary ignored the active force of social and cultural conditions in shaping individuals. Mental tests that failed to diagnose individual talents and potentialities, and focused too narrowly on quantitative averages, were unable to measure the broad range of intelligences, talents, and qualitative differences of persons. Deweys counter-position to eugenicist educational theory not only highlighted his argument against it. It also underscored his understanding of the individual as unique, unfinished, and infinite in potential. Of note, this debate with other educational theorists illuminated the crucial role of education in rethinking the contemporary world and the place of the individual in it. Dewey stressed the importance of quality over quantityhis hypothesis was that through thoughtful, experimental action human living might become more fulfilling, more meaningful and enriched, although there were certainly no guarantees, especially in the context of modernity. In fact, concentration, crowding, and difficulties with meaningful employment may act as bulwarks against enriching the lives of individuals and cultivating the uniqueness and individuality that lies potentially in each. In my view, Dewey provided an important contribution here that goes beyond simply presenting a rebuttal and alternative to his eugenicist contemporaries, even though that alone is significant. What I also hope to have shown in this essay are two complementary features of Deweys orientation that point to further lines of inquiry with relation to focusing on the qualitative aspects of our highly populated, industrial, and increasingly urbanized lives. First, Dewey emphasized the responsibility of educators to discern carefully the particular specialties and possibilities of each student. Second, he forwarded a form of democracy that values the cultivation of individuality, shuns coercion and radical means-ends dichotomies, and urges the creation of a sense of place for everyone, which involves finding ways to accommodate the peculiar geniuses in persons. Examined together as complementary ideals, they display his faith in the possibility of the transformation of the individual and society. Even while rejecting any utopian thinking, if intelligently coordinated they offer a way forward in figuring out how we might make our world work for seven billion people and counting. Notes     PAGE  PAGE 1  David Cullen, Back to the Future: EugenicsA Bibliographic Essay, The Public Historian 29, n. 3 (Summer 2007): 163.  John L. Rury, [untitled review of Selden, Inheriting Shame] History of Education Quarterly 40, n. 1 (Spring, 200): 104.  Steven Selden, Inheriting Shame: The Story of Eugenics and Racism in America (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999), 68.  Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-environment controversy, 19001941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), 46, quoted in ibid., 91.  Peters, Foundations of Educational Sociology (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 274, quoted in ibid.  Paul Popenoe and Roswell Johnson, Applied Eugenics (New York: Macmillan, 1918), 370, 371, quoted in ibid., 54.  John Woodside Ritchie, Biology in Human Affairs (New York: World Book Company, 1941), 31, quoted in ibid., 77.  Ibid., 90.  Ritchie, Biology in Human Affairs, 40, quoted in ibid.  Ritchie, Biology in Human Affairs, 699, quoted in ibid., 78.  Ibid., 11317. Selden is, as far as I know, one of the few scholars to discuss the relation between Dewey and eugenics. John Lachs, and Robert Talisse mention it, too, but even more briefly than Selden: The distinction between evolution and eugenics is evident in American philosophy through its emphasis on democratic participation and individual liberty, both of which are at odds with governmentally sponsored eugenics. John Dewey is an apt example in this regard. While endorsing Darwinian evolution, he critiqued the eugenicist ideal of Plato and advocated a society that maximizes the possibility of full and equal participation of all its members in the benefits that government provides. For Dewey, facilitating such participation through education and rational persuasion is indispensable to promotion of social welfare and justice. American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia (New York: Routledge, 2008), 256.  Ethics, revised ed, The Later Works, v. 7: 1932, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Press, 1985), 454.  Selden, Inheriting Shame, 113.  For the propagation of poverty the genius of this country can hardly be outdone in India, [sic] Meantime, here, in this resort, the great houses of the officials are being built and the officials discuss eugenics and other modern doctrines, while the latest concubine exhibits the newest baby, as happened a few days ago during the call of a foreigner. (04099) Alice Chipman Dewey to Albert C. Barnes, August 19, 1920, The Correspondence of John Dewey, v. 2: 19191939, rev. eds. 2005 and 2008, Larry A. Hickman, General Editor (Charlottesville, Va: InteLex Corporation, 19992005).  Dewey acknowledged Geigers attack on eugenics with no critical comments (hence apparently approvingly) in a letter to Geiger. (08388), John Dewey to George Raymond Geiger, January 23, 1930, The Correspondence of John Dewey, v. 2. Geigers dissertation was published as The Philosophy of Henry George (New York: Macmillan, 1933), and he addressed censoriously the eugenic approach to social reform in Chapter X, Georges Ethical Solution, specifically pages 53642. Geiger was critical of the movements good faith, i.e., its end goal, and the circularity of the means employed by its adherents in attempting to achieve it. Citing F. H. Hankins in The Racial Basis of Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1926)who argued that widespread education and free discussion will do much to introduce positive eugenicsGeiger noticed (among other things) that the movements seeming failure to recognize explicitly that a breeding program is the definite product and peculiar creation of a social system, that it is thus as much dependent for its application upon an economic and political structure as is any other social proposal. For Geiger, The very fact that such vital eugenic and characteristically social agencies are introduced by the eugenic approach only incidentally seems to give evidence of a genuine difficulty in this concentration upon the suggestions of biology. Ibid., 539, 539. In other words, the very means of eugenics must themselves be the product of prior social means, so eugenicists own prescriptions reveal that they rely on social means and the priority of social factors to achieve their supposed biological ends; thus they undercut their own premises. Ibid., 540, 541.  Selden, Inheriting Shame, 113.  Dewey, Individuality, Equality and Superiority, The Middle Works, v. 13: 19211922, Essays, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 295.  Dewey, MW 4:157, quoted in Selden, Inheriting Shame, 114.  Stated Dewey, Mr. Cutten begins his presidential career with a startling view of the social stratification which is to be the ultimate outcome of an educational classification based on intellectual classifications by means of mental testing. We are to arrive at a caste system like that of India, but on a just and rational basis. For [quoting Cutten] when the tests of vocational guidance are completed and developed, each boy and girl in school will be assigned to the vocation for which he is fitted. There will be no difficulty in filling the ranks of unskilled labor and mechanical operators, for Mr. Cutten implicitly believes the yarn that the army tests have shown that the average mentality of the population is slightly over thirteen years. Mediocrity and Individuality, The Middle Works, v. 13: 19211922, Essays, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 290.  Ibid., 294.  Selden, Inheriting Shame, 116.  Mediocrity and Individuality, MW 13: 294.  Individuality, Equality and Superiority, MW 13: 295.  Ibid., 296. Our new feudalism of the industrial life which ranks from the great financier through the captain of industry down to the unskilled laborer, revives and reinforces the feudal disposition to ignore individual capacity displayed in free or individualized pursuits. Ibid.  Ibid., 297, emphasis added.  Ibid., 29798.  Human Nature (1932), The Later Works, v. 6, 19311932, Essays, eEd. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985, 38. Dewey provided concrete examples connected to arguments over the supposed rigidity of human nature. He wrote that the present controversies between those who assert the essential fixity of human nature and those who believe in a great measure of modifiability centre chiefly around the future of war and the future of a competitive economic system motivated by private profit. It is justifiable to say without dogmatism that both anthropology and history give support to those who wish to change these institutions. It is demonstrable that many of the obstacles to change which have been attributed to human nature are in fact due to the inertia of institutions and to the voluntary desire of powerful classes to maintain the existing status. Ibid.  Ibid., 32.  Ibid.  Individuality, Equality and Superiority, MW 13: 299.  Ibid.  Ibid.  Ibid., 300.  Ibid., 297.  Dewey, Democracy and Education, The Middle Works, v. 9: 1916, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 316. Occupation is a concrete term for continuity. It includes the development of artistic capacity of any kind, of special scientific ability, of effective citizenship, as well as professional and business occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in gainful pursuits. Ibid., 317.  Ibid., 326  Individuality, Equality and Superiority, MW 13: 300. ;<dhi~t y 0 o 1 2      # y z Żڷ{wpiah!nhQ`qH* h!nhzGU hzGUhzGUhMh(h(6h( h!nhQ`qhh5h^% h^%5>*h!nh^%5>*hLDhDVhRxhDwhDwhLD5>*hLDhLDCJaJh!nhLD5>* hLDhLD h,C[5>* hLD5>* h 5>*h!nh 5>*&<WXijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ $da$gdLDdgdQ`qgdLDdgd pggj : d`gda $da$gd d`gdQ`q $da$gd^%dgdQ`q d`gdDw $da$gdLD 789:OTg-56k]$23Lm#_deIm¾¾ݫݚݏݏݏݏ݇h!nhf6hIf h!nht[ht[jh!nha0JUhahb' h~Lht2ht2huhKh_7Y h!nhB|nhB|nhMhf h!nhfjh!nhf0JUh(hzGU h!nhQ`q5 \e#or)A3FZ[[n&*!!'!E#F#H#V#\#k#n###p$s$%%%%&&&&&&& h!nh h h-hh5hg h!nh?|Ph?|Pjhj0JUhG jh!nhf0JUh!nhf6hD|hB|n h!nhfB *!G#H#$<''))*,-/K2O2N57a;=5?AAdgdQ`qgdQ`q^gdQ`q $da$gd d`gdQ`q&&&:';'D'L'))))Z+[+I-Q---y//////////000011I2J2K2O2P2s2z2221383J5K5c5d5*7+777E8T8e9k9l9t99999E:O:s:t:_;`;p;hR;hhf6 hhfhh5h h!nhh!nhf6hh h!nh-jh!nhf0JUh- h!nhfDp;x;;;T=U=`=m=====2?3?Y@c@f@g@AAAABBDDbEkEEEGGHHKKKKKKKMMMMNN@PWP:Q;QrQxQRR-U.UVVVWWWDZmZg\p\ѳhPhhQ`q h!nhQ`qh.( h!nh'h'h!nhf6hh5hfjh!nhf0JU h!nh|h| h!nhfhj.BA CDDEGK+OdgdQ`qgdQ`q^gdQ`q d`gdQ`qp\^^^^^^bbccccddeeff-g1ggghgjgogpgqgsgtgvgwgygzg|g}gggggggggggggggg hh9hIhù×h!nh 6 h!nh jh!nh 0JUh#0JmHnHuh h 0Jjh 0JUhQjhQUhfhf5>*hQ`qhLh[Bh hYh= h!nhQ`q6 h!nhQ`q5pgrgsgugvgxgyg{g|gggggggg hhii$jjkkLkkgdagdQ`qh]hgdABt &`#$gdJ@=IhKhihhhhhiiipiiiii$j%jHjXjjjjjkkkkk6kLkMkWkokkknn o!o"o(o*o6oEoooooooorqqrrrrrr&sDsttxxxxxxy%y8y?yyyyyyyhfzh 6 hfzh h jh 0JUjh!nh 0JUh!nh 6 h!nh Nk ooorxxyyf}t}}}}7H܂*2:HV#0ijgdQ`qy|| }}f}g}t}u}~}}}}}}}}}}}}78HIY_`p܂݂ނ%*+23:;HIJQVW_vx#$01]dijkhQ`qhQh0h 6 h0h h jh!nh 0JUh!nh 6 h!nh Jjk01hBP/ =!"#$% D@D Q`qNormalCJPJ_HaJmH sH tH DA@D Default Paragraph FontRiR  Table Normal4 l4a (k(No List Q`qFootnote Text,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char1 Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char1 Char Char Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char,Footnote Text Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char1 CJPJaJ@&@ Q`qFootnote ReferenceH* Q`qFootnote Text Char Char Char Char Char Char1,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char1 Char Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char1 Char Char Char Char,Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char2,Footnote Text Char Char_HmH sH tH <+@"< f Endnote TextCJaJ>*@1> fEndnote ReferenceH*4 @B4 ABtFooter  !.)@Q. ABt Page Numbera 0+Footnote Text Char Char Char Char Char CharOJQJ_HmH sH tH 7  ZE:!Z#%'()I*J-*/1_35279<=?CE:I-MNk}vwxyz{|}~xo-q~6 +L:.gGT\k}<WXijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~:  *GH<!!*$%'K*O*N-/a355799 ;<<=?C+GiEiiiiiqq-s3s5t;twwl}hjor//>>AAMNp_p_r_r_s_s_u_v_x_y_{_|___t`z`aabbbccccccc dd2g4gggjj|oopppphunuvuuuvvvw!w9w?wJwwzzzz<{B{J{P{x{{{}}l}33333333333333333333333333333333iiK*O*99KCKOOj_o_p_p_r_r_s_s_u_v_x_y_{_|___ccuuzzH{V{}h}l}iip_p_r_r_s_s_u_v_x_y_{_|___l}\[ RxI, ^%Q&'(.(So,j*3J@=X@[BCLD~LCO?|PzGU_7YJuYhZ,C[j]@^AeB|npQ`qABtvDwczD|ugz#ht[-= T;CQt2LO]2j`(ECZ(b f|yb'nIL G =P0DVRhYza gj.3KuMPR;YIf7@<_gz%{H{}l}Ac0AAA@iiCiik}`@Unknowngz Times New RomanTimes New Roman5Symbol3& z Arial7&{ @Calibri"1h T>2Q0>2Q0!4d@_@_2QKX ?Q`q2'Dewey s Dilemma: Eugenics and EducationtmOh+'0   @ L Xdlt|(Deweys Dilemma: Eugenics and EducationNormaltm84Microsoft Office Word@y@'i@aa0i>2Q՜.+,0 hp|  0@_ (Deweys Dilemma: Eugenics and Education Title  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSUVWXYZ[]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrsuvwxyz{}~Root Entry F