

Relating Identity and Diversity

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In a session on "Women, Friendship, and Diversity in the 19th Century" at a recent conference, I explained a striking anecdote from Jane Addams's *Twenty Years at Hull-House*.¹ As a way to illustrate that she was constantly learning from even the poorest of her neighbors in order to make visible and hopefully undermine the prejudices of the white, middle class, Protestant citizens of Chicago, she recalled an incident in which a young immigrant woman who lived in a neighboring tenement house was helping out one day by answering the door. She later told Addams with amusement of how a wealthy society matron, who was coming to Hull House to see what good she could do for the poor, mistook the neatly dressed young woman as being of her same social class. She questioned her in great detail about the strange customs of what she called 'these people,' without realizing that she was one of them. The way Addams drew a moral from this story demonstrates why she was able to recognize in herself and others of her ethnicity and class that they were not free of prejudice, as they thought, just because they were white, well to do, morally upstanding, and well educated. She could easily have laughed with the young woman at the ignorance of wealthy benefactors; instead, she unexpectedly puts herself in the place of the society matron, despite the fact that she, herself, would never consciously disparage others. Her startling insight into what only a few other intellectuals like W. E. B. Du Bois recognized and wrote about at the time as 'white' or class privilege was that—no matter how much we try to understand and help others who are different from ourselves—we are sure to blunder because we can never see them as they see themselves, we cannot intuit their perspectives, emotions, or values as they do.² Addams then acted on her insight by always taking a neighbor

with her when giving speeches about Hull House and its activities, lest she be caught in making hasty generalizations when speaking of conditions known more intimately by someone actually living them.³

During the question period, a young black woman commented: "I hope she paid them." After the laughter died down, she said that it seemed to her to be a case of a woman of privilege using those who were less well off to establish her own credentials as a reformer. Like Addams before me, I was surprised that a seemingly insightful account could be perceived as unconscious but nonetheless real exploitation by someone on the receiving end of such intended solicitude. But I was simultaneously struck by how the criticism missed the transforming power of an insight into the biases introduced by just such racial and class privilege as the young woman had identified and the daring required to carry this awareness into the refined halls of the public forum, where working class immigrants were not welcome. By conspicuously sharing her authority and privilege with them, Addams had deliberately challenged both their exclusion and the audience's prejudices. The young woman's comments showed she found Addams's response inadequate according to today's standards, and they are a needed reminder that the lessons of the past do not automatically apply to the present. But what were the circumstances in the late nineteenth century? And does this difference make a difference?

It does so if we take contextualism as seriously as do the pragmatists. William James could not have put the centrality of context more forcefully than he did when he asserted that "concreteness as radical as ours is not so obvious. The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point of it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing."⁴ And John Dewey makes context or situation fundamental to his analysis, arguing that in actual experiences objects and events are not isolated, but always parts, phases or aspects "of an environing experienced world—a

situation.”⁵ He goes so far as to call the neglect of context the most pervasive fallacy of non-pragmatist philosophic thinking.⁶ So once we take contextualism seriously, making judgments without taking it into consideration necessarily distorts the issue and skews values. This is not to advocate a pernicious moral relativism that refuses to cross cultural, class, gender, temporal and other boundaries to criticize and seek to rectify harms against those with less power to resist them. But neither is it a license for those with firm beliefs in the universality of their moral judgments to impose their morality on others as they see fit.

In developing just and harmonious social relations, it is equally important to recognize diversities I do not share and to identify similarities despite such differences, but it is not always equally pertinent to do so. Whether diversity or similarity should take priority at any given time is a matter of judgment, values, and the situation at hand. It requires the sort of self-reflective awareness of possible bias that Addams advocates and the development of methods for bringing about such recognition and strategies for overcoming bias once it is found. The context for such reflection and for determining and executing appropriate methods shifts over time, but not completely or all at once, which is why earlier models are both helpful and need to be constantly reworked. In recognition of the temporal and developmental character of understanding, it is not Addams who falls short in the given example, but too often we, ourselves, insofar as we fail to build on her insights and methods.

1. Should Differences Make a Difference?

With few exceptions, the founding generation of pragmatists rejected identity based on group membership as a basis for political action. Dewey, for example, conceives of feminist discourse as unnecessarily polarizing the relations of women and men and of anti-racist discourse as re-inscribing the black/white divide; James downplays the grievances of women and

the poor

against male and upper-class privileges, and Addams rejects the characterization of capital and labor as irreconcilable enemies.⁷ Rather than thinking of group membership as contributing to social morality, for example, Addams thinks it pits groups against one another as adversaries. Dewey reports in a letter that when he asked Addams if she didn't think that ideas and institutions such as "Labor & Capital and the Church & Democracy" could be basically antagonistic, she replied that the "antagonism of institutions was always unreal; it was simply due to the injection of the personal attitude & reaction; & then instead of adding to the recognition of meaning, it delayed & distorted it."⁸

Group divisions, including those of class, emphasize different moralities and undermine social cooperation and the goal of solidarity across boundaries. Identifying only with one's own group loyalties reinforces the sense that members of other groups are dangerous and unreasonable and can only be treated as lesser human beings. This inevitably leads "to the use of brute force—to the methods of warfare."⁹ In arguing that 'the Negro problem' is really a problem of White distortive perceptions of Blacks, W. E. B. Du Bois, by contrast, recognizes the force of interests arising from color or racial distinctions. But even so, he thinks that such differences are exaggerated and become oppressive and lethal as a result of specific historical events, legal injustices and cultural hierarchies. So for Du Bois, also, the dualistic characterization itself is blamed for inflaming passions and contributing to the harm.

The remedies proposed by pragmatists, however, do not consist in ignoring the underlying grievances brought about by exaggerated differences. They include openness to the attitudes expressed as possibly revealing injustices that are unrecognized or deliberately distorted by those whose different circumstances encourage different beliefs. Du Bois, Dewey and Addams think

that these differences can be expressions of varied cultural, social or political groups, while James is more inclined to radically particularize differences or to see them as psychological categories. But if genuine grievances and attitudes can be expressed by recognizably coherent or homogeneous groups, but such expression itself is seen as the problem rather than as flowing naturally from genuine differences, then what sense of 'difference' is being assumed?

How do we divide up the world imaginatively, practically, and meaningfully? We do so by class, race, gender, sexual orientation, geography or territory, needs satisfied or unsatisfied, wealth or poverty, and nation state—the list is as endless as our interests, needs, desires, and imaginative projections. Such divisions can be called perspectives, interests, or world-views, and more negatively, identity-politics, prejudices, or false consciousness. James is like Nietzsche in being one of the most important theorizers of the centrality of perspectivism and selective interests in affecting the way the world appears to us and the values we hold. Like Nietzsche, also, the ubiquity of perspectivism is not a moral issue per se, not something to be praised or blamed, but a condition of our being in the world that must be taken account of in our efforts at understanding ourselves and the world around us. Praise or blame, approval or disapproval, reward or punishment, are second-order judgments on the embodiment, inner or outer, including the expression, display, or acting-out of, such differences.

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A useful paradigm of difference, of diversity, can be developed from pragmatist writings. Unlike over-essentialized discourses on the 'Other,' pragmatists start with the everyday, actual exchanges and background conditions through which our ideas take shape. Elaborations of an over-generalized Other ignore the fact that a substantive sense of identity—even if it is felt to be fragile or under attack—requires at least the possession of an identity or membership in a group or

groups so taken-for-granted as seemingly not to need explanation, definition, or defense.

Responsibilities derived from such essentialized relationships hide the fact that self-evident norms and the constitution of normality are often rooted in cultural, social, economic, political, and legal privilege and consequent sense of entitlement. The classical model of identity, the presumed unitary self that perdures over time, has no purely logical relation to social privilege accorded to one group based on possession of the 'right' traits, however these are defined. But as Dewey argues when tying the assertion that rationality distinguishes the nature of human beings to the social privilege of the Athenian citizen-philosophers, whose life of reflection is supported by the taken-for-granted services of slaves and women, such powerful models both affect and are affected by the concrete situations in which they arise and to which they are applied.¹⁰

By attributing one distinctive function as defining the nature of human beings, thinkers like Aristotle opened the way to claiming that when this function is diminished or missing in a person or group of persons, or only claimed to be missing or impaired, then that person or group is less than human. Dewey explains that this meant that "by nature, and not merely by social convention, there are those who are slaves—that is, means for the ends of others." He further points out that women have traditionally been classed with slaves in that they are viewed as "among the animate instrumentalities of production and reproduction of the means for a free and rational life"—for men.¹¹ Dewey's genealogical account connects rationally generated definitions with the concrete conditions in which they arose and the ways they were used to support the social system already in place. Absent the recognition of such concrete conditions, appeals to a generalized 'Other' or to an anonymous 'They' are subject to similar criticisms. As James says, "What closet-solutions can possibly anticipate the results of trials" actually made¹²

For what such concreteness means in practice, we can turn to Milton R. Konvitz and Alain

Locke. In a book of essays honoring Horace M. Kallen, Konvitz demonstrates the importance of developing concrete, rather than merely abstract, analyses. After reviewing what he calls "the Civil War amendment" to the Constitution of the United States, Konvitz, notes that their provisions of "equal protection of the Law," and "privileges and immunities of citizens," and prohibition of "slavery," and "involuntary servitude," are merely abstractions. He says that "[t]o see what these provisions mean in reality, one must turn to concrete situations and observe how judges, particularly the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, interpreted and applied, or refused to apply, these terms and provisions."¹³ After reviewing the many Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments applying to former slaves and free African Americans, he concluded that at least up until his time in the pre-Civil Rights era, they upheld the freedom of spirit, but not necessarily of the body; that is, freedom in principle but not in reality. He then approvingly quoted Kallen's definition of freedom as "the right of individuals to their individuality, their right *to be different* without penalty and without privilege, especially without penalty."¹⁴

Alain Locke went further and argued for James's notion of "the discovery and vindication of a psychological pluralism stemming from a plurality of values and viewpoints." The irreducible variety of human experience was itself a valuable resource, but only if a constructive pluralist approach can "establish some effective mediating principles for situations of basic value divergence and conflict."¹⁵ Where Konvitz hopes for the implementation of the right of individuals of every persuasion and state of being to be left unhindered in their own pursuit of happiness, Locke recognizes that differences, even differences of skin color, are more than skin deep. They are the outward appearances of various ways of life and beliefs forged over centuries. While no values or beliefs can be assumed to be held by anyone based on her or his

skin color, neither can a homogeneous sameness despite differences be assumed. He argues that what is called for is "a realistic but sympathetic understanding of the bases of our value differences, and their root causes—some of them temperamental, more of them experiential, still more, of cultural derivation."¹⁶

Conflicts are inevitable where differences matter, but it does not follow that there is an orthodox position or universal values to which all must submit to avoid or resolve conflicts. Such appeals to universal values must be understood within the context of the arrogance and long-standing bigotry of Western culture from which they arose. Locke deplors cultural absolutism, the remnants of a semi-bankrupt imperialism, that masks the oppression of Asiatic, Moslem, and African groups under the rhetoric of universal values. Locke argues instead that it is only by legitimating and interpreting diversity that a way can be opened up for discovering "some 'harmony in contrariety,' some commonality in divergence" that would both resolve conflict without oppression and provide a means for greater understanding and better values.¹⁷

Just as things, for James, are nothing but "special groups of sensible qualities, which happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names," so the self is "the home of interest," and "the organizing center of experience."¹⁸ James links self and thing together dynamically in his 'full fact' of consciousness understood not as an isolated inner phenomenon, but a "field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude towards the object *plus* the sense of self to whom the attitude belongs."¹⁹ Dewey develops this interplay of persons and their surroundings even more dynamically, arguing for the co-constitution of organism and environment through transactive activities that are on-going and never-ending.

If James's preferred model of explanation is the co-constitution of self-thing or self-world and Dewey's is that of organism-environment transaction, there is still a sharp contrast between

them in that for James, the social is one category among others, while for Dewey, the social is all-encompassing. For both, though, selves are not essential identities, but multi-relational. The 'other' is not, therefore, in the first instance, the alien against which I define myself. Nor is the other a moral imperative in the flesh demanding recognition. As Simone de Beauvoir wrote in *The Second Sex*, the Self-other relation in regard to men and women seems to differ from other human relations in that it appears to be an original, unbreakable, *mit-sein*, a biological fact, and not an historical event whose legitimacy can easily be questioned.²⁰ But this is an illusion, created to lock women into a subordinate position validated by nature. Over time, selves and others in actual situations, as structured by earlier situations and anticipating future ones, form, re-form, make and unmake, who and what they are becoming. Relationships are not essentially dual nor univocal, but multiple and many-layered. Therefore, the ascription of 'alienness' to some particular group of others, or of superiority and cohesiveness to a group of which I am a part, is a break, a tear in the usual fabric of relations. As a privileging of one unequal relationship over many others possible, it requires explanation through historical events and individual choices. Insofar as such privileging is harmful, it ought to be called into question and more beneficial ways of relating developed.

This pragmatic model of multiple relations in continuous, dynamic interplay runs counter to the common-sense view of the world as consisting of hard and fast divisions of every sort, from individual units or 'things' to nationalities, to species, to sexes, to towns, to countries, etc. The philosopher's task, according to James, is to see "the familiar as if it were strange and the strange as if it were familiar. . . . It rouses us from our native 'dogmatic slumber' and breaks up our caked prejudices"²¹ The pragmatist expression of this task is to smudge boundaries, to challenge the ready-made world as a fiction, to make the world fluid again. The self-other dichotomy is

too limited to express the multiplicity of relations through which selves and others act and understand themselves differently in different situations. It also essentializes the other and distorts the range of possible interactions through which persons continually become who they are and therefore reduces them to a less than human status.

To categorize and treat those different from my own self as despicable, inherently flawed, or lacking something physically, culturally, and/or morally, therefore, reflects a false understanding of the nature of the interactive processes among selves and others that constitute human beings and other organisms. According to Addams, to make of oneself an exception is the common trait of selfish persons, whether such exceptionalism includes others sharing "the identity of political opinion or religious creed" or anything else.²² To the extent that others are considered to be naturally inferior just by being other, then to that extent I am also naturally inferior, since perception and judgment take place on both sides. Such negative assessments are also moral failings because they deny the reciprocal obligations required for a desirable society in which individuals and the common good mutually flourish. On the flip side, to deny that others are other, or different, would require that they reproduce the way of being that I find congenial or familiar. It has been a continuous struggle throughout human history to accept the otherness of the other, whether between human beings, societies, and civilizations, or in human/non-human interactions, as something positive and valuable. Especially when such an alien—because not-me or mine—other is embodied in a group identity, continuous negotiation and re-negotiation are required to keep from hardening many expressions of ways of being on both sides into one or a few that then become litmus tests of belonging.

The depth of these struggles to maintain self-identity while interacting with others whose beliefs and ways of life call mine into question is disclosed in Leon Festinger's theory of

cognitive dissonance. This arises when we hold two inconsistent ideas that cause unpleasant tensions, leading us to engage in strategies to lessen the dissonance. According to Festinger's student, Eliot Aronson, this dissonance is greatest when our sense of ourselves as honest, intelligent, well-meaning persons is called into question by new information. Our favored strategy to overcome the dissonance is to protect at all costs our favorable self-image. "In general, people forget facts that suggest that they may have behaved stupidly or badly, they seek and believe information that confirms what they already 'know', and deny or dismiss contradictory evidence." Apparently, these delusions and blind spots are hard-wired as coping mechanisms, but they can be ameliorated through social means. The method offered by Aronson, one that Addams already proposed over a hundred years ago, is that "if we can easily recognize biases in other people but not in ourselves, then we should perhaps ask the opinions of others more often, since they are the ones who can recognize our biases."²³

How does Addams negotiate this terrain studded with minefields? What can we learn from her? She diagnoses the bewilderment and anxiety aroused by the dislocations and disturbances of contemporary life as stemming from the misplaced attempt to apply the standards of an individualistic morality to situations plainly demanding the application of social ethics. What is needed in these troubled times is to "be brought into contact with the moral experiences of the many" in order to broaden our sense of what constitutes an adequate morality.²⁴ Individual experiences and one's own traditions are too narrow a basis for developing just and effective approaches to disturbances arising from increasing diversity in both domestic and international relations. This insight was recently bolstered by social science studies showing "that when relatively like-minded people are grouped together, they don't settle around the average point of view of the individuals in the group but rather become more extreme in the direction toward

which they're already inclined." Bill Bishop elaborates: "Mixed company moderates; like-minded company polarizes. Heterogeneous communities restrain group excesses; homogeneous communities march toward the extremes."²⁵

Addams developed her own version of standpoint theory.²⁶ She argued that those who suffer the most from unjust social conditions gain unique insights about society unavailable to others in positions of privilege. She seeks to disabuse those in more powerful positions of the belief that their positions necessarily make them the best judge and executioner of what is right or wrong with, and what needs to be done about, social, political, and economic situations. She wants to motivate those in power to consult and take seriously the opinions of the less privileged members of society and in this way begin empowering them to help determine their own condition in life. On the other hand, Addams does not make the mistake of thinking that those who are least well off in society necessarily take in all the factors causing them harm nor do they have a monopoly on the most effective plans of action to overcome the injustices experienced. Neither does she idealistically assume that those who have suffered from class, religious, ethnic, gender or other disparities and prejudices and who come into positions of power will therefore automatically extend the same sympathy and help that they once needed and desired to others like themselves who have not yet made it out of their oppressive conditions. Addams noted that she was discouraged by the fact that many sordid tenement houses were owned by earlier immigrants who preyed on more recent ones. But she immediately forestalls the prejudicial conclusion that this fact demonstrates that immigrants are naturally morally perverse and there is no point in trying to improve their conditions. She does this by pointing out that the example likewise undermines the assumptions underlying the high self-regard and privileges of the propertied classes, saying: "The theory that wealth brings responsibility, that possession entails at length

education and refinement, in these cases fails utterly."²⁷

2. Minefields in Diversity Politics

It is wrong to stress differences when it is used as an excuse for prejudicial treatment – privilege on one side and submission and suppression on the other. This is complicated by the fact that the wrongness is tied to intentionality, but harms can be caused despite original intentions. Even perceptions of difference arising without regard to any particular agenda and discussions of difference intended to be neutral can take place within an unrecognized and unacknowledged context of prejudice that colors them. Also, reports on or investigations of differences can be used by others as evidence for a prejudicial approach. Even without such an immoral use, over time, what seems to be a benevolent understanding of differences can come to seem to be the very expression of prejudice. It is also wrong to ignore differences that are positive qualities in others or to ignore talents and accomplishments because they are seen and kept as the prerogative of those more privileged. How far such differences should be defined and mobilized in political or socially reformist actions is not easy to ascertain, however.

Differences, as such, are neither static nor evenly distributed among groups. This argues against assuming any of a range of traits as necessarily belonging to any individual member of a group. The exact relationship between group identity and individual instantiation should be a matter of choice by the individuals to whom it supposedly applies. In regard to these differences of identity, then, does this prohibit all 'policing' activities by which groups include and exclude members? Do native American tribes have the right to determine membership qualifications in terms of what binds them together and distinguishes them from other groups? Do African Americans or Hispanics? Difficulties arise when simply deferring to choices by individuals and ignoring the multiple relationships that constitute identity.

The Cherokee Nation, for example, recently voted to deny tribal membership to the descendants of people they once owned as slaves. Present identities were determined by deferring to a congressional commission set up over 100 years ago. At that time, the Dawes Commission had drawn up one roll, which listed the names of Cherokees by blood, and another, which listed Freedmen, composed of Blacks irrespective of whether they had Indian blood or not. Present-day tribal officials labeled their vote to deny tribal citizenship to the descendants of Freedmen, a matter of self-determination, while a group calling itself the Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes, said the vote effectively took away the rights of people.²⁸ To attempt to solve the impasse by simply granting both groups the right of self-determination, without settling the issue of what constitutes group identity over time, would produce an unstable alliance and not a tribal community. If asking whether the presidential candidate Barack Obama is 'black enough' to be supported by the African American community denies him the power to identify himself in terms of his multi-ethnic relations, does it follow that can one become a member of an ethnic, cultural, or religious group solely by self-selection? What about the Anglican Church, which wants to define membership as excluding their fellow Episcopalians who hold the view that homosexuality is not a sin but just one among a range of sexual expressions?

3. Bridging Differences: Fluid Identities, Human Solidarity

These conflicts underline the power struggles surrounding issues of difference. They are not easy to resolve, either in theory or in practice, but some suggestions can be made. If the relationship between individuals and groups is not understood as two opposing units coming into contact, but as a process of multiple identities interchangeably inner and outer, then a dialogue rather than drawing boundary lines and assigning 'ownership' or exclusive rights would be more

appropriate. Sometimes I think and feel with others with whom I am aligned or with whom I identify and then I am inside looking out; at other times, I savor my individual differences from group identity or feel more drawn to other groups, and then I am outside looking in. Such exchanges do not happen in a vacuum, however, nor am I, the individual, the only center of the exchanges. To move from an interaction, as such, to a worthwhile or desirable, life-affirming transaction, some preconditions are required.

For James, my dealings with others will be harmful unless I grant the validity of ideals of others unlike myself and so not do not leap to hasty judgments based on my own limited experiences and values. According to Locke, intercultural understanding and cooperation depends on recognizing both the "principle of cultural equivalence," and "cultural relativism." By 'the principle of cultural equivalence,' he means that there are "functional equivalences" or human constants between cultures, no matter how different they appear, and by 'cultural relativism,' he means understanding that cultures and their traditions are not inalienable absolutes, but have developed over time, for various reasons, and therefore may be criticized and transformed without losing group cohesiveness.²⁹ For Dewey, it is a matter of caring or mindfulness, which he describes as learning to recognize how my actions affect others and those of others affect me, and directing my actions so as to take those others into account. And for Addams, Hull House was firmly grounded "on the theory [that] the dependence of classes on each other is reciprocal" and that the progress of each, socially, economically, and morally, depends on the progress of all.³⁰

Addams based her philosophy on the solidarity of the human race. She was convinced that the basic likenesses of human beings, "if they are properly accentuated, easily transcend the less essential differences of race, language, creed, and tradition."³¹ It is important to note that

Addams stressed the condition that they be properly accentuated. The claimed likenesses cannot just be ones that are congenial to those who have the power to enforce their own views, whether they are conscious of their privileges and biases or not. Locke also searches for "universal values" that unite human beings despite different expressions in different cultures. He is very aware that how such similarities are accented makes all the difference. The idealistic philosophies of those who, like Plato, have argued for absolute values and a universal human nature, have often been used to justify intolerance and mass coercion in social behavior, as Hans Seigfried also argues in "We the people/s: Bloody universal principles and ethnic codes."³² Against such an assertion of *a priori* universal values, Locke argues that values must be found in actual societies, not as expressed by some supposedly superior philosophy, but in cultural equivalences that reveal new insights as much as they recall old ones.³³

Addams uses concrete examples to help us understand how differences can be used as resources to enrich a common sense of shared humanity, rather than serve to divide and exclude, to privilege some at the expense of others. In trying to determine how the college-educated middle class women residents could be of help in poor neighborhoods, she first stresses their painful lessons in learning how to question their own intentions and beliefs so that they would be able to empower others rather than impose their own values and outlooks on them. Addams also develops a model of the outsider/insider role that anticipates later anthropological theory of the participant observer. This role is not passive. She often talks of the role of interpretation in Hull House activities. She says that residents should be "ready to arouse and interpret the public opinion of their neighborhood."³⁴ This is because social energies can lie dormant in industrial neighborhoods, where the effort needed just to survive can be overwhelming. In a democracy, such inaction is very detrimental since it leaves the field open for corruption.

Two approaches, which supported each other, were evident in Hull House practices. They reflected a recognition of the ubiquity of power hierarchies and disclose conscious attempts to work through, rather than ignore, them. One approach was to design and carry out activities that strengthened the well-being of those in need and give them the tools required for effectively acting on their own behalf. Working with others was both the goal and the means of the settlement approach. But the settlement residents also recognized an obligation to work on behalf of those who did not yet have the resources to do so themselves. They used their educational, social, political, and economic advantages to bring the needs of the neighborhood to the attention of the wider society to effect needed reforms. In such a situation, Addams thinks that the differences of race and language that separate neighborhoods into ethnic groups could be more easily overcome through the mediation of residents who, on the one side, take the time and make the effort to live quietly among their neighbors "until they grow into a sense of relationship and mutual interests," and on the other, have the educational and cultural resources to survey the neighborhood as a whole, "to furnish data for legislation, and to use their influence to secure it."³⁵

This careful attention to negotiating identities and differences was not limited to the slums of Chicago, and as Addams increasingly moved into international work for women's betterment and for world peace, she continually urged its wider application. In doing so, she did not claim the priority of her own experiences or insights, but welcomed similar efforts wherever she found them. In this spirit, she praised her fellow workers abroad, commenting that she "had never heard a social worker from any country give a more sympathetic interpretation of the inner lives of her clientele than a Japanese charity visitor gave at the Honolulu conference [of the Pan Pacific Union] concerning the high suicide rate of the very poor in the Japanese cities."³⁶

Endnotes

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