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These two kinds of naturalism, physicalist and humanist, mirror, now within naturalism, reflect the major bipolar disorder of modern thought, the division of reality into the objects of physics and psychology. Its symptoms are widely evident. In the conviction that any mention of natural science is a philistine or politically incorrect intrusion into our understanding of humanity. In the almost universal presumption that philosophy of mind and epistemology have as their sole object human mentality and human knowledge, to which ethology is irrelevant. In the prejudice that the only philosophically relevant natural science is physics, as if chemistry, the Earth and biological sciences are, as Lord Rutherford quipped long ago, nothing but stamp-collecting. In the conviction in much analytic and continental philosophy that metaphysical inquiry into nature is pointless. Thus do philosophers in reaching out to other disciplines reiterate the dualism: Verstehen versus cognitive science; animal studies but no zoology; cultural anthropology without paleoanthropology; ecology, of course, but not the underlying biology which might threaten to define anatomy as our destiny. All this suits Americanist philosophy least well. For it is the fate of the American philosophical tradition to be virtually the sole living philosophical legacy of a broader historical tradition which we could call post-Darwinian naturalism. (If you count Whitehead as an American which I am happy to do then American philosophy is its sole living philosophical legacy, with no qualifier.) That broader tradition combined natural science with general metaphysics, accepted the relevance of multiple sciences, and saw nature as complex and evolving over time. That is the forgotten naturalism. In what follows I will review the tradition and discuss emergence, one of its central concepts. As motivation for all this we may note that today a number of scientific studies give the forgotten naturalism a decent chance of being true. Or, if that term troubles, of being our most fruitful conception of nature. Some scientists are today closer to the spirit of the forgotten naturalism than are we American philosophers. Which is a bit of a shame. Soon after Darwins Origin of Species of 1859, thinkers began wondering if the entire universe had evolved, as well as life. Regarding both cosmological and biological evolution, their question was: can novel, complex, qualitatively distinct systems evolve from more simple systems through, as they saw it, mechanical or random processes like natural selection? The result was the great age of post-Darwinian naturalistic speculation, from 1870 to 1930, influenced in its midlife as well by the response to special and general relativity. It included, among its earliest lights: our own Peirce, heavily influenced by thermodynamics and biology; G.H. Lewes, who coined the term emergence; and above all Henri Bergson with his notion of creative evolution and his critique of the mathematico-physical analysis of time. Its culmination was The Roaring 20s, which saw the main works of the British Emergentists, Samuel Alexander, Conwy Lloyd Morgan, and C.D.Broad, as well as R.W.Sellars and M.W.Wheeler, along with Deweys Experience and Nature, Whiteheads Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality, and finally Meads 1920s lectures, published after his death in 1931. Bergson, the British Emergentists, the Americans, and Whitehead were part of one conversation. Not long after 1930 this whole field of naturalistic metaphysical speculation largely disappeared from the most prominent forums of philosophy. Philosophy of science largely became the methodology and epistemology of physics. With few exceptions (like Nicolai Hartmann, Hans Jonas, Mario Bunge, and some interpreters of Whitehead) the entire project of a systematic, multi-disciplinary philosophy of nature disappeared from philosophy. Emergence and related notions were largely kept alive by cross-disciplinary scientists in systems theory, evolutionary epistemology, and biosemiotics, thinkers like Michael Polanyi, Konrad Lorenz, Herbert Simon, Donald Campbell, Thomas Sebeok, and Stanley Salthe. Today, as Philip Clayton and Paul Davies have noted, we are witnessing a Re-Emergence of Emergence in the science of complex dynamic systems.(Oxford, 2006) Some of this has recently made its way back into philosophy, for example in the separate work of Clayton and William Wimsatt. Emergence was invented as an alternative in the philosophy of biology to reductionism and vitalism. Reductionism said life can be explained in terms of physics and chemistry; vitalism said there is an ontologically distinctive life force independent of the physico-chemical world. The emergentists took a middle path, holding that in the course of cosmic evolution sufficiently complex systems arise that exhibit properties which are not characteristic of their parts. The emergentists claimed the mental is irreducible to the biological, the biological irreducible to the chemical, and the chemical irreducible to the physical. All are natural, all are related, but each level contains irreducible novelty. I must make a brief remark about a concept thought to save us from the need for emergence, supervenience. The term was first used by Lloyd Morgan. Donald Davidsons version asserts no higher level difference without a lower level difference. This is a kind of dependence-relation, but a very particular and narrow kind. The full subvenient physical base of, say, my current mental state must include not only my brain state, but central nervous and endrocrine system states, behavior, current environment, my learning history, etc. It is hard to imagine being able to specify just what is in it. If the subvenient base cannot be specified, how can we decide whether two such bases are identical, hence whether supervenience actually holds? The mental depends on the non-mental, yes, but how to know that dependence takes the form of supervenience? Now, not all the naturalists were emergentists. Whitehead employed the term liberally, but did not use it to characterize the development of life and mind. Dewey was unhappy with it, which is surprising since he was close to Mead, who was an emergentist. Dewey accepted novelty in evolution but thought emergence was part of an attempt to surpass a dualism which he had already rejected. He disliked its doctrinal associations, and wrote in a letter to Arthur Bentley that "Emergent [e]volutionseems to be a doctrine and a rather absurd one.(John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951, New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 04.21, no.15429) Perhaps he meant that some Emergentists accepted a religious and apparently teleological idea of evolution. But emergence need not assume that. It mainly registers the fact of irreducibility, that some entities or properties cannot be reduced to their parts or the science thereof. Believing that is a natural consequence of accepting several other beliefs. First, complexity of organization and/or complex processing of components in some cases yields irreducible entities and/or properties. Second, in nature certain kinds of things asymmetrically depend on others; cells cant exist without atoms, but atoms can exist without cells. Third is a limited ontological pluralism. We may accept that there are multiple irreducible sciences, like physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology in todays language this means denying explanatory reduction. This is prima facie good reason to believe that nature contains at least that many kinds of entities, properties, structures, and processes. Hence, together with the preceding claim, nature is hierarchically arranged. Last is the idea that this hierarchical series corresponds to natures historical evolution. None of this implies necessity or a telos; the more complex kinds of systems have come just later in natures history. Since 1930 science has discovered that this last claim of the emergentists seems to have been right: the physical came before the chemical which came before the biological which came before the mental (and if I may add) which came before the cultural. To allay fears that emergence is an unscientific notion, we need an account of reductive explanation. We can get this from the person who has, to my mind, done the best work on the issue, William Wimsatt.(Wimsatt 2007) For Wimsatt, a reductive explanation explains a systems properties by properties of its parts governed by their interaction rules. Reductions are crucial to science, but are typically intertwined with non-reductive explanations, which explain system properties phenomenally by interactions with other systems at the same scale as when we explain the dent in the fender by the impact of another car or functionally as selected by an encompassing system as when we explain an organisms genotype by the adaptive fit of its ancestors phenotype. Hence there is not only upward, but side-to-side and downward explanation. Reductive explanation of a system first requires its perspectival decomposition there may be different ways of cutting it into parts and second an idealized model of component interactions. The differences between and interactions among such decompositions become very complex in living systems. Wimsatt argues that while reduction is crucial for explaining some system properties, the ability to reduce all of a systems properties is rare. Reduction works wherever a system property can be explained as an aggregation of part properties, but needs supplementation where components exhibit complex or highly organized interactions; for example, where there are non-linear effects. Wimsatt suggests aggregativity tracks the conservation laws of physics, concerning properties like energy, mass, charge, and momentum. My mass is indeed nothing but the masses of all my organs, all my cells, all my chemical substances, etc, and all are equal. But this is not true for as seemingly simple a property as my volume because volume changes in chemical reactions. The more complex a systems componential interactions, the more context-dependent are the contributions of parts to whole, the more its properties are non-aggregative and require supplementation by phenomenal or functional explanations. Reduction and emergence are thus matters of degree and compatible. Reduction explains something about almost anything, but everything about almost nothing. While many physicalists today try to be non-reductionist, it is still instructive to ask what exactly is right and what is wrong with the claim Cahoone is nothing but elementary particles, i.e. quarks and electrons? Cahoone, and every material or biological system composing Cahoone, has quarks and electrons as its smallest identifiable entitative components. But it is not true that the rules of quark and electron behavior explain Cahoones properties, that there is nothing in Cahoone but quarks and electrons, that what happens to his quarks and leptons happens to Cahoone, or what happens to Cahoone happens to his quarks and electrons. We need not even mention Cahoones mind or behavior to see this. First, the existence of the collection of elementary particles that, it is claimed, is Cahoone is itself inexplicable without reference to processes that cannot in principle be stated by physics, like natural selection. A strong physical reductionism would deny ontological and/or explanatory validity not just to psychology, but biology, chemistry, the Earth sciences, and most of physics except for Quantum Field Theory. Second, the states of Cahoones organ systems, organs, tissues, cells and even macromolecules are tuned to remain stable despite most of the atomic and subatomic chaos underlying them. Most microscopic states and changes have no consequence for the enduring macroscopic systems they compose. Concomitantly, things can happen to Cahoone that cannot in principle happen to his quarks and electrons: my atoms do not freeze when I do because phase changes refer by definition to collections of molecules. Last, natural systems are not components alone; they typically have as well a structure and undergo a process. The reductionist accepts this too, but has to make the structure and process properties of the parts, so-called relational properties. But where their explanation requires reference to the components location or role in the whole system, the reductive explanation has been supplemented with a non-reductive explanation; the whole is being explained by parts themselves explained by the whole. This is fine scientifically, but it is not reductionism. Now I will point out some implications of the forgotten naturalism. Dewey and James (and in a different way, Whitehead) accepted, at least part of the time, a notion of primary experience, meaning whatever is presented or represented prior to all conceptual abstraction including the subject-object distinction, or as Dewey put it, the distinction of experiencing, or subjectivity, from the experienced, or objectivity. Now, the only way to take primary experience as the basis of reality is to believe that everything current natural science says about the history of the universe is wrong. Experience could not have existed in this universe until at the very least four to five billion years ago. This is also why idealism must be wrong. You can, of course, make primary experience the basis of your analysis of what is for us. But metaphysically, unless science is completely wrong, primary experience arises upon, or near-about, the birth of some kind of neurologically sophisticated organism. On the other hand, there is physicalism. For the past 50 years analytic philosophers of science have been trying to formulate a non-reductive physicalism, or a dual-explanandum theory, in effect, accepting a physical ontology that is related to the view of the world of physics and maybe chemistry, while inventing conceptual strategies for avoiding an intolerable explanatory reduction of all other sciences to physics, like supervenience. But there is no reason to be a physicalist, even a non-reductive one. First, we rarely notice how difficult is the definition of the physical. I am by no means doubting its existence, just doubting that we understand it. You can use a modern form of Descartes definition of material substance and say the physical is spacetime or space-like extension, but according to current physics this is very likely not to hold below the Planck scale, implying that what exists at the universes smallest scale today is not physical. Alternatively you can define the physical as the objects of physics, which is fine, but it would mean the unique objects of chemistry and biology are not physical. Further, as noted, there is no reason to assert an ontology that is not explanatory. If explanation requires multiple sciences, that is prima facie reason to accept a pluralist rather than a physicalist ontology. Now it is true that nature seems to exhibit strata or kinds of entities that are asymmetrically dependent, again, minds depending on organisms which depend on chemical substances which depend on the objects and forces of physics. So it seems that all kinds of things in nature directly or indirectly depend on the physical. But that does not imply physicalism as a metaphysical doctrine. Dependence on the physical need not mean to use John Posts definition of physicalism that psychological, biological and chemical systems are physical systems and properties, or all truths are determined by physical truths, or that there can be no non-physical differences without physical differences. (Post 2007, ch.4) The only reason to move from the empirical claim of dependence to these claims is a foundationalist metaphysical urge that one kind of thing must be or cause or exhaust or found or determine or explain everything else. Physicalism must be reductionist in some sense. Naturalism need not be. There are three ways, it seems to me, to avoid physicalism while still avoiding dualism, and all three played a role in our forgotten naturalism. First is the Germanic perspective that influenced James and Dewey, just mentioned, that the physical and the mental derive from primary experience. Another is to read the unique properties of more complex strata into natures simplest components. That is what Peirce did in his panpsychism, and Whitehead in making his actual occasions both biotic and mental. Besides stretching the concepts of mentality and life beyond anything the sciences of life and mind can accept, this view continues to try to find something that constitutes everything. The third way is pluralism. Pluralism can be combined with the conclusions of modern natural science and asymmetric dependence only in the form of emergence, or if you prefer, a hierarchical conception of nature. And unless contemporary natural science is utterly wrong about the world, this hierarchy matches the historical evolution of the universe. Emergence is the name for what pluralism plus hierarchical dependence require. It is merely a statement of ordered, interdependent plurality. None of the foregoing does any good if one accepts what we might call postmodern objections to general metaphysics, shared by many analytic, continental, and even Americanist philosophers. But we can endorse the forgotten naturalism on the basis of a more modern, of if you will, postmodern methodology. First, we accept that nothing in the naturalism described here makes any more than fallibilist claims to truth. Naturalism is a fallible hypothesis that is substantially supported by multiple sources of experience, evidence and inference. Second, our naturalism need make no claims whatsoever about the Whole, the Foundational, the Simple, the Ultimate, etc. To knowing something about any of these we would have to know something about everything, which we ought not expect to be able to do. In general metaphysics we aim to know as much as we can, all at once, in a coordinated way. We aim for intelligibility and truth of an indefinitely wide scope. But we can renounce claims about the Whole. We do not have to characterize everything collectively. Third, we can accept that general metaphysics ought to begin with a language relatively, not utterly, neutral with respect to major disagreements in the history of thought. But a metaphysics, like any theory, can be adequately supported only if its evidence can be described independent of the theory. Consequently, a general metaphysics needs two languages, not one. We must begin with a language comparatively neutral with respect to major competing metaphysical theories in which we label the evidence and things we are going to inquire into. Then we argue for a partisan language to account for that evidence on that basis. Our primary metaphysical language must be able to handle things in a preliminary way without predetermining our conclusions about them. We can do this because we have given up the requirement that our theory represent the Whole. I will not spend much time trying to justify that the most neutral ontological standpoint is a pluralism that recognizes anything discriminable as equally real, in whatever context or order of relations it functions: quarks, fictional characters, processes, relations, meanings, cells, numbers, signs, etc. Some may recognize this as the pluralism of Justus Buchler. But if you have another pluralism that allows us to speak of anything without speaking of everything it should do as well. Now to the point. Given the most open-ended and pluralistic language for whatever we discriminate, we can argue for naturalism within or on the basis of it. Naturalism claims that what we discriminate and know most robustly is in and of nature. This is an hypothesis, not an a priori claim. And I make no claim that everything must be natural; whether there are things that are not is a contingent question open for inquiry. We and what we know seem to function as parts of nature, however one might want to characterize the Whole, the Underlying, or the Ultimate, which task we have declined. By further hypothesis, nature is an ontologically plural finite set of asymmetrically dependent and increasingly complex orders of kinds of things, properties, relations, and processes, divisible, as our manifold inquiries are, into at least the physical, chemical, biological, mental, and cultural, the last being as far as we know the sole province of humans. Note the physical is an order of nature, not the whole of nature. All forms of inquiry have a place here, applicable to different orders in which things function, their validity in any one case being a matter for continuing inquiry. As for the divine, which naturalism ostensibly denies, the current naturalism could in principle accept divinity understood naturalistically, as continuous with natural orders, or since it makes no claims about the Whole, it accepts that the supra-natural remains a serious question to be approached from the standpoint of robustly accessible natural orders. In conclusion, there is some bad news and some good news. The bad news is that we Americanists have not shown a lot little interest lately in metaphysics and the sciences, the general description of nature, or the possibility of crossing over the two cultures and their multiple, local reiterations. But the good news is that, if we were to get over our postmodern and humanistic fears of such a project, we would discover that we are the inheritors of perhaps the most promising way to make sense of nature in general. The job is waiting for us, if we want it.      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