x_filesize')); // Sort image tag $OC_sortImg = 'current sort selection'; ?> ࡱ> y{x'` gbjbjLULU ;.?.?WN'J`8\z4,R"a,c,c,c,c,c,c,$4.h0~,QQQ,,Y Y Y Qa*Y Qa,Y Y :&,& 0i=& a*,0,G&R1Y1&1&:Y ,,j,QQQQD  Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the State Abstract: In this essay I propose a conception of pluralism rooted in the classical pragmatist tradition. Drawing on the work of William James and Mary Parker Follett, I articulate political pluralism through their work and endeavor to extend their thought in order to think through the application of pragmatist pluralism to the state. I focus particularly on state governance in the form of policymaking, drawing particularly on the work of Follett in order to demonstrate that pragmatist pluralism lends itself to deliberative democracy as a form of governance in practice. Pluralism has been at the center of debates in political theory and philosophy for the past century. The concept of pluralism, defined as acceptance of the many (rather than the one), difference (rather than sameness) and at least partial disunity (rather than unity), has occupied attention because it entails potential problems for communal living and self-governance, which are assumed to necessitate some degree of consensus. Theorists and philosophers of political pluralism, having accepted pluralism as a descriptive fact, ask: given that pluralism makes consensus-formation difficult, how are we to live together and govern ourselves under conditions of pluralism? This paper begins to carve out an answer to this question based on the work of classical pragmatists, William James and Mary Parker Follett, specifically attending to the question of how governance is possible given political pluralism. Despite strong critiques of a pragmatist approach to pluralism, I argue that pragmatism both offers a way to understand and validate societal pluralism and to understand the role of pluralism in the state. Pragmatist Pluralism The problem of pluralism in philosophy figured centrally in the work of William James. James both recognized pluralism as a description of reality and endorsed pluralism as a good. His empirical observation of pluralism motivated his conviction that the differences that populated the world may never come together in a whole. The pluralistic view that James espouses is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-form at all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it may remain outside of the largest combination of it ever made, and that a distributive form of reality, the each-form, is logically as acceptable and empirically as probable as the all-form commonly acquiesced in as so obviously the self-evident thing. Turning to the individual, James asserts that knowledge is always partial: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. This partiality of insight contributes distinctiveness to the individual, conferring upon her a unique perspective. These unique perspectives and ideals are not wholly available to others; we all have a certain blindness to the experiences of others and to the significances of these experiences to them. The recognition of both our own limited standpoint and our inability to know fully the perspective of another, James urges, should lead to humility, and tolerance, reverence, and love for others. Late in his career, James began to elaborate the implications of pluralism in terms of politics. In his essay, The Moral Equivalent of War, he offers a tentative and tailored resolution to a particular conflict of values regarding war. In his intellectual negotiation of the conflict between pacifists and war advocates on the eve of WWI, James sought a resolution of that antagonism that did not necessitate the capitulation of one side to the other. Endeavoring to inhabit the perspectives of both sides, James wanted to capture both of their needs in a common ideal. He proposed an alternative to sending men to war, that of a conscription of young men enlisted against Nature, that sought to satisfy the desire of much of the population to maintain martial virtues, but also to avoid the ravages of war. He proposed this integrative ideal as a moral equivalent of war. Though underdeveloped, James offers an initial theoretical resolution to a situated conflict of values, from which Follett later drew inspiration for her concept of integration. Mary Parker Follett, another early theorist of pluralism, also validates pluralism as a political good, but provides a fuller account of the role of pluralism in political life than does James. For Follett, pluralism is both a descriptive fact and a normative good. Difference is, for her, constitutive of social and political life and that which provides the opportunity for growth. Though significantly influenced by James, Follett struggled to incorporate her pragmatist and idealist proclivities. Thus, both James and Dewey can be read into her work, but also Royce and Hegel. Her resolution of this intellectual discord is evident in her concept of integration, which drives her contributions to political theory. Here she utilizes James conception of integration of ideals, supplemented by her understanding of Freudian psychology (as interpreted by Edwin Holt), to suggest a way to understand the development of a kind of unity out of difference, but one that recognizes the irreducibility and desirability of difference. Follett begins by privileging difference as a central feature of social life. Pluralism manifests in the individual, between individuals and between groups in society. Turning to the political, one of the questions that motivates Folletts discussion of democracy is how a populace with divergent desires can form a common will and govern itself. Follett rejects as solutions mere consent or yielding of power to an expert class; these answers cannot ground democracy because they do not address the question of difference. If dealing with difference is the crux of the social process, then the question is how to approach diversity and conflict so as to promote growth and progress. Though diversity pervades society, it need not result in conflict. The confrontation of diverse interests may lead to one of four outcomes: (1) voluntary submission of one side; (2) struggle and the victory of one side over the other; (3) compromise; or (4) integration. It is the last of these which Follett argues should ground democratic practice. Integration is the creative process of confronting diverse desires, the revealing of values, the consequent revaluation of values, followed by a uniting of desires in a new value and activity. Follett describes the form of interaction in a committee meeting as a model for the process of integration: I go to a committee meeting in order that all together we may create a group idea, an idea which will be better than any one of our ideas alone, moreover which will be better than all of our ideas added together. The novel idea emerges from the intermingling of all the different ideas of members of the group. From this interpenetration, a common, composite idea develops that is both different than mere compromise and than any of the constituent ideas. Following James integration of ideals, Follett emphasizes that something new emerges from this sharing of ideas: Whenever we have a real group something new is actually created. Folletts emphasis on the creation of new collective desires resonates with James emphasis on the invention of new ideals. Difference is essential to the process of integration: In that continuous coordinating which constitutes the social process both similarity and difference have a place. Unity is brought about by the reciprocal adaptings of the reactions of individuals, and this reciprocal adapting is based on both agreement and difference. Difference is not obliterated through the process of creating unity, but rather difference is the condition that makes unity possible. As in James Moral Equivalent of War, it is the presence of divergent views that necessitates the invention of a unifying ideal. In both James and Folletts views, the divergent desires that lead to conflict in the first place are likely to still be present even after the achievement of a unifying ideal or an integrated whole. However, where the differences between parties generated an impasse to action, now the new ideal or integrated whole offers a way forward. According to Follett, this is never the end to conflict. Rather, the process is forever iterative; after each integration difference emerges on new planes: Social progress is to be sure coadapting, but coadapting means always that the fresh unity becomes the pole of a fresh difference leading to again new unities which lead to broader and broader fields of activity. Follett takes integration to be the central social and political process. Thus, she sees democracy as an essentially creative activity. Just as James urges us to understand pluralism in a way that motivates us to strive to understand and appreciate the differences we perceive in others, Follett encourages us to see the unity that integration allows us to achieve as something that we must work to attain: Progress does not depend upon the similarity which we find but upon the similarity we achieve. Thus, democracy is a project that we must work at. Pragmatist Pluralism and the State In his article, Resurrecting the Pluralist Universe, David Schlosberg argues that the classical pragmatists, specifically James and Follett, have much in common with contemporary political theorists who work on the problem of pluralism, both in terms of substantive focuses on difference, and in theoretical work on unity without uniformity and communication across difference. However, one important development in recent work on pluralism, particularly in the agonistic democracy literature, is a turn away from the state as a site in which pluralism can and should be negotiated and towards civil society and the public sphere. This recent theoretical turn away from the state prompts Schlosberg to ask: Is the state pluralistically redeemable? Utilizing the work of the classical pragmatists, I endeavor to reorient the discussion of pluralism back towards the state. Granting the agonist critique that the state has often been a source of suppression of pluralism under the guise of liberalism, I look into the black box of the reified state and interrogate the practices of the state that can be rethought from a pragmatist pluralist perspective. Specifically, I examine public policymaking as a site in which we should and can be attentive to pluralism. Pragmatist pluralism, and specifically Follettian pragmatist pluralism, points us to a reconception of governance, specifically public-policymaking, as deliberative practice. Follett provides a picture of public policy-making grounded in experience: We sit around the council table not blank pages but made up of all our past experiences. Then we evolve a so-called common will, then we take it into the concrete world to see if it will work. If our common solution fails in testing, then we must make necessary modifications and try again; this is the process of common will formation. However, the ideal of the common will is ever elusive: The common will never finds perfection but is always seeking it. Consensus is an ideal that we are constantly striving for through the process of integration and pragmatic experimentation. The part of the process of integration that is key to our understanding of deliberation is the process of re-valuation. For Follett, values are neither static nor isolated, but rather are contextual, dynamic, and a function of our activity. The process of valuation is inherently social and tied to practice and experience. But because values are tied to experience and experience is multiple and varied, diverse values proliferate and often come into conflict. According to James, what makes the conflict of values a particularly thorny problem is that our own experiences, feelings and interests cloud our ability to see the values of others as equally possible and equally valid. That is, we are initially (and sometimes incorrigibly) blind to what makes a life significant for another person. James urges that because we cannot have the experience of the other, which generates her unique perspective on the world and her ideals, we cannot condemn the forms of existence that she treasures, so long as they do not bring harm to our own. Despite our blindness, we should strive to recognize our own views as necessarily partial and contingent, to widen our perspective in order to apprehend a larger world of varied ideals, and to open ourselves to the experiences of others. The fact that values are dynamic and relational creates the condition of possibility of their destabilization by the process of deliberation. We all can, as James himself illustrates in What Makes a Life Significant, open ourselves to the experiences of others in daily life, but deliberation more directly generates this process by making extant pluralism apparent to those brought together by a common problem. Deliberation forces us to see each other in both our difference (of experiences and desires) and our sameness of common pursuit of problem resolution. It is this encounter, this sharing of experiences and desires in a deliberative forum that opens up the possibility of revaluation of interests. In the words of Follett: The confronting of diverse interests each claiming right of way leads us to evaluate our interests, and valuation often is evolved into revaluation; not in the sense that sour grapes hang high, or that a pis aller must be accepted, but a genuine revaluation. It also draws into the field of attention other values which otherwise might not be taken into account, for our choice is a choice of activities in which all the values have a stake. Whereas in daily life we are able to narrow our field of vision to the perspective generated by our own ideals and desires, in deliberation we are presented with the experiences and desires of people that differ from us. As a result of this encounter, our field of vision is stretched to accommodate not merely our own course of life but those divergent forms of life that are foreign to us. This stretching opens a space for reflection; it provokes the recognition of the contingency of our experiences and desires and the necessarily partial view we have of the world, and by virtue of it, of the problem at hand. When before we saw the other as foreign, he with whom we intractably disagreed, we now see him as a familiar being, one who strives just as we do, but in ways conditioned by his own idiosyncratic experiences. The process of familiarization enabled in the deliberative context allows us to see each other as partners in collaboration, rather than competitors in a zero-sum fight over outcomes. As Follett asserts, domination, which necessarily produces winners and losers, is the wrong paradigm for solving social problems. In a competitive framework we are condemned to reify the differences between us and to seek self-gain over cooperation, but the process of deliberative interaction facilitates the interrogation of difference and the opening of space for new ideals to emerge as solutions to common problems. One may object that this process is only possible if the parties are open to such a transformative encounter. Follett addresses this objection. She asserts that deliberation can only be a valid process if those involved accept that the ideas that they enter the meeting with are to interweave with those of other participants in order to create something new; if participants insist on maintaining their own ideas, then solutions to problems are impossible. This may seem a high bar for deliberation, but Follett contends that the mere act of participating in a deliberative forum helps to create an environment in which revaluation is made easier. Follett asserts that the very fact of our doing something together creates a bond. We are doing something together if we merely sit round the table. It is the process of deliberation that creates a sentiment of working together, what Follett calls sympathy. Sympathy emerges from the process of interrelation: This true sympathy, therefore, is not a vague sentiment they bring with them; it springs from their meeting to be in its turn a vital factor in their meeting. It is the feeling of being united towards a common purpose. For a deliberative group, it is a consciousness of themselves as a new unit and a realization of the needs of that unit. Whereas the individuals in the group previously saw themselves as isolated defenders of their negotiating positions in a competitive political environment, they now see themselves as engaged in a common cause, one that invites them to connect with one another rather than differentiate themselves. In the deliberative setting, the desires of the participants become intertwined in the search for resolution of a problem. Another concern about deliberation, which Follett also addresses, is the role of power in the deliberative context. When politics and policy-making is viewed as strategic bargaining, power takes on an important role. Here, power is seen as leverage, that which allows one party to get what it wants. Follett, worried about the destructive nature of this understanding of politics, urges that we must also reconceptualize power in addition to reconceptualizing politics itself. In strategic bargaining, power is wielded against others in an attempt to gain advantage. However, if we reconceive strategic bargaining as integration, our goal is no long to win, but rather to work together to solve a common problem. Because integration entails the breaking down of difference and the endeavor to understand the experience and desires of ones partners in deliberation, the process of integration works to neutralize the use of arbitrary, coercive power. Instead of power over, the power created in integration is power with. Follett views power with as genuine power because it is power over the deliberating whole, rather than power over others. In this way, our decisions as a deliberative body are empowered because we have achieved through by working together. In this democratic process, legitimacy is attained through our active engagement with one another over concrete problems, rather than passively registering our preferences at the voting booth. Thus for Follett, democracy is an active process, an attempt to create unity, that requires the experience of all. It is learning how to unite experience with experience. Follett urges that we treat discussion not as a struggle but as experiment in cooperation. It is by this process that society achieves growth and progress, and it is this process that defines her vision of democracy. Conclusion In this essay, I endeavored to provide a pragmatist account of political pluralism, grounded in the work of James and Follett, and to extend their work in order to think though the application of pragmatist pluralism to the state. I focused specifically on state governance in the form of policymaking, drawing heavily on the work of Follett in order to demonstrate that pragmatist pluralism lends itself to deliberative democracy as a form of governance in practice. One parting thought on the problem of deep pluralism. Deep pluralism has shown itself to be a theoretically intractable problem. But the lack of a satisfactory theoretical answer to the problem of deep pluralism has not deterred thoughtful and sophisticated reflections on the role of pluralism in political life. To theorize politics is to recognize that there are concrete problems in the world that need to be addressed, not just conflicts of value in the abstract. In order to honor political reality and to provide an account of politics that can both help us to understand political life and conceive of a way to do better, we cannot just throw up our hands in the face of intractable value conflicts. Rather, we need to theorize ways to negotiate pluralism in practice in the situated places where it occurs. Pragmatism provides a means to do this, not by offering rules for the adjudication of conflict, but by offering a way of thinking about solving problems under the condition of pluralism. On this view, it is not the responsibility of political theory to say how deep pluralism can be solved, but rather to offer a way forward, while understanding and respecting that there may not always be a way forward in all conflicts. This is, sometimes, the best we can do. Bibliography Follett, M. P. (1918). The New State: Group Organization, The Solution of Popular Government. New York, NY, Longmans, Green and Co. Follett, M. P. (1924). Creative Experience. New York, NY, Longmans, Green and Co. James, W. [1910]The Moral Equivalent of War. In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. (1977). Ed. By J. McDermott. Chicago University of Chicago Press, pp. 660-671. James, W. The Types of Philosophic Thinking. In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. (1977). Ed. By J. McDermott. Chicago University of Chicago Press, pp. 482-496. James, W. On A Certain Blindness In Human Beings. In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. (1977). Ed. By J. McDermott. Chicago University of Chicago Press, pp. 629-645. James, W. What Makes A Life Significant. In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition. (1977). Ed. By J. McDermott. Chicago University of Chicago Press, pp. 645-660. Koopman, C. (2009). Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. New York, Columbia University Press. McClure, K. (1992). On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality, and Political Identity. Dimensions of Radical Democracy. C. Mouffe. London, Verso. Schlosberg, D. (1998). "Resurrecting the Pluralist Universe." Political Research Quarterly 51(3): 583-615. Talisse, R. B. and S. F. Aikin (2005). "Why Pragmatists Cannot be Pluralists." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41(1): 101-118.  Schlosberg, following McClure (1992), notes three distinct generations of pluralism, the classical pragmatists, Dahl and the empirical pluralists, and the agonistic democrats (Schlosberg 1998).  See Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin (2005)  David Schlosberg, ibid., 589.  William James, The Types of Philosophic Thinking, in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. McDermott. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 494.  William James, On A Certain Blindness In Human Beings, in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. McDermott. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 645.  William James, What Makes A Life Significant, in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. McDermott. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 658.  William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. J. McDermott. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 669.  Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization, The Solution of Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1918), 24.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 30.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 35.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid,. 35.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 36.  David Schlosberg, ibid.  David Schlosberg, ibid., 601, footnote.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 50.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 51.  Mary Parker Follett, Creative Experience (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), 171.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 244.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 47.  Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization, The Solution of Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1918), 46.  Mary Parker Follett, ibid., 97.  Most notably by John Rawls, but also by Joshua Cohen, William Connolly, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and James Bohman.     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