Dorothy Rogers, Montclair State Universityl
Note: This paper was presented to the NJ regional philosophy association on April 21, 2001. A longer version originally appeared in my dissertation, "Making Hegel 'Talk English' – America's First Women Idealists" [Boston University, 1998]. Since none of the works cited in this paper are currently in print, I present this paper as a starting point for those interested in Marietta Kies and her work.
Introduction to Marietta Kies
Marietta Kies (1853-1899) is a little-known member of the early American idealist movement in philosophy, led by educator and philosophical practitioner, William Torrey Harris, first in St. Louis, MO, and then in Concord, MA. She is among the first women to be conferred with a Ph.D. in this country. She is also among a relatively small number of women in the late nineteenth century who held faculty positions at the college and university levels; in Kies' case these included Colorado College (1882-84), Mt. Holyoke Seminary (1885-91), Mills College (1891-92), and Butler University (1996-99).
Kies followed a unique intellectual path for women in her era. Unlike her slightly older female contemporaries, she did not remain within the stereotypically feminine branches of philosophy – pedagogy, aesthetics, theories of friendship, love, or the nature of woman – but instead concerned herself with social and political philosophy. She also focused more narrowly on Hegel himself than did other women in her Idealist circles. Therefore, Kies didn't limit her intellectual pursuits to informal study under Harris at the Concord Summer School of Philosophy that he founded, but pursued professional academic training with the University of Michigan's rising stars, George Sylvester Morris, Henry C. Adams, and John Dewey. Under them, she studied Hegel's History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Right thoroughly, and developed a theory of altruism that, in some sense is an outgrowth of Hegel's theory, but in others is a reaction against Hegel – to be detailed in the paragraphs that follow.
Justice, Grace, and the 'Ethical Principle'
Kies authored only three works, two of which outline her political philosophy, The Ethical Principle (1892) and Institutional Ethics (1896). In both, she contrasts "justice" with "grace" and suggests how the two might be used to complement each other in society. In many ways, Kies' theory matches current feminist "ethics of care" or other feminist theories that try to reconcile individualism and communitarianism. For she offers an alternative to the picture of political life as drawn by the classical liberal tradition: a society of relative equals in which "justice" reigns supreme. Drawing on Hegel (an unlikely candidate from the perspective of many contemporary feminists), [1] Kies presents society as an organic whole in which each individual is responsible for the care of others. In doing so, she offers an alternative to the individualist view of society, and thus of social and political progress. Kies insists that "grace", in which altruism takes precedence over self-interest, is an equally valid principle of political action. Better still from a feminist point of view, Kies does not attempt to debunk justice completely, but instead is comfortable asserting two truths simultaneously; justice and grace are not competing but rather are complementary principles in Kies' understanding.
The justice of which Kies speaks is an idea familiar enough to anyone acquainted with modern political thought. [2] It is the principle via which each individual obtains his or her due and is "the fundamental principle of individuality." [EP1] It is the responsibility of each person to assert rights and render unto others what is rightfully theirs. In the realm of justice, the individual "thinks, feels and acts, and receives the like in kind, nothing better, nothing worse."[EP1-2] Society is by and large an aggregate of individuals in the system that holds justice as primary, and social happiness is roughly equal to the sum of the happiness of all individuals within society. This is a mistaken notion in Kies' understanding, and one that she believes can be repaired by infusing grace into political theory.
"Grace" is a term commonly used in theology, but both as a term and as a concept is unfamiliar to the contemporary reader of political philosophy. It may even be that the use of this term in political discourse was unusual to Kies' readers in her own day, because she outlines what she means by "grace" early in the work.
Whereas the process in justice excludes the yielding of one's own for the sake of another, the process of self-sacrifice, of grace, is in its very nature the yielding of one's own immediate thoughts for self for those of, and in reference to, another. [EP2]
Lest the reader, then or now, jump to the conclusion that Kies is among any number of women thinkers in her time to endorse total and continual self-sacrificial thinking (particularly by women), this is not the case at all. In fact later in the work, Kies carefully distinguishes between the altruism that she espouses and self-sacrifice for self-sacrifice's sake.[EP12] Attempts at martyrdom are self-centered in Kies' view, because true altruism takes others as its object; it does not merely seek self-denial as an end in itself, which is the case with purely self-sacrificial thinking. Furthermore, Kies does not even hint toward a gender dichotomy in her analysis of justice and grace. At no point in her discussion does she suggest that altruism is more readily sought, achieved, or understood by women than by men. [3] Instead, the grace of which Kies speaks is a principle applicable to men and women alike, and it is not limited to the private sphere, but is to be implemented in the public realm.
Yet for Kies both justice and grace certainly have their places in an ethical hierarchy. She even seems to have anticipated twentieth century theories of moral development, listing a number of stages that are passed through on the way to realizing the ethical principle. While Kies provides no citations to indicate the source(s) she draws from in outlining this typology of moral/intellectual development, it certainly runs parallel to the Hegelian description of individual growth, a la Rosenkranz, and thus to ideas also conveyed by Harris, Blow, and Brackett. [4] First there are passions, such as jealousy, lust, and revenge, that are below even the child-grade of ethical behavior. But despite the fact that these are lowly states of mind, they do have a place on the ethical continuum, "for so long as human beings associate together, there is a phase of the ethical" [EP9-10] in all human activity. Second is the child-grade of ethical behavior in which an individual relies on external authority for guidance. This is followed by the third level, an individualism that is characterized simply by differentiation of self from other. This can easily develop into the fourth level -- i.e., pure individualism, otherwise known as egoism. Egoism, of course, is the most selfish sort of individualism, in which one's needs are singularly pursued and sometimes callously attained. The fifth stage constitutes a more enlightened form of individualism -- the quest for individual happiness. This is the ethical ideal sought by utilitarianism and is generally considered quite benign. Harm to others is avoided, of course, but individual fulfillment is supreme within this stage. Sixth, the utilitarian ideal is extended to the society as a whole, and an aggregate of happiness is thought to be the highest good to be achieved. Finally, we come to the highest stage, which for Kies is altruism. Altruistic individuals keep others as the center of interest and seek their own good only in the "reflected good" that arises as a result of their assistance to others. When individuals seek not merely that which will bring them pleasure, but rather are content with the reflected good that their altruistic behavior brings, then the good for all of society is possible.
The "ethical principle" -- i.e., altruism -- is an ideal which may be unattainable, and this Kies recognizes explicitly. [EP15-16] Yet it is an ideal that one should pursue, because although humans are finite creatures, their thoughts and ideals are infinite and therefore of a divine nature. In fact, ultimately Kies will say that the reason altruism is the highest stage in her ethical hierarchy is because it is most closely modelled after the Christian religion and, as such, links the human and the divine. Since human understandings of the ethical and ideals of social good evolve over time, humanity stumbles through the above-listed ethical stages in its quest for perfection, often falling far short of the altruistic ideal.
Having made the distinction between justice and grace clear, Kies now traverses some familiar Hegelian terrain to outline her understanding of the institutions of society and the nature of the state. As with the majority of the Hegelians in this study, Kies recognizes the family as the fundamental social institution. A person is born into a certain concrete family situation and is shaped and directed by the care provided there. There is also, of course, civil society in which the individual differentiates self from other, and the state which binds the individual to the whole and allows him/her to develop fully as a human being. But Kies points to intermediary institutions that are part of the larger whole, institutions that play a central role in the theories of her St. Louis contemporaries as well as her own theory. The first is, unsurprisingly, the school. While Kies acknowledges that this is not a fundamental institution, she does note that as a voluntary organization it supplements the family's educative role. [EP23] She also recognizes another institution, namely industry, which is another minor institution that allows the individual limited participation in the public realm. Finally, there is the church, which in its ideal is the entrance into communion with Christ, but in its actual manifestation is a voluntary organization, like the school, which aids in individual self-development.
Since the essence of the individual is freedom, and the foundation of the nation is also freedom, the state's role is to facilitate individual freedom, but within society. [EP22] Generally, justice has been thought to be the ideal ethical principle to help the individual attain such freedom, and Kies recognizes that justice is fundamental to the activity of the state. In line with Hegel, Kies believes that the state cannot concern itself with abstract "duty" nor with intention. In the first case, duty apart from a concrete set of circumstances is empty; in the second, the internal workings of an individual cannot be read from the outside, nor guessed at by any arm of the state. Instead, the state takes justice as its guide, and uses it to measure the external act performed by the individual in a particular instance. In the ideal world the act and the intention behind it would correspond, but this is impossible for the state to determine and therefore is beyond its concern. [EP38] While justice is the fundamental principle of the state, grace too has a role to play in state affairs. Reform movements, for example, have had as their guiding principle self-sacrifice rather than self-interest. Reform leaders both within government and without have practiced altruism themselves and encouraged it among their followers.[EP36-37] Furthermore, by calling for the suffering of some, these reformers helped effect changes that resulted in the betterment of all. [EP17] [5]
"True Socialism, or Helpfulness"
As a preface to her assertion that it is within the province of the state to enforce altruism as a policy, Kies outlines three "attitudes that society presents to the individual" as models for 2) an extreme socialism, in which individual rights "intersect at too many points" and obliterate individuality; and 3) true socialism, or helpfulness, in which individuals recognize that assisting the weak will benefit the whole. [EP40-42] The last of these is clearly Kies' preferred social "attitude," although she notes that ideally this would be a voluntary self-sacrifice by the strong on behalf of the weak.
At this point, it is important to note that another of Kies' mentors, Henry C. Adams (1851-1921), professor of economics at the University of Michigan, may have been an important influence on her. Adams does not seem to have been an associate of Harris, and he did not lecture at the Concord School. But Adams was an influential figure in other circles in his day, publishing a number of works on political theory and economics and later in life serving as statistician and economist to the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (1904-09). He had held a dual appointment at Michigan and Cornell from 1880-81 to 1886-87, teaching alternate semesters at each school when he was ousted from Cornell because his advocacy of the labor movement made its administrators uneasy. In the particular instance that disturbed Cornell administrators, a labor group grew violent during a strike that Adams had supported whole-heartedly in a previously published address. Adams seems to have been labelled a socialist and was promptly dismissed from Cornell, despite the University's claims to the contrary. The issue and Cornell's reaction to it were so touchy that the University of Michigan's president, James B. Angell, was fearful of keeping Adams on his staff at all, let alone giving him a full-time appointment. It was only after a long letter from Adams in which he made a plea for academic freedom -- along with a partial retraction of his pro-labor article -- that Angell took the chance of keeping him at Michigan [6] where he remained to the end of his career.
Since the uproar over Adams' purported socialism took place in 1886-87, the year just prior to Kies' first year of attendance at the University of Michigan, it is likely that she was aware of his political views before becoming one of his students. And we may safely assume that Kies was at least a progressive and perhaps had socialist leanings herself. She was in fact referred to as a proponent of "Christian Socialism," the "prevalence [of which] on earth she earnestly looked and ever prayed [for]." [7] In any case, the "attitude" she hoped society would encourage individuals to take, along with the following distinction she makes between the two "classes" of laws and their application, both point to Kies' socialist sympathies -- albeit, a qualified socialism.
Kies calls the first set of laws "protective," and she recognizes that they guard freedom in the negative sense. That is, protective legislation ensures non-interference by other individuals and/or by the state in the pursuit of individual happiness. But there is also a class of "constructive" laws which are not only protective in the negative sense, but are "also positively helpful to one or more classes of society." These laws go beyond preventing one individual or group from harming another, but assert state power to promote the goals of members of a particular class, individually or collectively. [EP45-46] This distinction by itself is neither new, nor particularly significant; the distinction between positive and negative laws was made well before Kies' time and has continued to be a helpful political philosophical tool since. But since Kies gives these terms a different meaning than the words themselves imply, it will be helpful to quote one of her own even more clear definitions of them:
Laws that specify punishment for infringement of rights of possession and transfer are protective laws, and illustrate justice only, but laws specifying and regulating the kinds of tenure and the changes therein are constructive and indicate the advance of social unity [i.e., grace]. [EP52]
The way in which Kies uses this distinction to advance her theory as a whole is our point of interest here.
Protective vs. Constructive Legislation
Kies' protective legislation parallels Hegel's "abstract right." [8] Such legislation provides only the thinnest layer of security from outside interference for each individual as an equal among equals. It does nothing to nurture individual human potential nor the growth of an entire class of people. Examples of protective legislation include laws against trespass, theft, and assault as well as those requiring payment of taxes. In the first case, individuals are prohibited from harming each other, thus advancing self-interest in the Hobbesian sense: Each individual, in being guarded against the too-aggressive actions of another, is able to pursue his/her own egoistic goals. In the second, each person is required to fulfill his or her obligation to the government; a promotion of self-interest in the utilitarian sense: The sacrifice of a relatively small amount by each results in a wealth of resources for the whole, allowing the whole (the state) to continue to provide a veil of protection for each individual. Protective legislation not only supports but promotes the pursuit of self-interest, and therefore is based on the principle of justice, in Kies' view.
The second set of protective laws might be thought to be a constructive provision in that by paying taxes each individual is contributing to the betterment of all. These protective laws correspond to Hegel's "police" power, or more accurately, public authority. [9] And in some sense, these public provisions for the good of the community might be seen as akin to the constructive laws Kies is advocating. Yet in her system, the level of self-sacrifice that public authorities demand, such as tax contributions and obedience to laws for public order, is not the same as that which is mandated by constructive laws. Constructive laws are more pro-active than this. Examples of such laws are those that establish a progressive income tax and those that prohibit monopolies.[EP52] In contrast to merely being required to pay taxes, and thus each contributing to the betterment of the whole on a minimal level, a progressive income tax recognizes economic inequities in society and places the burden of contributing to the financial well-being of the state on the wealthy. It actually requires that a certain level of altruism be enforced so that the state can "provide to a reasonable extent for the needs of its poor and unfortunate classes." [EP65] And Kies' rationale is prototypically Hegelian: society is an organic unity, and suffering by any of its members harms society as an entity. Similarly, in Kies' view the existence of monopolies is to be curbed by constructive legislation. Yet, she doesn't go into the details of how these constructive laws are to be enacted. This may be due to the fact that at the time she was writing, the labor and anti-trust movements were beginning to gain force, and she assumed knowledge on the part of her readers. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad strike of 1877 initiated a series of labor strikes, culminating with the Pullman strikes in 1896. Similarly, the outcry against trusts and monopolies had gained strength in this country at this time, and was being debated as the Sherman Bill in Congress during the 1889-90 session, the year before Kies wrote this book. Kies' readers would certainly have been familiar with the social unrest she was referring to, even if they did not agree with her assessment of the situation:
the excessive greed and monopolies in ownership of the present time can be successfully replaced by a system more nearly justice to all only by changing the thought of the nation on this question.[EP52]
Once public opinion had been changed, "just and lasting laws" would follow, and society would have attained "the higher plane of thought"[EP52] in which the principle of grace will have primacy.
Altruism, Civil Society, and State Action
For Kies grace functions on two levels. In one sense it is an ideal to be aspired to in private life. We are all better people, in Kies' view, when we keep the needs of others primary and relinquish our own selfish interests. By putting others first, we receive "reflected good." Although Kies doesn't define this term, it seems safe to assume that "reflected good" is a sort of vicarious pleasure, the benefit of seeing our own altruistic act result in someone else's joy or success. But as is clear from her rather strong statements about the nature of constructive laws, it is equally obvious that for Kies grace is necessary as a public ethic as well. In fact, she cites several examples beyond those given above in which government can -- even must -- enact altruistic policies. In the railroad industry, sanitation policy, education and labor law, and penal reform, government has been called upon to enact not merely protective, but constructive legislation. And state leaders' willingness to do so
indicates that the intimate connection and relation of all members of society is more clearly understood than in preceding centuries; it [also] indicates that the public has an interest in classes in society that are suffering injustice for others, and in those who are weak, poor, and unfortunate. [EP73]
As was common for thinkers in her era, it is clear from this statement that Kies believed that societal development is progressive, that her era was more advanced than those previous, and that (hopefully) following eras would advance even further. She also asserts that constructive legislation demonstrates an advancement in society's "ethical education" and that ultimately coercion will become unnecessary as a means to realizing the principle of grace in the world.[EP73]
Furthermore, Kies quite consciously limits her discussion to the "so-called field of competitive industrial activity,"[EP97] precisely because it is usually considered the domain of self-interest. Regarding the extent to which Kies remains true to Hegel's thought, this is an especially important point. After all, in The Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes it clear that civil society was indeed characterized by individualism and self-interest, recast as a system of needs. [10] And in The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel indicates that a formal and abstract "virtue" that tries to subvert individuality within civil society is bound to fail, even to contradict itself, because it is the very nature of individuality to assert itself in this realm. [11] Are we to conclude then that Kies was an under-educated Hegelian, unaware of the more nuanced points of his argument? This is highly unlikely. Kies went to study in Europe the year after publishing this book. During her year there, she studied in Leipzig, which suggests that she was proficient enough in German to have already been able to read Hegel herself by this time. In addition, George S. Morris, had published a book that outlines The Philosophy of Right thoroughly. In fact, Morris' biggest fault in Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History is that he was so true to Hegel that he virtually paraphrased him. So Kies was well-acquainted with Hegel's argument in its entirety, whether she read it herself or read Morris' faithful account of it.
The only notable exception in Morris' work is Hegel's gender dichotomy in which he claims that men's nature is external and objective and that they are realized in civil society while women's nature is internal and subjective, and they attain realization within the home. This is an idea that Morris neglected even to mention in his account of Hegel. Such a crucial omission gives us an important clue to the approach of Harris and his associates to certain elements of Hegel's thought. As Brackett's explicit rejection of Rosenkranz's similar claim that girls needn't be given a thorough physical education also suggests, America's early Hegelians seem simply to have dismissed such ideas as remnants of outdated ideas and either amended or excised them altogether.
Key concepts in Hegel's understanding of civil society remained intact in Morris' rendition of his theory of the state. Morris clearly outlined and explained Hegel's system of needs and of the estates. He also remained loyal to Hegel's view of civil society as the realm of individuation generally speaking. [12] And as a student of Morris at the University of Michigan, Kies undoubtedly would have been familiar with this book. So whence Kies' reformulation of the nature of industrial relations, which is a segment of civil society? First of all, Kies is interested in taking seriously Hegel's idea that society is an organic whole. Second, she takes even more seriously his understanding that the state unifies all members of society, and at all levels, reinforcing the "wholeness" of this organic whole. Third, she introduces altruism as a possible cure for a social ill that was also of great concern to Hegel: the potentially devastating effects that industrialization can have on the poor. Or as one translator from this period rendered it, Hegel was concerned about the "untrammeled activity" of civic society. [13]
Hegel recognized that contingent factors are often the cause of poverty, and this condition leaves them "with the needs of civil society . . . [which] at the same time [has] taken from them the natural means of acquisition." [14] Yet Hegel was perplexed about how exactly a "rabble" is to be dealt with, should such a class arise. He noted that private charity alone could not adequately make provisions for the poor, but is supplemented with a system of public assistance. [15] At the same time, however, if a system for public welfare becomes too effective, and the poor were to be sustained at an acceptable standard of living, they "would be ensured [a livelihood] without the mediation of work [which] would be contrary to the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual members." [16]
The only ways out of this tangle that Hegel can see are either to "leave the poor to their fate" and force them into public begging, as was the practice in England in Hegel's day, or to expand the domestic economy by means of foreign trade and colonialism. [17] With the first option, begging provides "the most direct means of dealing with poverty, and particularly with the renunciation of shame and honour"; with the second, "the pursuit of gain" motivates individuals to overcome the obstacles presented by traversing both land and sea. [18]
In considering Kies' discussion of industry then, it might help to take literally the title of Adams' book, The Relation of the State to Industrial Action which she cites at points throughout both works on "the ethical principle" and look at Kies as one who is assessing the ways in which the state and industry interact -- particularly as this affects the working classes. Taking this title literally provides the key, I believe, to Kies' justice/grace system. She is proposing guidelines for government intervention into civil society -- a proposal that Hegel fell short of making. The latter may indeed be the realm of free competition among individuals, but the former is a unity into which all else is subsumed. Therefore, when competition harms one or more of civil society's members, "the state should provide to a reasonable extent for the needs of its poor and unfortunate classes." [EP65] According to Kies' theory of altruism, as the manifestation of reason in the ethical world the state must by its nature rectify the situation. For certain spontaneous, competitive forces within civil society to damage and possibly even to destroy the organism as a whole would be irrational, after all. Looked at this way then, Kies is taking Hegel's acknowledgement of the problem of the welfare of the poor one step further. She is playing out what it means for the state to be rational in regard to the industrial powers that dominated in her day; and this is to enforce altruism. A quote from Kies herself supports my interpretation:
The voice of the organic whole, speaking through representatives who see the needs and correct relations of the different individual groups, demands that one class in society who will not voluntarily give up privileges which their position in society enables them to get, must be compelled to act as if they saw the good of others and the true interests of all classes. [EP79]
At the same time, Kies also recognizes that there are legitimate limits to state action. Kies declares that "in many relations of society, assistance from the state other than protective laws is unnecessary, [and] when equilibrium can be preserved without it, [state action] only corrupts and destroys the individuality of the assisted class." [EP95-96] Based on this statement, then, it is clear that Kies does agree with Hegel's understanding of civil society operating spontaneously as the realm of individualism. When a corporate body, such as the cotton or woolen industry, amasses so much power as to obliterate the autonomy of those beholden to it -- whether for goods, services, or employment -- then the state must intervene, check the industry's power, and provide safeguards against it on behalf of weaker forces. At the same time, the state must not completely orchestrate relations between entities in society. Since "the will of man is essentially freedom," state power should not infringe upon that freedom. In fact, in Kies' view when the state
take[s] away from any individual or class rights that are inherent in the personality of man, just then the state begins a process of the destruction of its members, and so begins a process of [its own] dissolution and death. [EP91]
Again, the state, as reason made manifest must act in a rational manner. It would be as irrational for the state to overstep its bounds and thereby undermine individual freedom as it would to fail to act and allow individual freedom to be annihilated.
It is significant that Kies is committed to altruistic action by the state. She rejects outright the common conservative suggestion that natural altruistic impulse will become manifest as private charitable organizations and that this can adequately address the ills of society. The problem with "spontaneous private charity," Kies insists, is that it is not "definite and systematized." [EP65-66] Therefore, it won't ensure that the weaker members of society are provided for. Instead altruism is to be promoted through the enactment of rational laws:
Since the true aim of a nation is . . . to secure a harmonious development of all its members, any legislation which wilfully violates or ignores the rights of any class or group of producers, or forgets to secure the good of an oppressed class, cannot in the long run prove to be correct legislation. [EP86]
"Correct legislation" by a rational state requires exactly the kind of monitoring described above. It must ensure that one force does not acquire so much power that it undermines the free development of individuals. In this way the state protects the natural and continuous development of the whole. At the same time, the state mustn't overreact to what are simply the normal workings of society by restricting freedoms of any one individual (even when that individual is a corporation) or group. The state must pass just, rational laws that will avoid both extremes. But in Kies' view, time has shown that the "laws that time has proved to be most beneficial to society have place[d] the good of society before private immediate good to the individual." [EP91] Therefore, in her view it is better to err on the side of grace rather than of justice.
In actual practice, however, justice and grace complement each other rather than compete. In fact, there are three ways to approach industrial relations: 1) from the point of view of self-interest (justice); 2) from the point of view of altruism (grace); or 3) from the point of view of economy and environment (pragmatism). [EP103] Kies goes through a number of examples of how a decision-maker would address real-life problems, depending on the perspective he or she takes. In all cases, the "economic man" would act according to self-interest, the "ethical man" would base his decision on altruism, and the "practical man" would do his best to strike a balance between egoistic/economic interests and altruistic considerations. The commentary Kies laces within this extensive list of examples demonstrates that her own position is more moderate than much of her earlier discussion has suggested. For instance, she points out that, given a chance to purchase a large tract of farm land, the standard altruistic approach might in fact not be the best route to take. Certainly it isn't ethical for the "economic man" to buy up all he can in order to exploit them as "bonanza farms." [EP110] Yet neither is it as noble as it might seem for the "ethical man" who "realizes that it is necessary . . . that an opportunity be given for [individuals] . . . to exercise [their] own energy upon [their] own material environment" to sell the land in small parcels at reasonable prices or to lease it long-term for co-operative farming. More beneficial overall is the "practical man's" decision to aim for the mean between these two extremes in Kies' view. He realizes that it would be a waste of capital and of resources to divide the land up among several owners. This is because he understands that a large farm is more efficient and will yield more opportunities for labor for working people. A "concentration of means is necessary" in this case, so the "practical man" would carry on large-scale farming, but would hire workers at reasonable wages and carry on business dealings in an ethical manner. [EP110-113]
Kies uses this dialectic of ethics to firmly establish her point: "the ethical principle" -- i.e., grace or altruism -- is in fact operative, even in business and industry. Furthermore, altruism needn't have harmful effects, but can support enhanced productivity in many instances. Finally, altruism may even come to be relied on more fully in the future. In the closing paragraph of The Ethical Principle, Kies rhetorically asks whether it is not true that
the 'economic man' of Mill's conception has become the 'practical man' of present writers through the recognition of the fact that men in business relations are moved by motives other than that of self-interest . . . and the 'practical man' of future generations will . . . resemble the ethical man of the present. [EP131] [19]
Conclusion
Kies made an important contribution to the American philosophical canon on a number of levels. She made Hegel's theory concrete and applied it to some very important social and political questions of her day. The problem of individual rights to autonomy versus community priorities and interests had become an increasingly perplexing problem, given the growth of industry. In this context, emphasis on individual freedom could be used to advance the interests of the large-scale business tycoon as well as the factory worker. The problem was that the command over resources which the business tycoon could amass rendered the individual achievements of any given individual negligible. By putting forth her theory of altruism, whereby state action to curb industrial growth was justified, Kies aided in Harris' mission to "make Hegel talk English," in an area that none of her women Hegelian contemporaries did.
But Kies' theory of "justice" and "grace" is valuable for contemporary discourse as well. First, it is an important addition to the body of writings in political philosophy that deal seriously with the intersection between individual and community rights and interests. Others have discussed and will continue to discuss this issue, but Kies' appropriation of Hegel toward the end of solving this problem provides valuable insights that can help inform other theories. Second, Kies helps to inform feminist theory as well. In the last two decades, feminist thinkers have made serious and substantive critiques of traditional political and moral theory, charging it with gender bias. Another model of political and ethical action is needed in order to include women in the dialogue, these feminists have claimed. What we find in Kies is precisely this sort of model. She rejects a political theory in which justice consists merely of a thin veil of protection against aggression in a world of relative equals. Yet she does not completely dismiss the tried and somewhat true theories of old in which, Aristotle-like, the state's purpose is to facilitate the growth of its members, both individually and as a body. In this way, Kies addresses many concerns of feminists today. Her theory of altruism is not the only one in the political philosophical canon, of course, but it is one that succeeds in bridging many gaps, and for this reason alone, it deserves critical attention
[1] See especially Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, ed., Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
[2] Kies does not provide citations here, nor even the names of theorists with this perspective, but simply assumes that her readers will be familiar with this point of view.
[3] This stands in contrast to contemporary feminists whose theories have asserted that gender difference is at the root of moral or ethical decision-making. It is ironic that, without so much as hinting at gender difference, Kies has spontaneously arrived at the type of moral theory Carol Gilligan suggested might evolve if different (i.e., women's) voices were allowed into the moral/political dialogue.
[4] See especially Kies, [IE12-13] in which she calls up ideas of organic unity, self-consciousness and distinctions between Western and Oriental thought, derived from both the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right.
[5] Kies gives the examples of women's higher education and slavery here.
[6] See "Introductory Essay," in Relation of the State to Industrial Action and Economics and Jurisprudence: Two Essays by Henry Carter Adams, James Dorfman, ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 37-42, citing a March 15, 1887 letter from Adams to Angell.
[7] Mathews, Memoriam, 25.
[8] See Philosophy of Right, §§34-40.
[9] See Philosophy of Right, §§235-237.
[10] See especially Philosophy of Right, §187-188, and §184, Addition.
[11] See Phenomenology of Spirit, §389 and §392.
[12] See Philosophy of Right, §§189-208 regarding the system of needs and role of the estates, and §§182-187 regarding civil society as the realm in which a person becomes individuated.
[13] See S.W. Dyde's translation of The Philosophy of Right §243, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), 231. Other quotations are from the H.B. Nisbet translation, Allen W. Wood, editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
[14] Philosophy of Right, §241.
[15] Philosophy of Right, §242, including Note.
[16] Philosophy of Right, §245.
[17] Philosophy of Right, §246-248.
[18] Philosophy of Right, §245 regarding coerced public begging; §247 regarding foreign trade.
[19] As noted of Bibb earlier, members of the St. Louis and Concord circles were well-read and thus were influenced by others than Hegel. This reference to Mill is an example of this fact, not an indication that Mill was a central figure in Kies theory. In fact, other than this reference, Mill is not mentioned.